CRITICAL REVIEW

VOLUME 4 NUMBER 3 $5.95

LIBERALISM AND RELATIVISM

ROOTS OF INDIVIDUALISM
J.G. Merquior on Louis Dumont

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Ryszard Legutko on libertarian nihilism

IN PURSUIT OF WHIZDOM
Aletheia Jackson on Robert Nozick

HYPOCRISY AND CAPITALISM
Laurence Dickey on Bernard Mandeville

AN ALTERNATIVE TO POST-LIBERALISM
Struan Jacobs on John Gray

THE DARK SIDE OF REASON
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Ian Shapiro on J.G.A. Pocock

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Tibor R. Machan, Chris Sciabarra

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Subscriptions, back issue orders and customer service inquiries should be sent to: Dave Brooks, Circulation Manager, Center for Independent Thought, 942 Howard Street, Room 109, San Francisco, CA 94103, USA. Phone (415) 465-4985, fax (415) 541-0597.

INDIVIDUAL SUBSCRIPTIONS:

$24 one year (4 issues), $43 two years (8 issues) within the U.S.
$35 one year, $59 two years outside the U.S. via surface mail
$50 one year, $89 two years outside the U.S. via air mail

INSTITUTIONAL/LIBRARY SUBSCRIPTIONS:

$49 per year within the U.S.
$55 per year outside the U.S. via surface mail
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CRITICAL REVIEW, An Interdisciplinary Journal, ISSN 0891-3811, CODEN CTRVE3, is published quarterly by the Center for Independent Thought. Indexed and abstracted in the *International Bibliography of the Social Sciences, International Political Science Abstracts, The Left Index, The Philosopher's Index, Political Science Abstracts, Public Affairs Information Service (PAIS) Bulletin, Sage Human Resources Abstracts, Sage Public Administration Abstracts, Sociological Abstracts,* and *United States Political Science Documents.*

Printed on acid-free paper.

Bookstore/newsstand distributor: B. DeBoer, Inc., 113 E. Centre Street, Nutley, NJ 07110. Phone (201) 667-9300, fax (201) 667-0086.

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CONTENTS

Volume 4 Number 3 SUMMER 1990

Essays and Review Essays

301 For the Sake of the Whole — J.G. MERQUIOR
Essays on Individualism
by Louis Dumont

327 Society as a Department Store — RYSZARD LEGUTKO

345 For the Love of Whizdom — ALETHEIA JACKSON
The Examined Life
by Robert Nozick

365 Post-Liberalism vs. Temperate Liberalism — STRUAN JACOBS

377 The Dark Side of Reason — JAMES D. MCCAWLEY
Farewell to Reason
by Paul Feyerabend

Research

387 Pride, Hypocrisy & Civility in Mandeville's Social and Historical Theory — LAURENCE DICKEY

433 J.G.A. Pocock's Republicanism & Political Theory: A Critique & Reinterpretation — IAN SHAPIRO

Correspondence

473 "From Aristotle to Marx" — TIBOR R. MACHAN, CHRIS SCIABARRA

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J.G. Merquior

FOR THE SAKE OF THE WHOLE

Louis Dumont is a distinguished Indianist but his later work has undertaken to ground an allegedly general need for holism and hierarchy in comparative historical sociology. Dumont's anti-individualist thrust, depicting as it does modern Western culture as an aberration, a kind of social disease inviting in the long run an even worse cure—the nemesis of totalitarianism—enjoyed in the 80s the status of a modern classic of sociological wisdom. Even those who, like the new humanist thinkers in France (Luc Ferry, Alain Renaut, Tzvetan Todorov) fight the influential antimodern stances of Heidegger or Leo Strauss, have come to share Dumont's strictures against individualism. This paper describes the main theses of Dumont's latest book, translated into English as Essays on Individualism, *while at the same time sketching a liberal critique of his anti-individualist bias.*

The Prince of Talleyrand relished carving up the meat he offered his guests. Yet as a flower of *ancien régime* culture Talleyrand kept a strong sense of etiquette and hierarchy in addressing them. Thus he would successively ask: "Would Your Highness do me the honor of accepting this humble *rôti*?" Then, "Monsieur le Comte, would you care for a slice of *rôti*?" Finally turning to some junior member of the party, he would merely ask: "*Rôti?*"

Louis Dumont's oeuvre is meant as a sociological defense and illustration of hierarchy. Naturally, as a social scientist Dumont is well aware of the irrevocable end of *ancien régime* ranking in modern society—a society whose cardinal priniciple is individualist egalitarianism. Yet he sounds

CRITICAL REVIEW, Summer 1990. ISSN 0891-3811. © 1990 Center for Independent Thought.

J.G. Merquior, 22, av. Foch, 75016 Paris, is most recently the author of *From Prague to Paris: A Critique of Structuralist and Post-Structuralist Thought* (Verso, 1986), *Western Marxism* (Paladin, 1986) and *Foucault* (University of California, 1985).

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deadly earnest about the *value*, if not the persistence, of hierarchy – far less playful, in any case, than Talleyrand's tongue-in-cheek observance of social rites he knew to have been undermined by the impact of the French Revolution, in and outside France. In this review I shall attempt briefly to do two things. First, to describe the main contents of Dumont's latest book; and second, to sketch an appraisal of his peculiar way of looking at a phenomenon – individualism – which, we cannot but agree with him, lies at the heart of modern society, regardless of our likes or dislikes.

Essays on Individualism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986) is the enlarged edition in English of Dumont's recent research on modern ideology, first published in French in 1983. The research began, as far as book-length publication goes, with *From Mandeville to Marx* (1977), a volume on "the genesis and triumph of economic ideology." Dumont's starting point is that modern individualism, when compared to the culture of other great civilizations, "is an exceptional phenomenon." But while there is general acknowledgement of its idiosyncratic nature, "there is by no means agreement on its origins"(23). Dumont's avowed aim is to contribute to the genealogy of individualism by considering "only configurations of ideas and values" (24).

The collection of essays under review covers a wide historical range. For Dumont, Western individualism as a central ideological tenet was born of Christianity. No great discovery, one might say: many scholars, old and new, have pointed it out. Renan, for one, held that belief in the infinite value of the soul as "le devenir individuel" was the heart and the chief legacy of Christianity, together with charity and the spirit of brotherhood. However, Dumont is far more specific than this. Not just its stress on the soul, but the this-worldliness of individualism makes the difference. As a noted Indianist, he detects individualist traits in the Hindu renouncer ethos – only to contrast it with developments in late ancient Christianity, when religious individuality began to turn to the world.

Before the age of St. Augustine there were several surges of individualism, pagan as well as Christian, philosophical as well as religious. Nietzsche called Buddhism "the religion of *self*-redemption."[1] Taoist meditation discloses to man what he is, what he can remain if civilization (*jen*) does not cancel the *tao*, his own uncontaminated essence (*sing*). (For Confucianism solitude is basically a negative state, the lot of the bad man; but in Taoism meditation is a strictly solitary affair, so solitude cannot, a priori, be bad.) Or again, to return to Dumont's own sampling, while both Plato and Aristotle still regarded self-sufficiency as an attribute of the polis, the ethical sects of Epicureans, Cynics and Stoics posited it as an *individual* quality or goal (27). By asserting the moral depth of the soul,

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early Christianity enhanced religious individualism, but it also combined it with chiliasm and otherworldliness. Then the greatest of the Latin Fathers, Augustine, played down collectivist millenarianism and nurtured the dialectical drive towards action in the world for the sake of heavenly values. Unlike natural law, that Stoic belief, Augustine assumed "an increased distance between nature and man" as well as "a tendency to isolate . . . a world of men considered essentially as individuals" (43), while at the same time showing a new confidence in the historical potential of the Christian kerygma. So close to the fall of Rome, Augustine displayed—against the quietism of the Donatists—a remarkably optimistic faith in the City of God. As a result, he energized transcendent values, endowing them with a tensional, this-worldly (in Dumont's usage, "inworldly") thrust.

But Dumont is also much impressed by another development: the growth of theocratic leanings in medieval Christendom. Already Augustine had replaced endorsement of sacral kingship—an archaic institution—with the preaching of the utter submission of state to church, of the paltry *civitas terrena* to the glorious *civitas dei*. This augured Gregory the Great's "Let the terrestrial kingdom serve" (sixth century). Now while a pope like Gelasius (c. 500) had been keen on a hierarchical but strict *separation* between priestly authority and royal power, in the age of Charlemagne the pontiffs came to act as successors to the Roman emperors, legitimizing the *translatio imperii* from ancient Rome to the Carolingian dynasty.

Dumont's contention, made clear in his great work on the caste system, *Homo Hierarchicus* (1966), is that true hierarchy means subordination, but *means also the subordination of power to a higher value* (e.g., purity in India). Accordingly, he sees the Carolingian papal monarchy as something definitely inferior to Gelasius's beautifully differentiated order, with its divine authority *encompassing* instead of coercing earthly power. Yet he is also prepared to discern a new "coherence" in the post-Gelasian position of the medieval papacy. Dumont's analysis (50–2) is terribly compressed, but the general drift is clear. He regards the evolution of Christian thought on social authority from Gelasius to the onset of feudalism as a reversal of the sacral kingship pattern. Once the popes began to see themselves not only as Christ's vicars but equally as the Roman emperors' heirs, a model of *kingly priesthood* took hold. Severing their ties with Byzantium, the popes invested themselves with supreme temporal authority in the West. "The Church now pretends to rule, directly or indirectly, the world, which means that the Christian individual is now committed to the world to an unprecedented degree" (52).

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As one can see, Professor Dumont doesn't bother too much about specifications. It's easy to imagine experts quibbling over a point or two. For instance, what about the next big trend in the history of the Church—the crucial Age of Reform in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, from the rise of Cluny to the Cistercian movement? No doubt it was an epoch-making instance of perestroika in the Church; yet at a deep ideological level it meant a move *away* from this-worldly "kingly priesthood," an ecclesiastic introspection, as it were (not for nothing conducted by monasticism) which worked as a strategy of, in Toynbee's terms, "withdrawal and return" before the vigorous but ultimately fateful entanglement of the Church in worldly affairs stretching from Innocent III Segni (c. 1200) to the Renaissance popes—the target of Luther. Historians of the Church seldom fail to notice that St. Bernard, the famous abbot of Clairvaux from 1118, was an outspoken critic of the theocratic claims of Gregory VII Hildebrand.[2] That the mystic Bernard—the preacher of the Crusades which were "the foreign policy of the reformed church"—could be so "indirectly inworldly" while so at odds with the ideological formula stressed by Dumont seems to prove that many more were the paths leading to the Rome of the individualist boom. Moreover, the hierocratic ambitions of Hildebrand were far from defining the thought of the Church, even at the Curia. Innocent III, the lawyer-pope who is generally reckoned the summit of papal sovereignty, went no further than the Carolingian assertion of an overarching authority over the Empire. In other areas he just stayed within the limits of feudal custom: thus in Sicily the pope saw himself as an overlord, but certainly not as a universal monarch with boundless temporal powers stemming from his position as head of the Church.

Naturally enough, Dumont sees the Protestant Reformation as a watershed in the final shift from otherworldliness to the "individual-in-the-world." By getting rid of Church mediation, Luther put the individual soul directly in touch with God. As for Calvin, less prone to mystic feelings, his God was the quintessential Will, and therefore "the affirmation by proxy of man himself as will" (54). The Calvinist elect bows completely to God's decree; yet he also exhalts himself, however unconsciously, as God's instrument for changing the world. In that sense, the Puritans became the epitome of this-worldly individualism. Dumont closes his first chapter by stating that in Calvin's theocratic vision the Church, for all its primacy over the state, was "dissolved as a holistic institution" (59). Max Weber would agree.

The Protestant dissolution of the Church was no mean achievement. For the Church had long been busy trying to subordinate both the state

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and the individual. Not only did the Holy See assert its own imperial authority over the Empire; the Church also gradually took charge—by the regulation of sacraments—of personal piety.[3] Against all this came the Reformers, who rejected the Church both as central authority and as source of salvation. While in thought if not always in deed, Catholic imperialism had "unified the field" of Christian values in terms of this-worldly action motivated by transcendent values, the Reformation destroyed this holistic framework and churned up a new kind of *homo religiosus*—the strenuous inworldly saint, an athlete of asceticism. Still, as Dumont writes, "The Reformation picks the fruit matured in the Church's lap" (59).

Dumont's second essay focuses on "the political category" from the thirteenth century onward. Under the spell of F.N. Figgis, he depicts the medieval Church as an all-embracing institution, an organizer of diversity into firm hierarchy. And like Figgis's main theoretical source, Otto von Gierke, he draws a sharp contrast between *universitas*, or corporate unity, and *societas*, the partnership whose members remain distinct and indepedent. Obviously the medieval Church, unlike the modern state, was a *universitas*, not a *societas*. This is grist for Dumont's mill, for it betrays the strong holistic nature of medieval, i.e., premodern civilization. Modern individualism, nevertheless, had more than one medieval forerunner, and Dumont doesn't forget to mention the best-known among them: William of Ockham, who in the early fourteenth century went so far in his anti-papal pamphleteering as to deny that there was anything like a "Franciscan order"—there were just Franciscan monks like himself, scattered throughout Christendom.

Western Individualism in Political Thought

Dumont devotes the rest of chapter two to political thought from Hobbes to Rousseau and the aftermath of the French Revolution. He strives to show a constant predicament, which is "the recognition of the difficulty to combine individualism with authority" (78)—admittedly no small matter when it comes to *political* thought. One can feel Dumont gloating over the fact that Hobbes, for all his contractarian conception of the state in a mechanistic way, as emphatically a *societas*, ends up by granting that the proper life of man, over and above the beastly condition of the war of all against all, is "closely dependent upon the state" (84). Still, the Hobbesian Leviathan cannot be deemed holist because it evinces no hierarchic ordering of the social body and, unlike the Church, is not oriented toward

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any transcendent end. The same pattern occurs in Dumont's interpretation of Rousseau. Buying C.E. Vaughan's picture of the *Social Contract* as anti-individualistic, Dumont aligns himself with those who think that the political Rousseau started from individualist premises only to reach holist conclusions—beginning with Locke and ending with Plato's *Republic*, as Ernest Barker famously put it. Postrevolutionary thinking was to be more straightforward. It tried hard to renew the holist approach, insisting on the social nature of man and reconceptualizing the state as a corporate unity. In the process, two new perspectives arose: sociology and socialism, both the brainchildren of the Saint-Simonian school. But Dumont does not value them equally. To him, while sociology matured as the disciplined awareness of social wholes, socialism boils down to a truncated holism, since it extols collectivism yet eschews hierarchy (103).

Chapter three of *Essays on Individualism* is a reminder of Dumont's *From Mandeville to Marx*. For "in the genealogy of modern concepts, politics is followed by economics. Just as religion gave birth to politics, politics was to give birth to economics" (104). Here Dumont's key distinction is his claim that while in traditional societies relations between people are more important than relations between people and things, in modern society it is the other way round. In addition, he discerns two types of wealth—estates and money—with landed wealth traditionally valued higher because it entailed rights over *people*, not just over land. With these two *distinguos*, Dumont attempts to enlarge on Karl Polanyi's celebrated thesis of the social "embeddedness" of the economy in traditional societies.

For Dumont, modern "economic ideology" overlooks the fact that the institutional autonomy of the economic sphere—most conspicuous in the Victorian "market society"—is a historical aberration, the norm being the prevalence of person/person relations, the protection of land against money and more generally, the subordination of the economy to the social whole. Siding with the *Gemeinschaft* socialist Polanyi, Dumont cold-shoulders Marx. In his view, Marx was less a true sociologist of the economy than a mere sociological economist, having fallen prey, to a large extent, to the liberal assumptions of economic ideology—especially its individualist, non-hierarchical assumptions. The *Essays* do not alter this judgment. If Hegel is blamed (100–1) for overrating conscious action and for positing holism in exclusively political terms (the state-worship Marx demystified), Marx is chastised for his mix of individualist presuppositions, economistic shortcomings and artificialist hubris—just as is the case in part two of *From Mandeville to Marx*—a book, by the way, whose original (French) title, *Homo aequalis*, stresses the enmity of the economic

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ideology, the liberal-Marxist thought of modernity, towards hierarchy, the sound principle of holist normality.[4]

Sociology vs. Individualism

But the Hobbes-to-Marx (or Ockham-to-Marx) line of modern ideology is a Western arch with a variant: German social theory. Dumont devotes two chapters to it (chs. 4 and 5), discussing Herder, Fichte, Hegel and Troeltsch. Herder is his hero, because he fathered the anthropological, i.e., *pluralist* concept of culture.[5] Fully acknowledging the social nature of man, he recovered the holist approach to society. But unlike the spontaneous holism of traditional societies, Herder's version recognized all cultures *as equals*. This enables Dumont to speak of a Herderian transfer of individualism to the level of social wholes (cultures), and thereby of a merger of holism with individualism (116).

Similarly Fichte, a fierce egalitarian, discarded subordination in society, yet devised a metaphysics where wholes encompass parts which are their dialectical opposites (the I comprehending the non-I). This is precisely the gist of Dumont's favorite conceptual figure: the hierarchic diarchy which he found in Gelasius's two-tier notion of papal authority encompassing temporal power. Finally, in our own century, Troeltsch (examined in chapter 5) provided a firm last echo of the German ideology. For Troeltsch characterized the German idea of liberty as "state socialism and culture individualism." *Bildung* within authoritarianism—such was the ideal unabashedly proffered by Troeltsch, liberal theologian but German patriot, as a very Teutonic reply to Western liberalism at war.

Focusing on the German variant of the modern ideology—a holism of sorts, since it was a holism compromising with individualism—allows Dumont to sketch an elegant parallel between two national cultures. A Frenchman, he contends, thinks he is a man by nature and a Frenchman only by historical accident.[6] By contrast, a German, at least up to the War, would normally see himself as essentially a German, and a man *only through his being a German* (130–1). Again, while Frenchmen saw nations as collections of individuals, Germans saw them as collective individuals; and where Frenchmen would juxtapose nations as equal samples of mankind, Germans would rather *rank* them. Underlying all this we find Dumont's beloved pair of dichotomies: holism versus individualism, hierarchy versus egalitarianism. Yet it also seems that the Frenchman Louis Dumont had to Germanize his mind in order to accomodate his own position. Here, of course, he is in rather good company—for in terms

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of sociological ancestry, who was more holist than the Frenchman Durkheim, and who more individualist than the German Weber (221)?

As an epilogue to his selective gallery of modern thought Dumont chooses to dissect the conceptual world of "the totalitarian disease." He had already broached the subject in *Homo aequalis*. Karl Polanyi saw fascism as a teratological reaction against a social pathology—the "abnormal" market society. Similarly, Dumont sees totalitarianism as a contradictory attempt to subordinate the individual to the whole in an individualist society. Totalitarianism is therefore the return of the repressed social—with a vengeance.

Chapter six of the *Essays* applies this theory to Nazism. Hitler's regime is described as far more than the work of a group of fanatics, or Germany gone wild. Following Ernst Nolte, Dumont stresses the Nazi debt to Bolshevism—the totalitarian party. Borrowing from Karl Pribram (1922), he dwells on the nationalist transformation of socialism, away from democracy (France) and economics (England). He might have also enrolled Spengler's *Preussentum und Sozialismus* (1919), where by the way Marx is construed as an "English" thinker, working on essentially liberal-capitalist grounds and proposing a "Phaeacian" proletarian utopia—a blissful social state enjoying effortless affluence, quite the contrary of Prussian discipline. But above all Dumont wants to present *Mein Kampf* as the gospel of a perverse holism, predicated on what is to him an individualist valuation: racialism as a struggle for life (172–3). "Hitler himself was infected with that poison he pretended to be fighting. The individualism implicit in the struggle of all against all dissolved in his mind that which he had wanted to believe in and the Germans had to believe in: the 'community of the people.' It is hence very likely that . . . Hitler projected onto the Jews the individualism that was tearing him apart" (176).

Dumont's project may be summed up as a disquisition on a Weberian theme—the uniqueness of the West—using a Durkheimian concept—ideology as collective representation—to comment on a Tocquevillean problem: the collapse of hierarchy and the rise of egalitarianism cum individualism. His conceptual tools are holism, hierarchy, individualism. The glossary of the *Essays* reads: "We call holist . . . an ideology that valorizes the social whole and neglects or subordinates the human individual; see the opposite: individualism." Ideology is in turn specified as a "social set of representations," a "global ideology" (279).

As for hierarchy, the glossary, insisting on distinguishing it from power, refers to the afterword to *Homo hierarchicus*. There Dumont defined hierarchy as "the encompassing of the contrary," and illustrated the definition with the help of the first book of Genesis. First God creates

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Adam as the sexually undifferentiated man. Then from one of Adam's ribs he extracts a being of a specific gender. The point is that in the process Adam changed identity. From being undifferentiated he became a male. On the other hand Eve is both a member of the human species and the female contrary to Adam, the main representative of that species. The beauty of hierarchy is to Dumont this dialectic of encompassment—the figure of hierarchic diarchy.

In terms of the history of anthropological thought it is almost impossible not to relate this dialectic of set/subset, or whole and part, to the impact of structuralism. Now the second part of the *Essays*, a trio of methodological papers, reflects inter alia on "that part of the heritage of the Durkheim school . . . not adopted by Radcliffe-Brown" (224). A few lines later we read that, more specifically, what has been "set in the foreground" since Radcliffe-Brown is "the fact that man thinks by distinctions and that the oppositions resulting from this fact in a certain way form a system" (225). Either this echoes the Lévi-Straussian revolution in anthropology or I don't know what structuralism is about.[7] Dumont actually quotes Lévi-Strauss in the first methodological essay, an old article on Marcel Mauss; but subsequently, somehow, the strategic place of the master of *The Savage Mind* for the Durkheim-Mauss-Dumont chain is not underscored in *Essays on Individualism*. Instead, Dumont embarks on considerations of the importance of values for anthropological thought. Endorsing Maurice Blondel's dictum that contemporary philosophy theorizes value where modern philosophy tended to theorize knowledge (236), he distances himself from the Humean separation of fact and value and reaches the bizarre conclusion that "a solid and thorough comparison of values is possible only between two systems taken as wholes" (243). In other words, if you care for value-grasping, don't forget to be a holist.

Social Origins of Western Individualism

As Dumont is the first to admit, his task of identifying the individualist theme in Western thought could be extended virtually to infinity. Therefore he can't be blamed for lots of inevitable omissions, especially if the missing individualist trends or patterns are social practices rather than disembodied ideological clusters. For instance, one might think of at least four separate developments, certainly of great moment in the history of Western individualism, which because of their practical nature tend to fall beyond the pale of Dumont's inquiry. They are: the new pattern of

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property and sexuality encouraged by the Church in the age of Gregorian reform; the so-called "discovery of the individual" in Western culture between c.1050 and 1200; the peasant revolution of fourteenth-century England; and the birth of a protomodern concept of natural rights c.1200–1450.

In the age of Gregorian reform, as shown by Jack Goody,[8] the Church came to favor a new pattern of property and sexuality. By insisting on exogamy and fostering celibacy except in case of marriage by mutual consent and by stimulating freedom of testation, the Church helped shape a situation in which landowners actually felt enticed to bequeath their estates to God rather than to their kinsmen. Late marriage, celibacy and in general more freedom from clan-like family ties put people closer to the Church than to kinship. But these developments also did much to enhance more individualistic mores, by creating a social infrastructure bound to undermine, in the long run, the "tribalist" mentality of earlier times.

The "discovery of the individual" has been brilliantly spelled out by Colin Morris.[9] By the twelfth century, thanks to the widespread growth of cities, the rise of primogeniture in France and England, and the advance of learning among the elite, there came into existence a large class of educated men who were neither monks nor warriors, and therefore needed new codes of behavior. Along with them were many young aristocrats, freed from the duty of living in their parents' estates by the relative peacefulness of the Age of the Stone Castle, and at the same time deprived of the right of inheritance by the new rules of primogenitary succession—the very stuff of dowry-searching and Crusade-making. In this more mobile society a concern with self-discovery, an interest in "relating," a focus on the role of the individual as such within society, and an appraisal of people by their inner intentions rather than by their external acts were among the cultural features. While collective eschatologies were fading away, the minds of believers became more fixed on the fate of individuals, as "cosmic expectation" gave way to "personal piety." Contemporary literature betrays a similar movement toward "a more inward and compassionate devotion"; autobiography flourished, and medieval psychology went well beyond Augustine in the probing of motives. The philosophical import of it all was grasped by Abelard: "Although," he wrote, "people say that Socrates and Plato are one in their humanity, how can that be accepted, when it is obvious that all men are different from each other both in matter and in form?"[10]

The effect of the peasant revolution of fourteenth-century England, as dissected by Alan Macfarlane, was that especially after the Black Death

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many English peasants managed to become non-servile toilers and started acting like rational calculators, evincing strikingly individualistic attitudes towards ownership and family. Macfarlane limits himself to writing only of the origins of *English* individualism.[11] But one can take this inquiry as an exploration of one path among others in the history of protomodern (i.e., pre-Reformation) individualism. Another such path, pregnant with possibilities, was the evolution of the concept of rights in order to rebut the Franciscan revival of apostolic poverty. In Rome the concept of *jus* had been not subjective but objective—it did not stress, as does our modern notion, the subjective side of the idea of a *claim* to things or on others. Conversely, *dominium* originally meant total control of one's possessions, but had nothing to do with interpersonal relations. But in the thirteenth century, prompted by the web of feudal relations, the great glossator Accursius redefined *dominium* as any *jus in re:* any right which would be defended against other people and could be alienated by its owner came to be seen as a *property* right. Eventually nominalist thinkers like Gerson of Paris further amplified the concept of right by equating it with the *natural* faculty of liberty. According to Richard Tuck,[12] the leading expert on the history of natural rights, the end result of the resistance to the Franciscan left was the idea that individuals have full rights over their lives and goods, deriving not from civil law or social intercourse but from their very nature as human beings or persons. Thus, well before the rise of *public* natural law theory (a post-Reformation development identified with the contractarian tradition from Grotius and Hobbes to Pufendorf, Locke and Rousseau), a strongly individualistic legal concept was at work in the later Middle Ages—a typical bridge between thought and social practice.

All these trends, in all their historical significance, can be seen as complementary rather than contradictory with Dumont's general picture. But at other points, Dumont has misinterpreted the record even at the level of high intellectual history—the only one Dumont set out to explore. Thus the noted French Hellenist, Jean-Pierre Vernant, contends that the Christian saints of late antiquity (as studied by Peter Brown), while certainly a long way from the citizens of the classical polis, were no world-renouncers similar to the Hindu ones.[13] This undermines stage one in Dumont's story.

Other criticisms can be made of Dumont's portrayal of the modern development of individualistic ideology. One might, for instance, take issue with Dumont's handling of Rousseau. In the *Essays*, as we saw, *The Social Contract* is construed as an anti-individualist treatise. Yet modern Rousseau scholars view the matter otherwise. They readily grant that the

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Rousseauvian *association* was not the same as the Hobbesian *civitas*, if only because Rousseau, like Diderot, learned from a whole climate of opinion to distance himself from mechanistic concepts. By the mid-eighteenth century, scientific thought witnessed a shift from mechanism to vitalism, and the shift was mainly about the emergence of complex creatures, wholes which were more than just sums. Buffon, Maupertuis and the Montpellier medical school stressed that change, in the case of complex entities, implied inner transformation. J. Hope Mason, who highlights this conceptual background, thinks that because of his affinities with vitalist perspectives, Rousseau's *association* entailed something very different from the sheer Hobbesian contrast of multitude and *civitas*; and he finds the root of the difference in the presence in Rousseau, and absence from Hobbes, of a republican vision, an ideal of civic fraternity.[14] Now while all this separates Rousseau from the mechanist, atomist individualisms of early modern contractarianism, does it make him an outright anti-individualist (even starting from individualist premises, as Dumont originally admits)? Mason believes not. He argues, as I have myself elsewhere,[15] that on no account did Rousseau ever countenance the sacrifice of individual freedom for the sake of the social whole. One can only infer that Rousseau, while not a classical jusnaturalist individualist like Hobbes and Locke, remained an individualist all the same—an individualist republican, which is miles away from the holist *malgré lui* of Dumont's interpretation.

Apart from misconstructions in his historical survey, criticism can be directed against Dumont's own assumptions. Alain Renaut hit the nail on the head by questioning Dumont's conflation of individuality and individualism. The former embodies the modern value of *autonomy*, which Renaut blames Dumont for neglecting. Because he confuses autonomy with independence and individuality with individualism, Dumont rejects modern egalitarianism and opts for hierarchy and tradition. Renaut's protest is that the evolution of modernity shows "a conflict between the values of humanism and those of individualism."[16] While deploring individualism as much as Dumont, Renaut retains humanism as an alternative, a modern potential of personal yet non-solipsistic autonomy. His book, *L'ère de l'individu*, sets out to criticize both Heidegger (the death of the subject *diktat*) and Dumont (the hierarchy nostalgia) as figures of the antimodern movement. Renaut's purpose is to save the subject from a monadological fate. He finds in Nietzsche, the main forerunner of the destruction of the subject, the herald of asocial, anti-humanist individualism (not individuality) in contemporary culture.

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Renaut's critique is important for (among other things) pinpointing the arbitrary nature of Dumont's wholesale condemnation of modernity. However, Renaut himself is far from accepting modern, and *a fortiori* contemporary, individualism, and as we shall see in the next section this position raises more than one problem. But for the moment it remains for us to keep to the same level of generality and stress the bias in Dumont's attitude towards modernity. It is a bias both substantive and methodological. On the substantive plane, it is painfully evident that Dumont simply asserts an incompatibility between social normality (in itself an elusive concept) and modernity, i.e., egalitarian individualism. (Ernest Gellner has noticed that Dumont once granted in passing the possibility of a holist but non-hierarchic society, thinking of Islam, but that the idea was quietly dropped, while the converse, a hierarchy without holism, which might well be employed to describe a few authoritarian polities in our time, of right and left alike, was not even entertained.)[17]

Normality equals holism equals hierarchy: Dumont is an unabashed believer in a "common mould of mankind" (244), "a common, nonmodern . . . 'normal' configuration of value" (256). Moreover he is convinced that for individualism to work (however badly), *it has to be helped by holism*. This idea receives full emphasis in a 1985 essay, a masterpiece of dialectical ambiguity which states that with their dependence on holist presuppositions, "the individualist representations tap on their opposite a further strength."[18] Dumont illustrates the point with Lenin. He reads the Bolshevik leader as an intensifier of "artificialism" (i.e., social constructivism), and therefore as a resolute borrower of a Western trait, which was then harnessed to the old Russian reaction against the West. Thus: super-artificialism (an occidental element) put at the service of anticapitalism (a Slavophile, populist tenet): an "individualism" that works.

The trouble with this is that it gives short shrift to the intricacies of Lenin's actual relationship with populism. To be sure, Lenin's stance toward populism was very different from the negative views of Plekhanov and Struve, the founders of Russian Marxism. While they were necessitarian Marxists, concerned with stages of economic development and the need for a phase of bourgeois democracy before socialism could be adopted, Lenin located the core of Marxism in class struggle. His 1889 book on *The Development of Capitalism in Russia* was a refutation of populist economics. Based on the second volume of *Capital*, at the time little known in Russia, Lenin destroyed the populist denial of the viability of capitalist development owing to the lack of an internal market, which the destitution of the peasant masses prevented. Lenin used Marx to show

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that the market was an *economic*, not a geographic, concept whose range is to be gauged in terms of the division of labor.

But from this point his argument took an odd turn. By stressing the dimension of widespread commodification and relations of production, Lenin subtly shifted the focus from the economic to the social and put a premium on class antagonisms largely independent of the *degree* of economic advancement, though not independent of the general transformative impact of capitalism upon the old, "feudal" fabric of czarist Russia. Dropping "stagism" enabled Lenin to surpass Plekhanov's contempt for the peasantry as a backward pillar of Asiatic despotism—*and also to revert to the populist hope of bypassing the bourgeois capitalist stage by marching through revolution from backwardness into socialism.*[19]

Yet this is not all. Curiously enough, Lenin's most original thinking, notably in *What Is to Be Done?* (1902), rests on assumptions which, forged in his youthful polemics with the populists, are strikingly akin to *revisionist* claims. As Domenico Settembrini has brilliantly pointed out, Lenin shared revisionist doubts about the revolutionary calling of the working class, and about the immiseration of the latter and the inevitable breakdown of capitalism. Like Struve, the "legal Marxist," Lenin anticipated Bernstein. In short, he agreed, however tacitly, with the revisionist diagnosis—if only because his own theory of capitalist development was tantamount to rejecting the idea of economic obstacles to endless capitalist growth. To Lenin, too, the working class was by itself just economistic and reformist, and capitalism was anything but doomed—all the more reason to put party above class, profiting from deep yet temporary dislocations (like the Great War) to mount a "dictatorship of the proletariat" primarily meant to prevent the embourgeoisement of the masses.[20]

Despite Rosa Luxemburg's famous charge, Lenin was no Blanquist—but he certainly was more of a revolutionist than the placid, compromising evolutionists of the Second International, however great his philosophical respect for Kautsky up to 1914. Now in his revolutionism he indeed rekindled Russian populism. Yet precisely the point is that there were at least *two* populisms, one nonpolitical and the other terrorist. Lenin's choice was to revive the embattled spirit of the latter. But then his social vision was the very opposite of the 'populists.' They wanted to avoid the throes of industrialization; he fervently wanted industrialization (minus capitalism). They looked at the rural community as social bliss; he regarded the peasantry as little more than cannon fodder for a modernizing revolution fraught with Promethean values miles apart from populist idylls.[21] *If Lenin updated anything, it was not at all the Slavophile revulsion against the West; rather, it was the Petrograndist rage to modernize without Western*

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institutions. Hardly a case of Westernization through the revivification of holist roots, as Dumont proposes.

Returning to the more general critique of Dumont, we must now say a word about his methodological bias. He is of course quite conscious that his enterprise is limited (and even so selectively) to the level of ideology, and indeed to *a* level of ideology. His procedure might be deemed analogous, in the history of religion, to Harnack's rather than Troeltsch's: it sticks to the history of ideas, eschewing the practical context of cult and piety.[22] At this juncture one can only object that Dumont largely ignores some important figures (the absence of Simmel is particularly harmful) and misinterprets others, while overlooking the wealth of modern reinterpretations (e.g., he doesn't profit from the labors of Brian Tierney on medieval political thought, of Quentin Skinner on Renaissance political theory, of J.G.A. Pocock on the republican tradition, or of Claude Welch on modern Protestant theology, not to mention several pathbreaking monographs on individual theorists). However, sometimes the actual text of the *Essays* belies its self-proclaimed limitation to interpreting (conscious) ideology rather than attempting to *explain* society and social change as an effect of ideology. In other words, there are occasional slippages into idealism or culturalism, the tendency to treat social reality as a direct emanation of worldviews.

For instance, in discussing modern Germany, Dumont maintains that at a deep level of collective ideology the Germans never surrendered the imperial idea (as against the territorial sovereignty of nation-states like France or England); and that as a result, when Germany was unified by Prussia, this, "at the level of internal representation," meant "a resurgence of universal sovereignty." Dumont's next comment is a model of the idealistic approach: "Such is perhaps the deepest explanation for the will to dominate inherent (in) pan-Germanism" (147–8).

Another example is his reference to the Weimar Republic. We are invited to see a reason for the weakness of the Weimar regime in that, "*because* of its democratic formula . . . the republic was unable to arouse" (136, emph. added) that "identification with the whole" built into the German ideological substratum, and therefore looked like a foreign import and an illegitimate polity.[23] This puts Dumont in a rather curious position. For on the eve of the Nazi takeover, anti-Western German sociologists like Hans Freyer wanted to preserve counter-Enlightenment Romantic tendencies *while dropping their anachronistic fixation on hierarchy*. Let us borrow from the Romantics, said Freyer; but let the borrowing be historicity and nationalism, not organicism and social rank.[24] After all, democratic holism (i.e. a polity shorn of both feudal ranking and of

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individualism) had a presence in German social thought since the days of Fichte and Jahn. This casts some doubt about the speed with which Dumont dispatches "the democratic formula" as alien to the German mind.

To be sure, Dumont is not saying that the "democratic formula" was the sole cause of the downfall of the republic. But the suggestion is that the dissonance between the holist roots of German culture and Weimar's Western-style democracy exerted a considerable causal weight. This hardly chimes with the ups and downs of the power game and the public opinion shifts under the Weimar dispensation. There were periods, as under Stresemann, when the republic enjoyed wide backing and democracy was felt to be authoritative. Later the withdrawal of support by most civilian and military elites, the bitter division of the left and of course the social chaos brought about by the 1929 depression quickly undermined whatever legitimacy the regime might have acquired. Still, all this points to a much more contingent and untidy causal cluster than any alleged "root cause" of national-ideological nature.

Dumont as Antimodern

As a history of ideas, then, Dumont's project is only a moderate success. Its subject could not be more interesting or important, yet his analysis suffers from too unilateral a viewpoint. Above all, the whole idea of handling individualism/egalitarianism as a social pathology is never properly justified. Indeed, it is scarcely argued. Yet it dominates the framework of *Homo aequalis* and the *Essays*. At bottom, Dumont's research into the intellectual origins of Western individualism belongs less to sociology than to the antimodern movement in contemporary social theory, whose stars in the Anglo-Saxon world are authors like Leo Strauss and Alasdair MacIntyre. Like them, Dumont is a holist/hierarchical thinker but not a proponent of illiberal regimes. In fact, he insists that no return to holism in modern society is possible without the danger of totalitarianism. But like them, he blames modernity for its chronic universalist liberal individualism. As with Strauss's "positivism," modernity is seen as a nihilist egalitarianism, a solvent of the sense of order which severs value from fact. And as in MacIntyre, individualism is cast in a stark negative role, atrophying the moral imagination. The self-image of Dumont's project is a critical examination of modern ideology. But its truer nature is as itself one more expression of modern *humanist* ideology, by which I mean, not modern humanism in the neo-Enlightenment sense of Renaut (i.e., auton-

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omy) but *the mainstream ideology of modern humanists*, of the humanist clerisy among contemporary intellectuals. In their midst, the first commandment is a strong detestation of modernity. While the urbane tone of Dumont's academic prose replaces the normal stridency of *Kulturkritik* masters like, say, Adorno, the core message—the indictment of modernity—is the same. It is surprising that Dumont fails to draw on such a brilliant philosophical satire of modern egalitarianism as Ortega's *Revolt of the Masses*.

Dumont's prestige in these days of the demarxified French intelligentsia probably rests on the fact that the conversion of the average intellectual to modern values is usually half-hearted. Totalitarian utopias are discredited, the myth of revolution discarded; but there lingers on a stubborn reluctance to accept the central principles of modernity. Capitalism and individualism are prominent among them. So Polanyi's and Dumont's attacks on the market and individualism as social pathologies are taken to be pearls of sociological wisdom. Even those, like Renaut, who resist the onslaught on modernity are not prepared to legitimize individualism as a social trend; they prefer to oppose a lofty ethical ideal—humanism as "autonomy"—to the actual dynamic of modern culture, comprising as it does impure, ambiguous forms of individualism. The charm of holism is a perfect alibi for the intellectuals' unwillingness to fully embrace the liberal temper; and it has none of the inconveniences of Heidegger's resounding antimodern rhetoric, lately further affected by revelations about the extent of the Master's involvement with Nazism. What is more, Dumont licenses the longing for hierarchy without the arrogant elitism and the esoteric airs of the Straussians. He reads as that *avis rara*: the level-headed antimodern!

A Scheme of Individualisms

The meaning of individualism is appallingly manifold. As Max Weber recalled in an often quoted footnote to *The Protestant Ethic*, a welter of heterogeneous senses lies beneath the term. The origins of the latter are well-known: they date from the derogatory discourse of Counterrevolutionary (de Maistre) and Saint-Simonian (Enfantin) publicists. By 1830 the *negative* meaning of individualism/individualist was already well established. A few more years and a paradox began to emerge: whilst some liberal thinkers, like Tocqueville, resumed the critical usage, and spoke of individualism as a bad thing (thus for Tocqueville it is the uncivic perversion of democracy in an unheroic materialistic society), luminaries of the

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socialist camp like Fourier felt quite able to employ the word in a clearly positive sense. Decades later this curious phenomenon repeated itself. Whereas a typical "new liberal" such as Hobhouse cast a cold eye on individualism, for Durkheim—a solidarist sociologist usually seen as a socialist of sorts—there was nothing wrong with it: individualism is the normal moral trend of modern societies, in itself by no means entangled in the modern social disease of anomie. As for socialists proper, Jaurès prolonged the Fourier line by defining socialism as the completion instead of the denial of individualism.

No wonder if some people tried to restore intellectual order by distinguishing aspects, or dimensions, of individualism before risking value judgments. Mauss, in his celebrated essay on the idea of the person (1938), observed that there was never a human being unaware not only of his/her own body but also of his/her spiritual and bodily individuality. Taking a more culture-bound angle, Foucault, in *The Care of the Self* (1984), drew a perceptive distinction between three practices:

(a) the role socially acknowledged to the individual and his degree of independence from the group:

(b)the valuation of private life;

(c) the intensity of self-regarding practices ("le souci de soi"), i.e., the range of self-analysis and self-formation.

Thus in a warrior society—a shame culture, in the language of yesterday's psychological anthropology—(a) obtains very much, but (b) and (c) are normally underdeveloped. But late ancient and early Christian civilization, the subject of Foucault's own book, had already elaborated several codes of *cura sui*, the care of the self. To a certain extent, this would clear the ground for the soul-culture of Christianity—the very point at which Dumont starts his own chronicle of individualist ideology.

The sociologist Steven Lukes, in his able conceptual survey, isolates four "basic or germinal unit ideas" as ingredients of individualism: dignity, autonomy, privacy, self-development.[25] But, following A.D. Lindsay, he associates the first one, the sense of personal dignity, with the Christian contribution, though admitting that the neotestamentarian emphasis on the value of each soul was undermined in medieval collectivism and reappeared in Renaissance humanism as the "dignity of man," later to be refined by Kant. Now I think we can qualify this Western perspective by noticing that the sense of dignity, understood as freedom from arbitrary coercion or interference, is an immemorial human experience to be found in all cultures. The land-bound peasant who saw his traditional rights, however narrowly circumscribed, respected by the feudal lord certainly had it. Dignity as a structure of entitlements, no

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matter how humble, protected by custom (and later by law) is perhaps the oldest experience of freedom; and its subject is certainly an individual, though it can also be a whole group.

But why is it that we instinctively refrain from calling this value *individualistic*, as much as the three others—privacy, autonomy, self-development? I believe the key difference lies in a variable which we might dub "embeddedness/disembeddedness." Dignity in the above consuetudinary sense always has for a subject a normatively situated individual or individuals—not a personality *detached* from its social niche or free from the grip of prevalent mores. This is why dignity, or the actual enjoyment of respect, is a universal dimension of freedom—but not a form of *modern* freedom, since it is compatible with a vast range of social orders.

By contrast, the growth of the three further notes of individualism, measured on a social scale, belongs distinctly to the modern era—indeed, it characterizes much of cultural and sociopolitical evolution since the mid-eighteenth century, when Church control, hereditary hierarchies, absolute royal power, the mercantilist economy and court culture began to have their authority increasingly and systematically challenged. Naturally, each of those modern ingredients of individualism—privacy, autonomy, self-development—had more than a prefiguration in a more distant past. Each one was foreshadowed by distinct ages or major trends in Western history. But their confluence stretches no further than the historical arch formed by the Enlightenment and Romanticism. Maybe their genesis can thus be summarized:

Ingredients of Individualism

	privacy	autonomy	self-development
Renaissance			⋆
Reformation	⋆		
Modern Natural Law		⋆	
Enlightenment		⋆	
Romanticism	⋆		⋆
Liberalism	⋆	⋆	⋆

Each of these historical periods has been cited as a source of individualism. Burckhardt's seminal essay of 1860 made of individualism the cornerstone of his interpretation of the Italian Renaissance; and although

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he includes many a trait of egotism, violence and immorality, it is moral independence and above all the humanistic, Albertian awareness of one's own personality—a harbinger of Goethe's cosmopolitan self-growth—that finally dominates the picture. Max Weber, as everybody knows, found very different roots for modern individualism in the worldly asceticism of the Puritans. The great legal historian Gierke located it elsewhere: in the atomist world of social contract theory, the realm of Grotius, Hobbes and Locke. Then Troeltsch, to whom Luther and Calvin were still "medieval" theocratic minds, assigned the birth of moral autonomy to the Enlightenment. The rest of the schema is well known. Romanticism put a premium on both privacy and self-development, poeticizing solitude and introspection. Not for nothing do we owe to Schleiermacher, greatest of Romantic theologians, the beautiful saying (in his *Soliloquies*) that "each man is meant to represent humanity in his own way, combining its elements uniquely." Finally, the rich deployment of liberal ideologists, from Benjamin Constant to John Stuart Mill, cherished all facets of modern individualism: privacy, of course, but also autonomy, both as independence and as self-rule; and self-development as an ethico-cultural ideal.

Yet there is at least one major problem with our chart. It omits early Christianity and the entire Middle Ages. Besides, a Greek contribution, political autonomy, though by no means individualistic per se, is part and parcel of the social framework of modern liberal individualism. Similarly, as we saw, at the time of Seneca the taste for the care of the self was very pronounced; it was a signal conquest of elite individualism. As for Christianity, what the greatest mid-nineteenth century Protestant theologian, Albrecht Ritschl, held to be a supreme gift of the Gospels—the infinite worth of the soul—is rather hard to pigeonhole in our triad. For during a long time belief in the soul was unaccompanied by privacy, or external autonomy, nor indeed by any general exercise of "self-development" along the lines of the ancient *paidea* or the modern humanist *Bildung*.

Presumably we ought to follow Hegel and claim that the Christian principle of individuality, at the beginning only a potential enhancement of the sense of personal dignity, led a long chrysalis life until the Protestant revolution. Nevertheless we saw that modern scholarship laid bare some important social and cultural trends of individualist stamp in the age of the Gothic: new patterns of property and sexuality; new forms of rights; new outlets of piety and personal expression. Up to a point, the Burckhardtian man of the Renaissance just made these more articulate (and here or there, more daring, in the face of traditional religiosity). But

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individualism had been gaining momentum during the latter half of the Middle Ages.

So the roots of individualism are indeed old and strong, and one begins to suspect that besides being the moral backbone of modernity it grew out of most of its Western background. What about today? Are we finished with Tillich's quite individualistic "Protestant principle"—the prophetic protest against any self-deifying power that be? Fortunately not—consider Vaclav Havel, or the late Andrei Sakharov. And at any rate, individualism of one kind or another has been the inspiration of most our moral prophets, from Kant to Kierkegaard, Mill and Nietzsche. Because they made the most of it, Emerson and Whitman became the founding fathers of American literature.

In Defense of Modern Individualism

There will always be good and bad individualisms. David Riesman made us familiar with "the paradoxical development which, in the course of the modern era, freed Western men progressively from many previous restraints while at the same time developing a seemingly individualistic character-type enclosed within new psychological restraints."[26] Such was the rise of "inner-directed" man, breaking the psychological mould of traditional society and its "groupist" controls; the proud frontier American, largely indifferent to others, as a kind of profane version of the Weberian worldly ascetic. As Riesman was the first to point out, the replacement, in turn, of inner-direction by the other-directed fellows of consumer society brought about a "lonely crowd" of gregarious but feeble individuals. In the Tocquevillian idiom, Riesman's new middle class of affluent high modernity is "individualistic" because of its moral conformism and political apathy. To the degenerate individualism of the other-directed crowd Riesman opposed (in 1950) a plea for "autonomy": but in *Individualism Reconsidered* (1954) he was at pains to distance himself from root and branch repudiations of either contemporary society or of the principle of individualism.

Nowadays mild or harsh critics of consumer society, like Richard Sennett and Christopher Lasch in America or Gilles Lipovetsky in France[27] have chided latter-day individualism as a narcissistic retreat into privatism. Despite "civic" surges like May 1968, or the earlier student revolts in America and Germany, the 1960s launched a final onslaught of egalitarian hedonism (i.e., mass consumerism) against the Puritan and utilitarian ethos inherited from earlier stages of the bourgeois culture. But,

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far less pessimistic than Sennett ("the fall of public man"), Lasch ("the culture of narcissism") or, at a deeper level, Daniel Bell ("the cultural contradictions of capitalism"), Lipovetsky avoids a global rejection of modern hedonism, preferring to stress its role as a democratizing force. Though in a different direction than expected by the (mostly) Leninist leaders of May 1968, the 60s were indeed the noisy threshold of an age of liberation.

My only disagreement, largely semantic, would fall on just one point: the fate of utilitarianism. Lipovetsky is of course right in contrasting the explosion of modern hedonism, with its taste for wild fantasizing, with the narrow unimaginative bounds of utilitarianism in the dictionary's sense. Modern consumerism is very much, as Colin Campbell claims in a remarkable study,[28] in league with a "romantic ethic" of imagination and self-illusion; and this Bohemian craving for the pleasure of endless novelty, this neophagic drive of the high consumerist fancy, is wholly fitting as the source of the protean demand that goes together with modern, hi-tech capitalism. But utilitarianism in a stricter sense, meaning the calculus of pleasure and displeasure, is by no means incompatible with the spread of hectic, protean consumption; actually it survives very well the demise of ascetic self-denial. In this sense, in modern individualism, the Puritan element goes by the board—but utilitarianism stays. The founders of utilitarian thought—Hume, Helvetius, Bentham—were anything but ascetic. Moreover, even in the dictionary's sense the 1980s yuppie is a utilitarian successor to the 1960s hippie.

A well-known fragment from Nietzsche's youth states that modern civilization is sadly wanting in true individualities. Then Nietzsche thunders: "there are but three forms of life in which man remains an individual: the philosopher, the saint and the artist." Very inspiring as anti-philistine rhetoric—but scarcely a recipe for good sociology. For social science should be less intolerant, and grant the possibility of many more individualisms besides the intellectual, the mystic and the aesthetic ones. Why can't Everyman or Everywoman be an individualist *à sa façon*? As soon as we climb down from humanist rage to historical observation (the fieldwork of the comparativist) we realize that in fact they can—but only as of late. As long as we have a society where achieved positions tend to prevail upon ascriptive roles; where privacy and personal initiative are not only allowed but valued; and where the pattern of allegiance to authority is no longer dominated by traditional figures like patriarchs or priests, there will be plenty of room for individualist manifestations in our midst.[29] Little is gained by conceptualizing them as pathological, an exception to an alleged holist rule of mankind. As for trying to decon-

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taminate modernity from individualism by playing autonomy against hedonism and commercialism, is this any more than a condescending attempt to elevate the priggish, vapid liberalism of the don over the concrete, manifold and impure—but so much richer—liberalism of society?

Dumont's study of the Indian caste system was rightly reckoned an advance because of its ability to recover the aboriginal meaning of Hindu categories, avoiding the reading of Western values into an alien situation. Of his worthy yet misguided discussion of Western thought the same cannot be said. Like Taine in his *Origins of Contemporary France*, he seems to lack a minimum empathy with his mighty subject, and this gives his interpretations too unilateral a slant. To which one should add the difficulties arising from the disparity between *Homo hierarchicus* and the rest of Dumont's main work, from *Homo aequalis* on. While in the former book his focus was truly sociological, analyzing the concrete social ideology of a given society, in the other studies he tackles the "economic ideology" of Western individualism, or what Gellner calls "disembodied ideology," yet nowhere provides us "with a convincing account of the social origins or basis of the ideology of individualism."[30] In short, the Indianist in Dumont is a sociologist; but the analyst of the West, despite his continuous talk about sociology, ends up by practicing none. Yet his central claim of the strangeness of individualism did rest on the promise of sociology, a holist discipline (according to him) in charge of vindicating holism in society.

For all of that, Professor Dumont is scrupulously honest about his likes and dislikes (as is Charles Taylor, another recent practitioner of reticence before contemporary culture, who is avowedly uneasy with naturalist humanisms);[31] and it goes without saying that his very critical standpoint is a source of many an illuminating insight on several aspects of individualist culture. For instance, dealing once more with German Romanticism, Dumont scrutinizes a central phenomenon, later extended to European modernist culture as a whole: *Steigerung*, that intensifying radicalization whereby each innovative author trespassed the limits of predecessors: Hegel does it with Kant, Marx with Hegel and so on, making of rivalry the seal of creation.[32] As with every learned, perceptive mind, we have much to learn from Dumont's bold forays into modern ideology. What a pity that his overall picture exudes such an unexamined animus against modernity. Tocqueville realized the dangers of equality and the defects of individualism. Dumont radicalizes both dangers, and in so doing, ends up by indicting equality even more than individualism.

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NOTES

1. Nietzsche, *Daybreak*, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 55 (bk. 1, sec. 96).
2. See for instance Geoffrey Barraclough, *The Medieval Papacy* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1968), 90.
3. Michel Foucault highlights the establishment and refinement of *confession* between the early thirteenth century and the mid-sixteenth century Council of Trent in the first volume of *The History of Sexuality, The Will to Truth* (New York: Pantheon, 1976).
4. For a review of *Homo aequalis*, see Vincent Descombes, "Pour elle un Français doit mourir," *Critique* no. 366 (Nov. 1977): 998–1027. Rather confusingly, after a good exposé of Dumont's argument, Descombes ends up by suggesting a replacement of his critique of individualism by a Heideggerian critique of the subject. For a fine, balanced recent reprise of the question of the subject, see Manfred Frank, *Die Unhintergehbarkeit von Individualität* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986; French trans. as *L'Ultime raison du sujet* [Paris: Actes Sud, 1988]).
5. For a brief discussion of the impact of this on the history of the culture concept, see J.G. Merquior, *The Veil and the Mask: Essays on Culture and Ideology* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 40–53.
6. In one of his latest texts, "Sur l'idéologie politique française — une perspective comparative," *Le Débat* no. 58 (Jan.–Feb. 1990), Dumont actually digs up a telling quote from Montesquieu's *Mes Pensées*: "je suis nécessairement homme . . . et je ne suis français que par hasard" (128).
7. I have discussed this with regard to structural anthropology in my book *From Prague to Paris: A Critique of Structuralist and Poststructuralist Thought* (London: Verso, 1986), 40–58.
8. Jack Goody, *The Development of the Family and Marriage in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).
9. Colin Morris, *The Discovery of the Individual, 1050–1200* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987 [1972]).
10. Morris, 65, 76, 79, 140, 152.
11. Alan Macfarlane, *The Origins of English Individualism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).
12. Richard Tuck, *Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).
13. Jean-Pierre Vernant, "L'individu dans la cité," in AA. VV., *Sur l'Individu* (Paris: Seuil, 1987), 20–37.
14. J. Hope Mason, "Individuals in Society: Rousseau's Republican Vision," *History of Political Thought* 10, no. 1 (Spring 1989): 89–112, esp. 100–6.
15. Cf. J.G. Merquior, *Rousseau and Weber: Two Studies in the Theory of Legitimacy* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 35–56.
16. Cf. Alain Renaut, *L'ère de l'individu: Contribution à une histoire de la subjectivité* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), 86; see also 69–112 and 220.

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17. Ernest Gellner, "The essence of egalitarianism," *Times Literary Supplement*, March 10, 1978: 275.
18. Dumont, "Identitiés collectives et idéologie universaliste: leur interaction de fait," *Critique* no. 456 (May 1985): 506–18, esp. 511 and 517.
19. For a fine defense of Lenin's debt to populism, see Andrzej Walicki, *A History of Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to Marxism* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 440–9.
20. Domenico Settembrini, *Socialismo e rivoluzione dopo Marx* (Naples: Ricciardi, 1974).
21. For an authoritative global view of Lenin's social theory, see Leszek Kolakowski, *Main Currents of Marxism*, vol. 2: *The Golden Age* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1978), 356–62, 373–412, 467–509, 513–7 and 520–7.
22. For this distinction, see Claude Welch, *Protestant Thought in the Nineteenth Century*, vol. 2: *1870–1914* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 292–3.
23. Also, in "L'idéologie politique française" (see n6 above), the impact of the Franco-Prussian war is said to at most "modify" a national ideology—universalism—which reasserts itself as a holist creed basically impervious to historical shocks.
24. Hans Freyer, "Die Romantiker," in Fritz Karl Mann, ed., *Gründer der Soziologie: eine Vortragsreihe* (Jena: G. Fischer, 1932). For a lucid comment, see Wolf Lepenies, *Die Drei Kulturen* (Munich: Hanser, 1985, trans. R.J. Hollingdale as *Between Literature and Science: The Rise of Sociology* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988], ch. 15).
25. Steven Lukes, *Individualism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), 44ff.
26. David Riesman, *Selected Essays from Individualism Reconsidered* (New York: Doubleday, 1954), 13.
27. Christopher Lasch, *The Culture of Narcissism: American Life in an Age of Diminished Expectations* (New York: Norton, 1979); Gilles Lipovetsky, *L'Ere du vide, essai sur l'individualisme contemporain* (Paris: Gallimard, 1983).
28. Colin Campbell, *The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern Consumerism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).
29. For these variables, see Alex Inkeles, *Exploring Individual Modernity* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983).
30. For Gellner, see n17 above; for quotation, see Adrian Wooldridge, review of Dumont, *Essais sur l'individualisme*, *Times Literary Supplement*, July 13, 1984: 776.
31. Charles Taylor, *Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
32. Dumont, "Are Cultures Living Beings? German Identity in Interaction," *Man* 21 (1986).

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Ryszard Legutko

SOCIETY AS A DEPARTMENT STORE

In a departure from traditional Western political theory that is reminiscent of left-wing anarchism, contemporary libertarianism rejects the necessity of making political choices based on a value hierarchy, instead claiming that it is possible for all individuals to pursue their divergent values simultaneously—as long as each respects the equal rights of others to do the same. The caveat, however, hides a conflict of loyalties that would plague a libertarian society: on the one hand are the particular loyalties of one's preferred utopian community; on the other hand, loyalty to the larger "framework for utopias" within which one's utopia exists. The second loyalty implies a value relativism incompatible with the first one, meaning either that loyalty to the libertarian framework will undermine the utopias within it, or that the particular values of the utopias will destabilize the libertarian framework. The durability of a libertarian society, then, requires a mentality best characterized as nihilistic. In this, libertarianism differs from liberalism but is surprisingly similar to the cultural diversity movement. The thesis is illustrated by examining John Gray's attempt to eschew both a hierarchy of values and moral relativism.

To choose is usually painful, but to live without choosing is impossible. This unpardonably banal insight lay at the root of Western political theory; the basic question this theory addressed—how people should organize the life of a community—was closely related to the question how and what people should choose and, consequently, why some choices are

CRITICAL REVIEW, Summer 1990. ISSN 0891-3811. © 1990 Center for Independent Thought.

Ryszard Legutko, Pigonia 4/75, 31-228 Cracow, Poland, is associate professor at the Institute of Philosophy of the Jagiellonian University, editor-in-chief of the independent quarterly *ARKA*, and author of *Plato's Critique of Democracy* (Cracow: Jagiellonian University Press, 1990). An earlier draft of this paper was delivered at the Warsaw conference on "Philosophy and Social Choice" organized by the Sabre Foundation and the Polish Academy of Sciences, June 1990.

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preferable to others. We know that only in a utopia can people be exempted from the unpleasantness of selecting some goals at the expense of others and from the risk of error, whereas in all actually existing political systems we are compelled by nature and by the logic of human affairs to sacrifice some values in order to achieve others. The obvious means to facilitate the political and social processes of selection was to find a generally valid criterion; it was hoped that, having understood the principle of choice, we would do the right thing and would not feel frustrated by the consequences. Such a criterion should serve as a guideline for all political agents, individual and collective, as well as for the present and future organizers of political orders.

The ancient thinkers had a clear solution to this problem. They argued—and by "they" I mean Plato and Aristotle—that there is an objective hierarchy of goods, and that the state should strive for the highest good, that is, the highest ethical purpose. Politics, as Aristotle put it in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, was "the master science," the science that "uses the rest of the sciences and . . . legislates as to what we are to do and what we are to abstain from"; "the end of this science must include those of the others, so that this end must be the good for man." Political philosophers are thus like "archers who have a mark to aim at . . . to hit upon what is right" (1094a). For ancient thinkers a political order resembled an architectural construction in which the highest good, embraced by the governing body, radiated from above and gave legitimacy to subordinate goods, which in turn functioned as criteria of choice in smaller domains of political life.

Since the beginning, however, it became evident that this criterion was highly controversial. Plato's *Republic* is regarded by many as a demonstration of the monstrosities to which the concept of the highest good leads in politics. The author himself, let us note, was aware that the translation of this philosophical concept into practical terms necessarily entails the brutal violation of the existing social fabric, and may be rejected by people as a dangerous fantasy, contradicting the most basic political experience. Thus, the moment the category of the highest political good was introduced, philosophers began to point out complexities of the issue and to analyze the means by which governments and theorists could minimize the dangers of a thoughtless, premature or simply false conception of the basic political criterion. Plato and Aristotle believed not only that the absence of any moral purpose in politics was catastrophic; they also realized the gravity of the danger that resulted from the imposition either of an erroneous criterion or of a theoretically sound one that was inevi-

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tably bound to become perverted as soon as imperfect rulers faced the insoluble dilemmas of imperfect societies.

To some extent one might write the whole history of Western political philosophy as a series of attempts to grapple precisely with these problems: how to define the basic criterion of political choices and what safeguards to introduce in order to neutralize the inherent oppressiveness of this criterion; how to make it more flexible, more human, closer to the true experience of politics, so that it helps people make correct and beneficial choices rather than stifling their initiative and becoming the source of repression and misery. Some theorists argued that the criterion should come from nature, which would give it the status of infallibility; others maintained that, on the contrary, it should be a matter of convention, so that people could easily adapt it to what they think are their genuine needs. Some said the criterion ought to be as general and as abstract as possible, not giving any privilege to a particular individual, group or interest; others took the opposite position and maintained that it should be concrete, derived from the actual traditions of a community or a nation and expressing its unique spirit. Some thought that those best qualified to formulate the criterion were the wise and virtuous few who should play the role of a spiritual and moral aristocracy; others held the opinion that the best, though not perfect judge is the majority of citizens, and therefore opted for democracy. Some philosophers believed in unchanged patterns of human nature like a sense of utility, others considered spontaneous evolution to be the ultimate arbiter. The list may continue, and probably it will continue as new hypotheses are created.

Liberal Utopianism

Let us now examine more closely one item from this list. It differs from the others in one important respect. It comes as close as one can imagine to the belief that the unpleasant side of political choice can be reduced to a minimum; in fact, it almost negates the banal premise about the inevitability of painful choices which I stated at the beginning of the paper and which I said had stimulated the first reflections on the nature of a political order. In short, it is a claim that one can construct or at least envisage a system in which people will not be forced to choose what they do not like, because there will always be goods and ideals suited to their individual aspirations. This ideal presupposes a world of plenty where no sacrifices are necessary and no frustrations await the people living in it.

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The theory which gave birth to this political vision emerged from the liberal tradition and specifically from its assumption that the individual has absolute primacy vis-à-vis the group. Most of the liberals rejected the Platonic and Aristotelian notion that a legislator-philosopher should attempt to determine (or reveal) an ethical purpose different from and superior to individual moral goals. If there is any general ethical purpose in the state—they argued—it should be verified by individual choices rather than superseding them. In some theories it amounted to saying that an individual sense of happiness or pain (which was called utility) is the ultimate and irreducible standard of the legitimacy of a political order. The theory I discuss is the extreme version of this argument: it claims that not only are individuals the only judges but also the sole legitimate creators of ethical and political criteria; in building institutions in a society we should therefore consciously eliminate what since Plato and Aristotle was the very nature of politics—the constant search for a compromise between the good of the individual and the good of the republic. There are conditions—they claimed—in which this compromise is no longer needed.

To exemplify this image of a human order one can quote a passage from Robert Nozick's well-known book *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* in which the author gives what he calls "the framework for utopia"; this framework

> will consist of utopias, of many different and divergent communities in which people lead different kinds of lives under different institutions. Some kinds of communities will be more attractive to most than others; communities will wax and wane. People will leave some for others or spend their whole lives in one. Utopia is . . . a place where people are at liberty to join together voluntarily to pursue and attempt to realize their own vision of the good life in the ideal community but where no one can impose his own utopian vision upon others. . . . If the ideas must actually be tried out, there must be many communities trying out different patterns. The filtering process, the process of eliminating communities, that our framework involves is very simple: people try out living in various communities, and they leave or slightly modify the ones they don't like (find defective). Some communities will be abandoned, others will struggle along, others will split, others will flourish, gain members, and be duplicated elsewhere. Each community must win and hold the voluntary adherence of its members. No pattern is imposed on everyone, and the result will be one pattern if and only if everyone voluntarily chooses to live in accordance with that pattern of community. . . . If a person finds the character of a particular community uncongenial, he needn't choose to live in it. This is all well and good for an individual deciding which community to enter.

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In the conclusion of his book Nozick emphasizes that this "model . . . designed to let you choose what you will" is not a pure fantasy. The framework for utopia is, as he says, "equivalent to the minimal state," that is, equivalent to the order which emerged not from the visionary imagination of a utopian dreamer but from rigorous philosophical reasoning. The minimal state is for him the "morally favored state, the only morally legitimate state, the only morally tolerable one." Calling it a utopia does not mean diminishing its practical or explanatory value. It is rather to give it "luster . . . to thrill the heart or inspire people to struggle or sacrifice," the better "to man barricades under its banner." It simply happens that this morally favored state "is the one that best realizes the utopian aspirations of untold dreamers and visionaries. It preserves what we all can keep from the utopian tradition and opens the rest of that tradition to our individual aspirations. . . . Is not the minimal state, the framework for utopia, an inspiring vision?"

This picture of a world which is spacious enough to enclose as many ideals, communities and ways of existence as possible, is built on the assumption that no single criterion, in fact, no finite set of ethical criteria can do justice to the multiplicity of human aspirations; therefore, the only possible solution is to make the world open to all criteria and to reject every political or spiritual authority that would usurp the right to promote or disqualify some human ideals, and thus restrict the alternatives from which individuals can choose. This world can be compared to a big department store where all possible goods are available, and where people are not forced to buy only those that are currently fashionable or recommended by some authoritative agency. There is no ethical hierarchy which would tell the producers what to produce and the customers what to purchase. In this department store there are goods for hedonists and spiritualists, for Jews and Muslims, for illiterate pleasure-seekers and for refined intellectuals; there is pornography and the Bible, Plato and Stalin, communism and laissez-faire. No group or individual is deprived of the opportunity to find what they look for. Muslims are not coerced to accept the Christian faith, homosexuals are not forced to marry the other sex, monks are not distracted from the search for the absolute, and usurers are not constantly reminded about the Sermon on the Mount.

That the department-store metaphor accurately renders the essence of this theory we can see from many scattered remarks in the writings of Milton Friedman. He calls the system he favors capitalism, but in fact this notion denotes something more similar to Nozick's framework for utopia than the world of Adam Smith or F.A. Hayek. The basic fact about Friedman's capitalism is its inherent diversity and openness. It not only

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has those properties, but it also maximizes them. The development of capitalism is a constant process of making space for more goods and ideas. Friedman makes it clear that it is not a system ruled by what some have called "the capitalist ethic." Such an ethical legitimation would necessarily limit the openness of the system and make it less diversified. In other words, to impose the capitalist ethic on a society would resemble the Platonic-Aristotelian procedure of establishing a general moral criterion for a political order—obviously far less rigorous, more flexible and more compatible with the variety of human experience than the one postulated by the Greek thinkers, but nevertheless a criterion which in the last instance is arbitrary and therefore repressive. Capitalism should not be a system where only those who accept the austere capitalist ethic can find satisfaction; it must be a home also for those who may subscribe to other ethics and who have been traditionally regarded as aliens from the point of view of the dominant ideologies: for Jews, homosexuals, eccentrics, etc. Friedman even believes that the minorities which fear discrimination should, in their own interests, support capitalism because it is the only system in which they are not prevented from pursuing their unique goals.

Friedman's vision of the best order is close to Nozick's minimal state. His philosophy is deeply anti-statist, anti-authoritarian, anti-absolutist. The concept of a minimal state means in practice the virtual abolition of the state, except for some of its simple protective functions. The main current of life thus flows outside politics, contrary to the Platonic-Aristotelian theory, according to which almost everything was political, that is, concerned with the well-being of the polis. The rejection of politics makes it possible, Friedman believes, to reduce the element of coercion inherent in every organization, especially in the state. The political procedures of selecting some goals or methods necessarily imply that those who want to make a different choice have no other option but to surrender to the dominant political power or, at best, to seek a compromise with the will of the majority. In either case their freedom of choice is considerably limited. However, when political methods are replaced by the mechanisms of capitalism, and when communities adopt the arrangements of a big department store, there is no longer any need for using coercive measures. The diversity produced by these arrangements eliminates any need for the unpleasant logic of political trade-offs. As Friedman himself says, such a system "permits wide diversity. It is, in political terms, a system of proportional representation. Each man can vote, as it were, for the color of tie he wants and get it; he does not have to see what color the majority wants, and then, if he is in the minority, submit." In another passage he writes, "If I do not like what my local community does, be it

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in sewage disposal, or zoning, or schools, I can move to another local community. . . . If I do not like what my state does, I can move to another. If I do not like what Washington imposes, I have few alternatives in this world of jealous nations."

Libertarians and Anarchists

One may note that this richness of choices available in a liberal society was first observed in antiquity by Plato, who compared democracy to "a garment of many colors, embroidered with all kinds of hues . . . decked and diversified with every type of character" (*Rep.* 557c). Plato sounds almost Nozickian when he calls this system "a bazaar of constitutions" (557d) from which individuals can choose the constitution which they consider the most suitable for their unique preferences. In the modern age this image of the ideal society has close affinities with the vision of the social order propagated by anarchists and some socialists of anarchist persuasion. In *The German Ideology* the young Marx craved a system in which one could be a hunter in the morning, a fisherman in the afternoon, a shepherd in the evening, and a literary critic at night. The mature Marx had few moments of anarchistic weakness; the most notable one comes from the well-known passage in the *Critique of the Gotha Program* which predicts that future society "will be able to inscribe on its banners: from each according to his abilities, to each according to his needs." Prince Kropotkin's *Modern Science and Anarchism* gives the following description of the social ideal:

> The anarchists conceive a society in which all the mutual relations of its members are regulated, not by laws, not by authorities, whether self-imposed or elected, but by mutual agreements between the members of that society, and by a sum of social customs and habits—not petrified by law, routine, or superstition, but continually developing and continually readjusted, in accordance with the ever-growing requirements of a free life, stimulated by the progress of science, invention, and the steady growth of higher ideals. No ruling authorities, then. No government of man by man; no crystallization and immobility, but a continual evolution—such as we see in Nature.

Of modern visions, E.P. Thompson's "Open Letter to Leszek Kolakowski" (published in *The Socialist Register* in 1973) provides a perfect sample:

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> With sources of power easily available, some men and women might choose to live in unified communities, sited, like Cistercian monasteries, in centres of great natural beauty, where agricultural, industrial and intellectual pursuits might be combined. Others might prefer the variety and pace of an urban life which rediscovers some of the qualities of the city-state. Others will prefer a life of seclusion, and many will pass between all three. Scholars would follow the disputes of different schools, in Paris, Jakarta, or Bogota.

Nozick and Friedman were of course aware of these anarchistic affinities. In a *Playboy* interview Friedman admitted this explicitly by wishing anarchists good luck and praising them for pointing in the right direction. Nozick and Friedman on the one hand and the anarchists on the other had a common and, one has to admit, correct presupposition. All of them rightly believed that a world of increasing diversity has fewer problems which have to be settled through the process of negotiations, whereas in a world of scarcity very many difficult and always unsatisfactory decisions have to be made that are likely to look arbitrary and frustrating to the parties involved. Plato and Aristotle's polis was undoubtedly a world of scarcity where the rules of distribution seemed essential; under modern capitalism, on the other hand, despite its remoteness from the ideal of maximum diversity, no such urgent political procedures are needed. Whoever has visited both Macy's and any of the state-run shops of Eastern Europe will not challenge the evident message of the libertarian theory.

The difference between modern American minimal-state theorists and anarchists is, however, no less significant than the similarity. Friedman and Nozick admire the economic system which for Kropotkin, Marx and others was a synonym of wickedness. For the American libertarians maintain that theory and history show capitalism to be the only system capable of producing a high degree of diversity. What for anarchists was an obscure vision of the future order, for the libertarians is a matter of hard facts. They accordingly regard anarchists as either impotent to realize their ideal, or misled in thinking that their goals can be achieved through socialist means, or simply stupid in rejecting the capitalist institutions which are said to be the only mechanisms that can at least partly make their dream a reality.

Divided Loyalties

Having said that libertarianism is undeniably an effective way to minimize the hardships of choice and to neutralize the repressiveness of political

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criteria, I do not wish to imply that the libertarian solution is perfect. A lot has been said against it, and at least a part of the critique has some validity. Let me analyze the objection which I consider to be most important.

An inhabitant of the libertarian world of plenty has two loyalties—one which ties him to his own community, and the other which makes him a supporter of diversity as a general principle of the whole society. He must be both a person of specific culture—a Jew, a Muslim, a Catholic, a European, a communist, etc.—and a dedicated adherent of the multicultural creed. He must be both closed within a certain cultural tradition, and open to, as well as tolerant of, all traditions.

Is such a combination possible? one might ask. Why not? seems to be the obvious answer. After all, most of us are to some extent the living examples of such a combination. Each of us has both larger and narrower loyalties, and this, I presume, need not be a source of intellectual or moral schizophrenia. A conference or a debating club might be thus regarded as a prototype of a good society where Muslims, Christians, communists and atheists exchange arguments and look critically at each other's as well as their own points of view. To some degree such a model was considered by the classical liberals, for example by John Stuart Mill, as a miniature of a healthy social order. If the critical mind is the main creative force of civilization, then there is nothing more natural than a state of different loyalties which generates a constant need to test ideas, introduce new ones, compare them with the old ones, etc. The classical liberals believed in the evolution of social wisdom, hoping that a permanent clash among different points of view would lead to a sort of cultural miscegenation—the best remedy against short-sighted parochialism.

Whether these hopes were justified need not concern us here. What is important is that this doctrine of society as debating club has little to do with Nozick's utopia and Friedman's capitalism. The libertarian vision of a society where there was enough safe space for every creed and occupation was inconceivable to the classical liberals; they did not want to offer shelters to small groups and eccentric ideologies. They rather encouraged those groups and the representatives of those ideologies to subvert retrograde aspects of the traditional beliefs and institutions. Diversity was not for them a state of non-interference but rather a vehicle for generating more conflicts, as a result of which new structures were to replace the old ones and a new consensus was to emerge on the ruins of old philosophies and social stereotypes.

Yet the creative role of omnipresent conflicts was not thought to produce a divergence of allegiances. A liberal did not have two different

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loyalties—one to his group, and the other to mankind; he rather tended to identify them with each other. Every new force of dissenters fighting against the old authority—women, slaves, the oppressed nationalities—was believed to represent mankind, to carry out the fight in the name of the human race, and in the long run to open new vistas for all human minds. Allegiance to the woman's cause was thus for John Stuart Mill indistinguishable from allegiance to the cause of progress, that is, to the cause of people at large. The logic of the debating club required that women and other oppressed groups be given a voice, but it was also expected that their voice change the general substance and form of discourse within a society. This identification of narrower and larger loyalties, which legitimized every form of dissent as a contribution to the dynamics of progress, implied a certain conception of culture. Liberals thought of culture in terms of hierarchy; to some extent they may be said to have inverted the traditional hierarchy of conservatives. The process of evolution was to indicate which parts of social structures were anachronistic—these were put on the lower level—and which parts contained the seeds of the future and deserved a place in the higher reaches of the cultural hierarchy. Thus, heresies became preferable to orthodoxies; dissidents to mainstream thinkers; minorities to majorities; atheists to fideists. Abolishing the throne-and-altar alliance and building democracy had not brought about harmonious equality within communities. New forces of oppression and authority emerged which broke the egalitarian principles on which democracy was founded; therefore, dissenters were expected to undermine democratic tyranny and to take in their hands the cause of the liberty of mankind.

The modern libertarians are not as lucky as the nineteenth-century liberals were on the question of allegiance. It is true that they pay little attention to this question, but one glance at their theory suffices to show that the libertarians' world does not permit an identification of dissent and loyalty. The first loyalty which binds an individual to Nozick's utopia and Friedman's capitalism stems from the acceptance of the principle of equality. Not only are all communities equal—in the sense that no moral, intellectual or political authority can impose the criteria of choice on them (this, of course, has nothing to do with material equality)—but there should not be any conflict among them, because this would amount to interference in their internal order. The whole point of the system of diversity is to make powerless all such interference and to enable every individual to find a secure place. Nozick's and Friedman's worlds contain no victors in the competition of ideas, for their systems were conceived in such a way as to preclude victory. There are, to use Friedman's example,

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no authoritatively good ties or bad ties, and discussions leading to compromises on this or on many other issues are not needed. All those who are dissatisfied with the available choices can found a new community, equal to other communities, or hope that spontaneous development will one day produce a community which will be compatible with their unique preferences.

This does not mean however that the libertarians' world is entirely value-free and contains absolutely no axiological presuppositions. The most obvious and important ones—the sacredness of private property and negative freedom—have been taken over from the doctrine of classical liberalism. This, of course, implies a form of ethical discrimination, that is, the rejection of the systems which do not recognize private property and that promote a moral purpose that requires curtailing individual freedom. Logically speaking, this should entail a very strong ethical position. In assuming the sacredness of private property and the autonomy of the individual one not only opposes alternative moral hierarchies (for example, a socialist one) but also presumably defends a particular hierarchy in which the primary values of private property and the autonomous individual coexist and are coordinated with other values, generating a large and complex ethical system. It would also mean the acceptance of certain social (cultural) norms and historically internalized forms of behavior which secure the functioning of this system in a society. Such attitudes are, roughly speaking, characteristic of modern neoconservatives; they are not, however, typical of libertarians, at least not of those who subscribe to the idea of diversity as an organizing principle. Because they equate private property with the autonomy of the individual, they refrain from entering into arguments in which the values of private property might be regarded as one of many competing values. They are rather inclined to think that they have been able to overcome the seemingly inconclusive controversies between competing values by letting individuals *choose their own*. Once we accept—their argument runs—the sacredness of private property and the autonomy of the individual, we will have opened the door to the realization of other values, even those which have been traditionally inimical to the liberal hierarchy; the opposite is not true. As Milton Friedman wrote in *Free to Choose*: "A society that puts equality . . . ahead of freedom will end up with neither equality nor freedom. . . . On the other hand, a society that puts freedom first will, as a happy by-product, end up with both greater freedom and greater equality." The same holds not only for equality, but also for other values.

To be strict, this is not a position of cultural relativism. Libertarians do not say that libertarianism is as good as authoritarianism; they do not even

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say that communism is as arbitrary as democracy or that a Christian ethic as much a matter of taste as a lesbian ethic. What they imply however is that non-libertarian orientations will be better off once they accept the primary libertarian values as a basis for the general institutional framework. This acceptance—they argue—will not force those orientations to make any significant doctrinal sacrifices. Communism may be morally repulsive and politically dangerous, but a communist enclave might very well exist within the Great Society which will harbor similar enclaves for other non-libertarian groups, all respecting the overall framework. Cultural relativism, or rather cultural blindness, becomes thus a likely consequence of the Great Society. To give an example: a communist is lured to enter the libertarian order by the promise that he will not have to renounce his views; but he will believe this only so long as he is convinced that the libertarian values on which the minimal state is grounded will not infringe on his doctrine. If there is a possibility that the values of the Great Society itself can be organically integrated into a specific culture within it, the communist will certainly decline an offer to join the Great Society; he will fear justifiably that the general institutional framework might be used by that specific, libertarian culture against him and against other groups; he must be sure that all groups and communities, like his own, are considered equally neutral from the point of view of the ruling libertarian values. Cultural relativism, though not being a necessary theoretical assumption, must eventually emerge as an actual practice in the libertarian order. Without it, one would have to distinguish between groups that can and those that cannot enter the Great Society, depending upon whether or not they accept the sacredness of private property, the autonomy of the individual, and the consequences of those values. This is of course a perfectly valid procedure (which goes back to Plato and Aristotle, and is supported today, among others, by neoconservatives), but it virtually destroys the claim of diversity that was initially attached to the Great Society, the libertarian framework for, or department store of, utopias.

The second loyalty that would survive the establishment of libertarianism links an individual with a community: ethnic, religious, professional, etc., each of them being naturally hierarchical. A Catholic, a Muslim, a Jew, a homosexual, a feminist, all of them by joining or being born into one of those communities have a right to accept various types of hierarchy and various types of authority. This naturally follows from the nature of the Great Society. But every culture is animated by its own truth; therefore every group finds its own *raison d'être* in promoting and working for the ethical system which it considers true and morally

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binding. That was precisely the reason why they decided to join the libertarian order: they accepted its rules in order to get more freedom to develop their culture. There might of course be disagreements among the members of a community, but those disagreements concern the modification of hierarchy; they do not and cannot aim at the abolition of all authority or hierarchy unless one's purpose is the annihilation of the community whose values one joined the Great Society to develop—except for the community of individualist relativists.

A libertarian thus faces the following dilemma: he accepts the equality of the truths and value systems of all communities within the Great Society; at the same time, he accepts a certain moral hierarchy of his own community. He is thus divided between two beliefs: one which compels him to behave as if all norms were relative and it would be improper as well as dangerous to strive for a universal truth; and another which makes him an adherent of a definite set of ideas considered truer and better than the ideas propagated by other communities; on the one hand, he finds, to use Nozick's expression, "an inspiring vision" in the cause of culture-blindness and thinks he should "man barricades" to spread this gospel; on the other hand, he chooses a certain culture together with its built-in mechanism of moral and intellectual discrimination against other cultures.

The Return of Plato

Which of these two loyalties is stronger? How is the conflict between them usually resolved? Which of these beliefs tends to dominate the other?

The classical answer to these questions can be found in Plato's analysis of the pluralistic society which, as we remember, he compared to "the garment of many colours." This is how Plato describes a libertarian man:

> He does not accept or admit into the guardhouse the words of truth when anyone tells him that some pleasures arise from honorable and good desires, and others from those that are base, and that we ought to practice and esteem the one and control and subdue the others, but he shakes his head at all such admonitions and avers that they are all alike and to be equally esteemed. . . . He also live[s] out his life in this fashion, day by day indulging the appetite of the day, now winebibbing and abandoning himself to the lascivious pleasing of the flute and again drinking only water and dieting, and at one time exercising his body, and sometimes idling and neglecting all things, and at another time seeming to occupy himself with philosophy. And frequently he goes in for politics and bounces up and says

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> and does whatever enters his head. And if military men excite his emulation, thither he rushes, and if moneyed men, to that he turns, and there is no order or compulsion in his existence, but he calls this life of his the life of pleasure and freedom and happiness and cleaves to it to the end. . . .
>
> [He is] a devotee of equality. . . . He is a manifold man stuffed with most excellent differences, and like that city he is the fair and many-coloured one whom many a man and woman would count fortunate in his life, as containing within himself the greatest number of patterns of constitutions and qualities. (*Rep.* 561b–e)

If we translate this passage into the categories of the problem in question, we will have the following argument. Plato seems to maintain that of the two beliefs described previously, the first one is the stronger and will eventually eliminate the second. An individual living in a libertarian society will soon lose his devotion to the Jewish, Catholic, or Protestant morality, and will cease to consider one to be truer than another. Like many different colors, all creeds and philosophies will look equal to him, that is, equally attractive, but at the same time equally arbitrary. He could indeed realize the anarchists' dream and become a religious poet in the morning, an atheist philosopher in the afternoon, a thrifty bourgeois in the evening; but in fact, this is possible only because he is none of these and has no genuine understanding or love for any definite cultural preferences. But Plato seems to say something more. He implies that the triumph of the libertarian-egalitarian mentality over all cultural hierarchies is possible only because this mentality is totally devoid of any meaning. It is the triumph of the power of nihilism in the most elementary sense of the word. The "inspiring vision" of the libertarian utopia turns out to be, on closer examination, the luster of the flicker denoting no philosophical or any other truth. It is the illustration of intellectual entropy. To nineteenth-century thinkers the liberal mind appeared a product of evolution and the culmination of the growing rationality of mankind. By contrast, the libertarian mind, as Plato sees it, resembles the product of disintegration which has gradually stripped it of every conviction, in fact, of any adherence to the category of truth.

To justify the relevance of Plato's diagnosis to the cult of diversity in liberal societies is not a difficult task. One can find Plato's followers, like Allan Bloom, who repeat the Athenian philosopher's argument almost verbatim. One can also find philosophers, like Alasdair MacIntyre, who on the basis of the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition try to combat the modern notion of the equality of cultures and to rescue the value of

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hierarchy. It is even easier to find examples of the libertarian malaise in the popular idiom, pervading the whole range of political output, from the dissertations of respectable scholars to the manifestoes of American ideologues. One would be tempted to cite endless cases of the use of that favorite term in modern political jargon—the world "culture"—to which almost everyone feels obliged to give lip service but which today means almost exclusively something repressive and dangerously autocratic, or something entirely harmless in its subjectivity, like fashion; in both cases it is assumed that under no condition should one draw more general conclusions and attempt to give a universal meaning to any specific culture. It is surprising that the modern prophets of diversity, who never tire of speaking of whites, blacks, Europeans, non-Europeans, men, women as cultural entities, prohibit any dialogue about the comparative value or cultural hierarchy which specific members of these groups—e.g., Jews, Muslims, Confucians, Christians, liberals, conservatives—contribute to the common heritage of mankind; this would amount to racism, or sexism, or cultural imperialism. Plato would have been proud of his accurate predictions if he could see that in the current ideological climate the only conflict that arouses emotion is the one about the equality of cultures. But if all cultures offer equally valid contributions, and if an individual is prohibited from evaluating a political order in terms of a more universal cultural hierarchy, then one should conclude that from the point of view of this order the values of the constituent cultures are worthless. And if the Culture (capital C) of the whole libertarian order consists of valueless cultures (small c), then the overarching Culture itself is valueless. The garment of many colors looks colorless.

Let us make our task more difficult. Let us look at the argument of someone who is not a doctrinaire libertarian but a serious and responsible thinker, and see if there, too, the Platonic argument is applicable. I am thinking of a British liberal-conservative philosopher, John Gray, who openly distances himself from the nihilistic presuppositions of unlimited openness. In his Latham Memorial Lecture (a revised version of which appears in *The Salisbury Review* of September, 1988) he defended the basic point of the diversity thesis. In modern societies, he said, there is no "moral solidarity"; the existing differences of cultures make it impossible and the striving for it dangerous. But he did not accept the Friedmanian and Nozickian thesis that the cure for diversity is more diversity and that the imperfections of the hitherto-existing criteria of social choice will disappear when there are no criteria at all. His solution is instead that "we may yet be able to draw on the resource of another kind of solidarity—that of civilised men and women, practitioners of different traditions, who

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nevertheless have in common a perception of enmity in regard to the totalitarian states and re-barbarising movements of our time."

I believe Gray's view does not invalidate Plato's argument that the Culture of equal cultures is empty. Gray seems to say that it is empty only in the sense that it does not contain any moral consensus. He emphasizes however that it is not empty in another very important respect. It is based, he claims, on civilizational consensus. Gray's position is debatable on various counts. In the first place, he unnecessarily assents to the thesis that Western civilization lacks a common moral bond and that therefore it is hopeless to argue about what constitutes its core. This thesis, popular among the intolerant preachers of diversity, must logically lead to cultural relativism, and I do not see how, given the premise, such a consequence can be avoided. But Gray is not a cultural relativist because he makes a distinction between those who belong to the civilization and the barbarians who threaten it. One wonders, however, what may account for the difference between "moral solidarity," which is said to be absent in the modern world, and "the solidarity of civilized men and women" which is believed to exist and to distinguish those men and women from barbarians. How can a civilizational consensus be maintained without any reference to morality; and if it can, how can it not be empty? I do not think the difference can be substantiated unless by civilizational solidarity one means the habits of civilized behavior, which makes possible the harmonious coexistence of various cultures. But then, one may ask if these habits, important as they are, constitute a sufficient ground for distinguishing "civilised men and women" from barbarians.

Gray's argument is more resolute: if we, people of different cultures, cannot agree on positive norms, we can at least agree on negative ones—on what we reject as inimical to civilization. He mentions two forces which can unite us in this manner—the totalitarian states and the re-barbarizing movements of our time. As regards the first enemy, the history of the last seven decades has witnessed remarkably generous support for those states (including some indirect support from libertarian foreign-policy "non-interventionists"). The disappearance of totalitarianism which we observe today, but which was long ago and, needless to say, much too early buried by the distinguished intellects of Western civilization, makes things more complicated. There will certainly be many offspring of totalitarianism which will be even more difficult to identify in order to form a civilizational consensus. As regards the re-barbarizing movements of our time, we face the same difficulty. On the basis of other statements by John Gray, I can fathom the danger he has in mind, and I might add I wholeheartedly agree with his diagnosis. But most of those

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movements act under the banner of cultural diversity, and I do not see how we can arrive at "a common perception of enmity" which would permit us to condemn them as neo-barbarians.

Gray's argument is not convincing: either "the solidarity of civilized men and women" is different from "moral solidarity," and then it is empty or superficial and thus subject to Plato's argument; or this solidarity is not empty, and then it contains moral criteria. In the latter case, we are back to the problem of the criterion of choice, which is close to abandoning the idea of diversity as an organizing principle.

Let me conclude. The aim of this paper was not to argue against diversity, but rather against the claim that increasing diversity eliminates the problem of choice and the need to argue about the moral purpose of a political order. The price that has to be paid for the illusion that this claim can be realized is higher than the cost of a constant and inconclusive search for the standards of right and wrong which political structures are meant to serve. One must reject the dichotomy of a totalitarian dictatorship, theocratic and ideological, or a libertarian minimal state, morally and culturally sterile; a gigantic prison or a gigantic department store. Plato's republic was definitely an unpleasant place to live. But is its absolute opposite the best regime a rational human being can think of? Who would like to spend one's entire life in a shopping mall?

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Aletheia Jackson

FOR THE LOVE OF WHIZDOM

Robert Nozick's The Examined Life *is an attempt at metaphysically speculative and humanly significant philosophy. It is a failed attempt. It fails because it is made within the constricted intellectual horizons of Anglo-American analytic philosophy, which leads Nozick implicitly to identify metaphysical speculation with tautology and extravagant absurdity and to identify value significance with aesthetic or emotional stimulation. Nozick's "meditation" on "The Zigzag of Politics" is singled out for special attention. It is argued that Nozick's transformation from libertarian to liberal welfare-statist is not a departure from, but a radicalization and affirmation of the egalitarian individualism and moral and political aestheticism of his* Anarchy, State, and Utopia.

"The unexamined life is not worth living." —Plato

"The examined life is no bed of roses either." —Anonymous

Aristotle tells us that all women and men desire to know. What's more, the most intelligent of them desire to know in a special way. They desire a systematic and integrated set of answers to questions like "What can I know?," "How should I live?," and "What can I hope for?" In short, they desire a *philosophy of life*.

Unfortunately, throughout much of this century the dominant schools of Anglo-American analytical philosophy have been largely unconcerned with philosophies of life, preferring instead to broadcast on the narrow-frequency band between the true depths of speculative metaphysics and

CRITICAL REVIEW, Summer 1990. ISSN 0891-3811. © 1990 Center for Independent Thought.

Aletheia Jackson, 1305 Gallatin Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20011, wishes to thank two anonymous referees for valuable criticisms.

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the genuine concreteness of human relevance. God and cosmology have been banished to departments of religion, physics, and astronomy. Being has been reduced to the value of a bounded variable in a partially interpreted first-order predicate calculus. And instead of debating the meaning of life, many analytic philosophers have preferred to debate about what "we" (here, now, at Oxford, Princeton, Harvard, or Stanford) mean by the word "meaning."[1] In the vacuum created by the profession's retreat into narrow semantic, logical, and meta-ethical issues, a variety of non-academic philosophies, New Age cults, pop psychologies, and self-help fads have sprung up to cater to the desire for wisdom and meaning in life.[2] Some of these are intensely interesting and truly valuable. Most are pure charlatanry and occultism.

Robert Nozick's *The Examined Life: Philosophical Meditations* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1989, henceforth EL), is a professional analytic philosopher's sincere attempt to write about the important things in life. It consists of twenty-seven "meditations" on such deep metaphysical topics as "The Nature of God, The Nature of Faith," "The Holiness of Everyday Life," "Being More Real," "Theological Explanations," "Importance and Weight," "The Matrix of Reality," "Darkness and Light," "Enlightenment," "What Is Wisdom and Why Do Philosophers Love It So?," "The Ideal and the Actual," and the afterdeath—and on such concrete human issues as "Sexuality," "Parents and Children," "Dying," "Creating," "Selflessness," "Value and Meaning," "Giving Everything Its Due," and man-made mass death. *The Examined Life* is a rich and turbulent book, filled with startling observations, sparkling aphorisms, and vividly detailed, almost phenomenological descriptions. Unfortunately, overall, it is a ridiculous book. Unkind critics will even call it a cynical attempt to cash in on the huge New Age market. In this it has been wildly successful. It is perhaps one of the most widely discussed unread books since *The Closing of the American Mind.*

The essence of Nozick's problem seems to be a desire to write truly speculative philosophy while accepting an image of speculative philosophy crafted by its most vociferious enemies, the logical positivists. Yes, yes, I know that logical positivism is officially dead. To paraphrase a quip of Wallace Matson's, "One still seeking to slay the jabberwock of logical positivism can hardly be *au courant* in 1991."[3] Still, I cannot help but think that the very swiftness with which some philosophers proclaim the death of positivism (or of analytic philosophy more generally) gives it a renewed lease on life, for such proclamations tend to forestall the kind of philosophical reflection that would disclose just how potently the positivists'

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philosophical categories and methods still rule the realm of thought, unbeknownst to the thinkers themselves.

This is especially true of Nozick. Like so many analytic philosophers, he seems to think that one must *either* strive for logical rigor and expressive clarity, *or* one must pursue depth and human relevance. If one chooses the latter, then, according to the crudest parodies of speculative philosophy, one must prattle on about whatever half-baked notion bobs to the top of one's stream of consciousness, and one must do so by conjuring up a cryptic, elliptical, semantic haze. To be clear is merely to be clever. To be wise one must muddy one's waters to provide an appearance of depth. In short, it's either A.J. Ayer—or Shirley MacLaine.

To be more specific, Nozick's problems seem to follow from his implicit acceptance of two of the logical positivists' central distinctions: between analytic and synthetic statements, and between cognitively meaningful factual statements and non-cognitive value utterances. Although these distinctions are officially in ill repute, they still seem to be potent in defining the parameters and style of Nozick's writing, allowing us to explain *The Examined Life*'s constant oscillation—in ever-widening swings—between solemnly pronounced tautologies and dizzying emotional outbursts, between extravagant metaphysical absurdities and embarrassing personal confessions, between gassing—and gushing.

Banality Is Profundity

The first distinction, between analytic and synthetic propositions, runs as follows. Analytic propositions are necessarily true, but trivially so, since they are mere tautologies, giving us information only about how we have chosen to use or misuse words. As mere tautologies, they are deemed unworthy of the attention of hard-headed, scientific philosophers. Synthetic propositions, however, are informative. They tell us something about the world; therefore, they are worthy of attention. Unfortunately, they buy this informativeness at the price of not being necessarily true. This distinction has been used as a criterion to exclude from consideration the profoundest statements of metaphysics—"A is A"; "Nothing noughts"; "Appropriation appropriates"; "Existence exists"—as mere analytical trivialities, as "mere talk."

A trace of this distinction seems to be present in Nozick's mind as the premise, "If it is profound then it must be banal." Through the fallacy of affirming the consequent, Nozick seems to make banality the test of

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profundity. Hence we are treated to profundities of the caliber of the following:

> Sex is better with an actual partner on the other end.
>
> A happy person tends to look upon the bright side of things.
>
> Two people *relate* when they respond to each other.

In his meditation "What Is Wisdom and Why Do Philosophers Love It So?," Nozick brings the philosophic quest to its final fruition by revealing, once and for all, (*in italics*) the answer to the burning question that such bumblers as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Spinoza, etc. could never get quite right:

> Wisdom is practical; it helps. *Wisdom is what you need to understand in order to live well and cope with the central problems and avoid the dangers in the predicament(s) human beings find themselves in.* (EL 267)

Lest this seem too vague, Nozick volunteers a helpful suggestion: "Not everything in the world fits in. (Sour cream does not.)" (EL 268).

In the meditation on "The Holiness of Everyday Life," we learn that:

> Eating is an intimate relationship. We place pieces of external reality inside ourselves; we swallow them more deeply inside, where they are incorporated into our own stuff, our own bodily being of flesh and blood. It is a remarkable fact that we turn parts of external reality into our own substance. We are least separate from the world in eating. The world enters into us; it becomes us. We are constituted by portions of the world. This raises primal issues. Is the world safe to take in? How do we come to trust it or find this out? Does the world care enough about us to nourish us? (EL 55-6)

As one reviewer asked, "Has Professor Nozick reported these findings to the Royal Society?"[4]

Murky Depths

Nozick does not, however, confine his "deep" pronouncements to mere banalities. Frequently his meditations become more conventionally "metaphysical." I hasten, however, to add that this is not metaphysics in the sense of Aristotle's enquiry into the Being of beings or Heidegger's search for the meaning of Being. Nor is it the analytical metaphysics of

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modality and mind-brain identity theory. Instead, it is the kind of "metaphysics" associated with crystals, astral projection, the Third Eye, and trance channeling. Throughout *The Examined Life* references to Zen, the Kabbalah, and other mystical doctrines jostle alongside New Age jargon, Nozick's standard sci-fi thought-experiments, and his breathlessly effusive, wildly arbitrary speculations. For instance, in his meditation on "Dying," our guru enlightens us with such whizdom as:

> Here is a more extreme speculation, that in death a person's organized energy — some might say spirit — becomes the governing structure of a new universe that bubbles out orthogonally right there and then from the event of her death. The nature of the new universe then will be determined by the level of reality, stability, security, etc., that she has managed to reach in her lifetime. And perhaps she continues eternally as that kind of God of that universe. This immortality, at least, unlike that usually described, would not be *boring*. (EL 25–6)

Perhaps the most offensive aspect of *The Examined Life* is Nozick's cavalier, voyeuristic treatment of religion. Either one is a believer, or one isn't. If one is a Christian, for example, one believes in the historical reality and transcendent meaning of Christ's crucifixion and resurrection. One then writes about them as historical facts. If one is not a Christian, then one cannot meaningfully repeat the Christian understanding of Christ's crucifixion. This fact simply cannot have the same meaning for a non-believer. But Nozick, who is not a Christian — or a believer of any kind — nevertheless writes in a matter-of-fact way about the sundry beliefs of various religions. In short, he wants to have his cake and eat it too. How does he manage it? *He simply isn't serious.* He doesn't take his subject matter seriously; he doesn't take his readers seriously. Hence the pretentious, shallow eclecticism of his whirlwind tour through Christianity, Zen, the Kabbalah, Hinduism, etc. Hence the glibness and utter frivolity of his treatment of solemn matters of ultimate concern.

This is all the more unfortunate because, in a few lucid and even touching passages, Nozick comes close to redeeming himself, seeming to display a genuine understanding of the kind of moral and aesthetic longing to which the world's great religions and philosophies of life give voice. Nozick poignantly expresses this longing in a question: "Is what we most want this: for our deepest parts to connect with the highest things there are?" (EL 140) The tragedy of *The Examined Life* is that, while Nozick's philosophical *eros* allows him to pose this question, his philosophical tools do not allow him to answer it.

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The Rhetoric of Analysis

Astonishingly, Nozick also manages to combine his metaphysical word-salad with some of the most annoying stylistic tropes of analytic philosophy. For instance, in his meditation on "Sexuality," he manages—quite needlessly—to incorporate a Venn diagram:

> We might diagram sexual intimacy as two circles overlapping with dotted lines. There *are* boundaries between the partners here, yet these boundaries are permeable, not solid. (EL 66)

Then there are the Rube Goldbergian thought-experiments:

> We care about things in addition to how our lives *feel* to us from the inside. This is shown by the following thought experiment. Imagine a machine that could give you any experience (or sequence of experiences) you might desire. When connected to this experience machine, you can have the experience of writing a great poem or bringing about world peace or loving someone and being loved in return. You can experience the felt pleasures of these things, how they feel "from the inside." You can program your experiences for tomorrow, or this week, or this year, or even for the rest of your life. If your imagination is impoverished, you can use the library of suggestions extracted from biographies and enhanced by novelists and psychologists. You can live your fondest dreams "from the inside." Would you choose to do this for the rest of your life? If not, why not? (Other people also have the same option of using these machines which, let us suppose, are provided by friendly and trustworthy beings from another galaxy, so you need not refuse connection in order to help others.) The question is not whether to try the machine temporarily, but whether to enter it for the rest of your life. Upon entering, you will not remember having done this; so no pleasures will get ruined by realizing that they are machine-produced [*sic*]. Uncertainty too might be programmed by using the machine's optional random device (upon which various preselected alternatives can depend). . . . (EL 104-5)

And so it goes, for several more wearying paragraphs of provisos, restrictions, and options, all of them equally pointless, arbitrary, and fantastic—and all of it to prove the initial assertion, "We care about things in addition to how our lives *feel* to us from the inside," a banal assertion that anybody can confirm by a moment's reflection and which nobody save the most dishonestly contentious skeptic would call into question in the first place.

Nozick also manages to incorporate opaque mathematical analogies and pseudo-scientific quantitative analysis. For instance, he asserts that

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"the reality of the self over time, I think, is that largest chunk of reality it is able to maintain most consistently." Lest this seem unclear, he explains it as follows:

> We can give this a sharper formulation. On our imagined graph of the self's reality over time, draw a horizontal line (parallel to the x-axis, the time axis) and consider the area under that horizontal line in all and only those places where that line also is underneath (or identical with) the reality curve. We can set various horizontal lines at different heights. Consider now the horizontal line A at the height that, for a given curve, yields the greatest area bounded by it underneath the curve. . . . Call this greatest area the *primary bulk* of the curve. This primary bulk will constitute our criterion of choice. For two reality curves of two different lifetimes (or of selves over time), let us stipulate that the one with the greatest bulk counts as the one with the greatest overall reality. (When and only when two curves tie in their primary bulk, we can look to their secondary bulk; this is determined by that second horizontal line—which must be above the first horizontal line—which yields the maximum area under both it and the reality curve, after excluding all overlap in area with the primary bulk. The limit of iterating this process—tertiary bulk, etc.—is the total area under the curve.) A self's reality is the largest chunk of reality it maintains most consistently. (EL 135-6)

Clarifying, isn't it?

The central metaphysical chapters of *The Examined Life* are simultaneously the most interesting and the most infuriating parts of the book. As one begins to read the book one quickly learns to cringe whenever the words "being" and "reality" appear, for in Nozick's hands they are like Rorschach blots: ominous, vacuous indeterminacies. "My concern in writing here is the whole of our being. I would like to speak to your whole being, and to write from mine." (EL 17) Nozick also has the puzzling habit of talking about "degrees" of reality.

As the book picks up steam, however, Nozick adds determinations to his concept of reality. The basis for this addition is simple. In his meditation on "Being More Real," Nozick observes that certain things—love, sex, aesthetic stimulation, and other peak experiences—make us *feel* more "real." He concludes, therefore, that reality is that which causes "vivid" and "focused" experiences, and that undergoing such experiences makes *us* "more" real. Reasoning from effect to cause, Nozick then begins reading his peak experiences back into reality, progressively adding dimensions:

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> Reality is a general notion that encompasses value, beauty, vividness, focus, integration. To say of any one of these – for example, beauty – that it yields greater reality is not merely to say repetitiously that more beauty brings more beauty. There is a general notion of reality that includes beauty as one strand; seeing beauty as a way of being more real places it within the pattern of this general notion, alongside the other strands, to their mutual illumination. (EL 137)

Although Nozick claims that beauty is simply one "strand" or aspect of reality, it soon becomes clear that he gives beauty a privileged position. For Nozick, whatever is beautiful *is* the real, the rational, the true, and the good. To treat beauty as the arbiter of what counts as real and good is *aestheticism.* For Nozick the aesthetic is properly a response to organic unity:

> A painting has aesthetic value . . . when it manages to integrate a great diversity of material into a tight unity, often in vivid and striking ways. Such a "unity in diversity" was termed an *organic unity* because organisms in the biological world were thought to exhibit the same unity wherein diverse organs and tissues interrelate to maintain the life of the organism. (EL 163)

> Something has intrinsic value, I suggest, to the degree that it is organically unified. Its organic unity *is* its value. At any rate, it is a structure of organic unity that constitutes value's structure. (EL 164)

By the time Nozick reaches his meditation on "The Matrix of Reality," the initial indeterminacy of his concept of reality has been overcome – and then some:

> In the previous meditation we expanded the list of dimensions of reality from the initial four – value, meaning, importance, and weight – to include many others as well. Let us consider the widest possible list of relevant evaluative dimensions. It contains (take a deep breath): value, meaning, importance, weight, depth, amplitude, intensity, height, vividness, richness, wholeness, beauty, truth, goodness, fulfillment, energy, autonomy, individuality, vitality, creativity, focus, purpose, development, serenity, holiness, perfection, expressiveness, authenticity, freedom, infinitude, enduringness, eternity, wisdom, understanding, life, nobility, play, grandeur, greatness, radiance, integrity, personality, loftiness, idealness, transcendence, growth, novelty, expansiveness, originality, purity, simplicity, preciousness, significance, vastness, profundity, integration, harmony,

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> flourishing, power, destiny. (Let us not ask whether anything has been left out. It is relevant to ask, though, which of these dimensions are realizable by the experience machine and which ones serve to exclude it.) (EL 182)

Lest the reader be overwhelmed by this incongruous and confusing list, Nozick seeks to harmoniously accommodate and intelligibly order its contents in an architectonic matrix. In this task he is more ruthless even than Kant, announcing in advance his willingness to "omit some dimensions that do not fit the form that is emerging or to include some additional ones this form may require" (EL 183). Nozick considers such structural forms as "a doughnut in fourteen-dimensional space or an infinite dimensional sphere giving off rays" (*ibid.*). But he finally settles upon a polyhedral matrix which bears a suspicious semblance to that classic emblem of the science nerd: the Rubik's cube.

I will not bore the reader with the details of the construction of this cube, such as Nozick's discussion of truth, his choice of architectonic variables like "being" and "towardness," his six illustrative diagrams, and his generation of such categories as "Sui Generis," "Unnamed," and "Peace that Passeth Understanding." Suffice it to say that Nozick does not appear to take this process very seriously, and neither should his readers.

Philosophical Ejaculations

The second distinction that Nozick inherits from the logical positivists—between propositions which state matters of fact and propositions which express value judgments—runs as follows. Factual propositions, because they refer to things in the world, can be judged either true or false. Because objective facts are hard and enduring, and because the distinction between truth and falsehood is black and white, factual propositions carry with them a certain weight and dignity. They demand to be treated with a modicum of logical rigor, mental clarity, and responsibility. This is in sharp contrast with value judgments, which do not express matters of fact. Instead, value judgments are simply emotional ejaculations in propositional clothing. Since they refer to the ephemeral and subjective, they cannot be either true or false, nor can they be wielded with the clarity, rigor, and responsibility that attaches to factual propositions. Values, in short, are purely subjective, a matter of feeling.

Traces of this distinction seem to be present in Nozick's thinking as the premise "If it is important, then it must be emotional blather." Again,

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through the fallacy of affirming the consequent, Nozick seems to transmute emotional blather into the criterion for value-significance.

There is one difference between Nozick and the positivists on values. Whereas the positivists treated values as purely subjective phenomena, Nozick claims that they are actually a kind of fact. They are grounded upon organic unity, and our response to them is aesthetic. But when you get right down to it, the criterion of organic unity seems much less important to Nozick in determining something's reality or goodness than his simple emotional response to it. Ultimately, then, his position reduces to the emotivism of the positivists. Hence:

> To be englowed by someone's love, it must be we ourselves who are loved, not a whitewashed version of ourselves, not just a portion. In the complete intimacy of love, a partner knows us as we are, fully. . . . Complex are the ways parents make children uncomfortable about sites of pleasure or elimination, and these feelings can be soothed or transformed in the closest attentive and loving sexual intimacy. In the full intimacy of love, the full person is known and cleansed and accepted. And healed. (EL 74-5)

Sometimes Nozick seems to examine life a bit too closely:

> We meet food in the anteroom of the mouth and greet it there. We probe and explore it, surround it, permeate it with juices, press it with our tongues against the roof of the mouth along that hard ridge directly above the teeth, place it under suction and pressure, move it around. We know its texture fully; it holds no secrets or hidden parts. We play with the food, we make friends with it, we welcome it inside.
>
> We open ourselves also to the specific character of the food, to the taste and the texture, and so to the inner quality of the substance. I want to speak of the purity and dignity of an apple, the explosive joy and sexuality of a strawberry. (I would have found this ridiculously overblown once.) (EL 56-7)

Political Aestheticism

Perhaps the clearest example of the triumph of the aesthetic over the rational in Nozick's thought is his meditation on "The Zigzag of Politics," in which we learn of Nozick's departure from the libertarian position which he defended in *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974, henceforth ASU). Nozick repudiates his libertarianism in favor of

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what appears to be a standard liberal pragmatism, but with strongly communitarian and aestheticist twists:

> The libertarian position I once propounded now seems to me seriously inadequate, in part because it did not fully knit the human considerations and joint cooperative activities it left room for more closely into its fabric. It neglected the symbolic importance of an official political concern with issues or problems, as a way of marking their importance or urgency, and hence of expressing, intensifying, channeling, encouraging, and validating our private actions and concerns toward them. Joint goals that the government ignores completely . . . tend to appear unworthy of our joint attention and hence to receive little. (EL 286-7)

There is also a strong element of egalitarian altruism in Nozick's position:

> The relational stance [discussed in Nozick's meditation on "Stances"], in the political realm, leads us to want to express and instantiate ties of concern to our fellows. And if helping those in *need*, as compared to further bettering the situation of those already well off, counts as relationally more intense and enduring from *our* side and from the side of the receivers also, then the relational stance can explain what puzzles utilitarianism, *viz.*, why a concern for bettering others' situation concentrates especially upon the needy. (EL 288)

What is most interesting about this meditation, however, is not Nozick's departure from his old views, but the continuity between his old views and his new ones. Indeed, it is my thesis that the argumentss of *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* are not sufficient to establish libertarian conclusions because their basic premises better support the welfare state. Nozick's new position, therefore, is less a repudiation than a radicalization of his earlier premises. The lesson of *The Examined Life* is that if libertarian convictions are to receive a sound philosophical validation, then it will have to be from non-Nozickian premises.

Nozick based the argument of *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* upon two Kantian intuitions: (1) that the autonomy and dignity of persons demands that they be treated not as means to the satisfaction of others' ends, but as ends in themselves; and (2) that the phenomenological basis of our access to the realm of intrinsic values is primarily aesthetic, which in Nozick's hands is reduced to a pure moral aestheticism: values are merely a matter of taste or preference. From these premises, Nozick deduces the central question of *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*: How to combine, on the one hand,

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the maximum amount of aesthetic stimulation with, on the other hand, a respect for the intrinsic value of the person? Nozick writes:

> The totality of conditions we would wish to impose on societies which are (preeminently) to qualify as utopias, taken jointly, are inconsistent. That it is impossible simultaneously and continually to realize all social and political goods is a regrettable fact about the human condition, worth investigating and bemoaning. (ASU 297)

Nozick is describing a situation in which we seek to maximize our utility under conditions of constraint—constraint imposed by the finitude of the means available to us, and constraint imposed by the rights of others who, because of their intrinsic value, cannot be used as means for our ends. Nozick, in short, is describing the basic situation that gives rise to modern economic theory's constrained maximization model of rationality: the necessity of pursuing a number of conflicting values under conditions of finitude. By introducing this model of rationality, Nozick deduces (with excessive cuteness, cleverness, and complexity) his libertarian conclusion: a society in which, within the framework of a minimal government, there flourishes

> a wide and diverse range of communities which people can enter if they are admitted, leave if they wish to, shape according to their wishes; a society in which utopian experimentation can be tried, different styles of life can be lived, and alternative visions of the good can be individually or jointly pursued. (ASU 307)

In short, within the meta-utopian framework of a libertarian minimal state, individuals are left free to join together voluntarily to design and tailor utopias to their individual tastes. This approach is superior to others because it allows for the realization of social values that could not co-exist within the same community. Like the free market in goods, Nozick's meta-utopia allows all to broker their conflicting individual preferences in a peaceful, cooperative manner. Nozick's description of the communities that would form—their origins, development, and dissolution—is explicitly aestheticist. The creation of a community is likened to the artistic or imaginative creation of one's own world, although there are of course limits to these creative flights: namely, the conditions of objective reality and the equal rights of others to indulge in a similarly rich fantasy life.

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Nozick's current political philosophy is remarkably consistent with his old one. First, it is still essentially Kantian, based upon intuitions of the moral dignity and rational autonomy of persons. Second, it is even more deeply aestheticist, politics being a medium for symbolic expression, both of the dignity of persons and of the spontaneous imagination. Third, it gives a central place to a constrained maximization model of rationality.

The Kantian and aestheticist aspects of Nozick's new position are made clear in the opening paragraphs of his meditation:

> We want our individual lives to express our conceptions of reality . . . so too we want the institutions demarcating our lives together to express and saliently symbolize our desired mutual relations. Democratic institutions and the liberties coordinate with them are not simply effective means toward controlling the power of government and directing these toward matters of joint concern; they themselves express and symbolize, in a pointed and official way, our equal human dignity, our autonomy and powers of self-direction. We vote, although we are cognizant of the minuscule probability that our own actual vote will have some decisive effect on the outcome, in part as an expression and symbolic affirmation of our status as autonomous and self-governing beings whose considered judgments or even opinions have to be given equal weight to those of others. (EL 286)

Nozick's transformation from libertarian to welfare-statist follows directly from the magnification of certain aspects of these two basic premises. First of all, Nozick's deep Kantian concern with respecting the dignity and autonomy of the other has evolved. Instead of the cold alterity of libertarianism we have the warm altruism of the welfare statist. Instead of the cool, non-judgmental moral egalitarianism of the libertarian *laissez-faire* attitude, we have a hot-blooded intolerance for those who are cold, selfish, and unsympathetic. In short, Nozick has begun to take his altruism seriously, using it as a basis for discriminating between those who deserve his respect and those who will foot the bill. Second, the aestheticist elements of Nozick's thought have been radicalized, acquiring a scope that extends far beyond individual preferences and an importance that overrides them:

> A concern for the expression and symbolization of values that can best and most pointedly, not to mention most efficiently, be expressed jointly and officially—that is, politically—is continuous with a concern for individual self-expression. There are many sides of ourselves that seek symbolic self-expression, and even if the personal side were to be given priority, there is no reason to grant it sole sway. If symbolically expressing something is

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> a way of intensifying its reality, we will not want to truncate the political realm so as to truncate the reality of our social solidarity and humane concern with others. I do not mean to imply that the public realm is only a matter of joint self-expression; we wish also by this actually to accomplish something and make things different, and we would not find some policies adequately expressive of solidarity with others if we believed they would not serve to help or sustain them. The libertarian view looked solely at the purpose of government, not at its *meaning*; hence, it took an unduly narrow view of its purpose, too. (EL 287-8. See also the entirety of Nozick's meditation on "Emotions," EL 87-98).

As for those who do not wish to participate in the symbolic affirmations of human solidarity,

> Their fellow citizens . . . may choose to speak for them to cover up that lack of concern and solidarity – whether or not the people themselves realize that they are *lacking* something. This covering up for them may be done out of politeness, or because of the importance to the others of a joint public affirmation of concern and solidarity, if only so they won't be forced to notice how uncaring and inhumane some of their compatriots are.
>
> To be sure, this joint public affirmation is not simply verbal; those spoken for may still have to pay taxes to help support the programs it involves. (That a fig leaf was created to cover the shame of their unconcern does not mean they do not have to help pay for it.) (EL 288-9)

Nozick raises the libertarian's objection, " 'Well, why don't those who want and need such a society voluntarily contribute to pay for its public programs rather than taxing the others, who don't care anything about it?,' " to which he sternly replies:

> But a program thus supported by many people's voluntary contributions, worthy though it might be, would not constitute the society's solemn marking and symbolic validation of the importance and centrality of those ties of concern and solidarity. That can occur only through its official joint action, speaking in the name of the whole. (EL 289)

Still, Nozick is also aware that the collective expression of liberal, altruistic values may be overridden if backsliding voters elect conservative politicians who express regressive collective values by attacking social programs. To handle this, he institutes the welfare-statist equivalent of the Brezhnev doctrine: "What's ours, we keep. What's yours is negotiable." In order to retain the gains of the welfare state, Nozick is concerned to allow for conscientious objectors to anti-progressive policies.

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> I think someone who conscientiously objects on moral grounds to the *goals* of a public policy should be allowed by the society to opt out of that policy insofar as this is possible, even though the rest would wish to include that person in their joint symbolic affirmation. (EL 290)

However, Nozick does not want such a policy to get carried away, allowing selfish and uncaring people to opt out of helping the needy.

> Some propose removing anything morally controversial from the political realm, leaving it for private endeavor, but this would prevent the majority from jointly and publicly affirming its values. (*Ibid.*)

In a long footnote, Nozick talks about the kinds of conditions under which concerned and altruistic citizens could express their collective values by preventing extremely insensitive citizens from expressing their values at all:

> We might be led, even, to weigh limits on a liberty as important as freedom of speech and assembly. Consider KKK members in white costumes marching through neighborhoods largely populated by blacks, people in Nazi uniforms with swastika banners marching through largely Jewish neighborhoods [etc.]. Must the residents in their home neighborhoods be asked to endure such declaiming and flaunting of support for previously widespread evil (and illegal) actions . . . directed at a group membership that is part of their very self-conception? Must we simply hope that other peaceful citizens from outside will express solidarity with these victimized groups by sitting athwart the path of those marchers to bar their way, showing a concern great enough to incur arrest and jail sentences . . . ?
>
> Or can we formulate specific principles whose scope is "tailored" to this very kind of situation, in order to legally bar such incursions, while mindful still of our general and strong commitment to the free interplay of opinion within the society? (EL 291)

Now, the libertarian is likely to object that Nozick's position is inconsistent. After all, one cannot be a consistent advocate of both the principle of free speech and the principle of sensitive, caring censorship. One cannot be a consistent advocate of both the principle of government conscription and the principle of conscientious objection. One cannot be a consistent advocate of both the principle of individual freedom and the principle of egalitarian income redistribution.

But Nozick would undoubtedly—and quite correctly—reply that his views should not be regarded as propositions to be logically integrated, but as *goals*, as values to be pursued. And, in order to pursue these

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conflicting goals, Nozick returns to his old friend, the constrained maximization model of rationality. On this model, rationality is not a matter of having a set of logically coherent and rationally or empirically validated propositions. Instead, it is a matter of maximally realizing a set of different and often contradictory values. Nozick's position, in short, does not need logical integration; it needs *brokering*. As Nozick writes:

> Let us suppose that there are multiple competing values that can be fostered, encouraged, and realized in the political realm: liberty, equality for previously unequal groups, communal solidarity, individuality, self-reliance, compassion, cultural flowering, national power, aiding extremely disadvantaged groups, righting past wrongs, charting bold new goals (space exploration, conquering disease), mitigating economic inequalities, the fullest education for all. . . . Not all these worthy goals can be pursued with full energy and means, and perhaps these goals are theoretically unreconcileable also, in that not all good things can be adjusted together into a harmonious package. (EL 292)

But although all of these goals cannot be pursued at the same time, Nozick claims that they can be pursued *in turn*—by one political party during one term of office, by another party during another term of office—and this decision is left to the ever-shifting tastes of the electorate.

The only real difference between Nozick's earlier libertarianism and his later welfare statism is that the early Nozick held that there are values which should never be whittled away at the margins to accommodate other, conflicting values. These sacrosanct values included property rights, the freedom of market exchange, the freedom to do whatever one pleases (consistent with the equal freedom of others to do the same).

But what are property rights in the face of the needy? We may grant the morality of the freedom to conceive, invent, produce, and exchange the values that sustain and elevate human life, but what is the moral status of our freedom to indulge our whims and grossest desires in the face of those who don't even have the ability to satisfy their basic needs? Why should we experience the tiny increment of utility consequent upon our third helping of lobster when, for a hungry and homeless person—an abandoned child, a refugee from war—the same mouthful could mean the difference between life and death? Why should we, as a society, publicly institute and protect the values of private indulgence and not the values of collective solidarity? It is considerations like these that lead the new Nozick to place *all* values on the "market"—including the market itself. He can do so because the new market is the market of liberal democratic politics, in which the electorate is empowered to maximize

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freedom *and* security, individualism *and* egalitarianism, capitalism *and* socialism, by whittling away on the margins of each to accommodate the presence of all.

Although Nozick's new political position is quite coherent, it nonetheless exemplifies *The Examined Life*'s triumph of the aesthetic over the rational. No consideration, for instance, is given to the consequentialist arguments offered by such disparate thinkers as Mandeville, Hume, Hayek, and Rand against the public cultivation and indulgence of altruistic sentiments. Yet if one can give rational moral, sociological, and economic arguments for why it is not good, say, to give money to panhandlers or to teach young men who may be potential soldiers to be equally sensitive to the suffering of all, then, when such positions—which, taken in isolation, are conventionally "ugly"—are seen integrated in the broader context of an organically functioning social whole, a certain *beauty* can supervene upon even the coldest shoulder and the hardest of martial virtues.

Furthermore, the new Nozick, like the old, is still uncritically captivated by the aesthetic beauty of laissez-faire economics—the dynamic yet self-correcting and equilibrating model of the economy:

> Note that a regimented society of individuals will not have the highest degree of organic unity or value. It will be less valuable than a free society wherein the major relations of people are voluntarily undertaken and modified in response to the particular changing conditions around them, giving rise to complexly interrelated and ever-shifting equilibria such as economic theory describes. Therein is the largest diversity of activity intricately unified. (EL 166)

In fact, Nozick is so captivated by the aesthetic qualities of the market that, like Murray Rothbard and other anarcho-capitalists, he extends market relations into the political realm as well, although with decidedly different conclusions. Nozick, however, goes much further in pursuit of aesthetic unity than the anarcho-capitalists, adding to the market forms of unity that can be nurtured only by the welfare state: "Building modes of solidarity, fellow-feeling, and sharing into the fabric of the society adds greater unity still to that provided by the market" (*ibid.*).

Aesthetically pleasing though the market may be, however, it is by no means clear that rationality is well protected either by the institutions of private property or by the checks and balances of democratic politics. There are, of course, arguments that both the market and democratic politics have (or can have) strong incentives against systematic irrational-

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ity. For instance, if a shopkeeper chooses to indulge her irrational racial prejudices, then she may find herself boycotted or driven out of business by more rational competitors. If a politician or bureaucrat chooses to indulge in arbitrary and irrational behavior, he may find himself defeated in an election or reprimanded by his superiors. Unfortunately, these arguments assume from the beginning that irrationality is simply a disvalue, something that impedes the pursuit of genuine economic or political values, rather than just another value, which, like all other values, has a cost associated with it. They further assume that, even if irrationality *is* a value, it cannot be pursued in an economically rational manner.

But it is all too clear that both of these assumptions are false. Many people find arbitrary, irrational, unjust actions to be a source of pleasure and satisfaction. In short, they *are* values. Furthermore, it is clear that people are willing to indulge these values at the expense of more conventional economic and political values. In short, they *are* willing to pay the price. Moreover, they may pursue their irrational desires in an economically rational fashion, treating irrational behavior as one more value to be maximized, carefully weighing its risks, costs, and benefits. Thus, for example, the irrational shopkeeper might decide that expressing her racial prejudices might be worth so many lost customers per year, and she may choose to indulge her prejudices surreptitiously, in a way that minimizes her costs. For instance, she may choose to insult only those customers who look like they are just passing through town and are not likely to be customers again in the future. The irrational politician may choose to anger socially marginalized groups. He could attack groups that traditionally vote for opposing parties and do not, therefore, represent lost votes. Or he could plunder a small and voiceless group, spreading the booty around to buy more votes.

Another way of putting this criticism is that the claim that the market serves to enhance rationality trades on an equivocal use of "rationality." All that this argument can legitimately establish is that the market encourages economic rationality, i.e., the pursuit of conflicting ends by appropriate *means*. In short, we have the tautology that the rule of economic rationality encourages . . . economic rationality. What this leaves open, however, is the question of the rationality—i.e., the goodness, the moral defensibility—of the *ends* pursued. And as we have seen, it is possible to pursue irrational ends by (economically) rational means.

Now perhaps it seems that I am demanding that Nozick's new position eliminate all social irrationality and wickedness. This would be an unfair and even utopian demand. There is, of course, no such thing as a perfect regime, and the choice of regimes must always be a matter of weighing

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relative goods and evils. Nozick, however, shows no sign of such a level-headed approach. He does not consider the supposed beauty of the welfare state in light of its tendencies toward corruption, systematic fiscal irresponsibility, creeping bureaucratic oppression, long-term economic instability, and the replacement of ties of family, community and social solidarity by power relationships between atomized individuals. In short, Nozick's new welfare statism, like his old libertarianism, is still a form of irresponsible utopianism.

I should also stress that in criticizing Nozick's aestheticism I am not taking the side of cold, hard facts and the clammy, dissecting hand of reason against warm and fuzzy topics like goodness and beauty. This is the very false dichotomy that I dispute. In fact, I wholly agree with Nozick's attempt to treat the true, the good, and the beautiful as aspects of a single organic whole. In this Nozick seems to be recovering one of the most important doctrines of classical and medieval metaphysics, a doctrine known in scholastic terms as the "circumincession of the transcendentals." It can be argued that the simultaneous separation and opposition of reason and goodness, reality and beauty, fact and value is a defining characteristic of philosophical modernity, causing the proliferation of forms of instrumentalist rationalism that cannot account for their own goodness and conceptions of the good that cannot account for their own rationality. This has led ultimately to the bifurcation of contemporary philosophy into two warring camps: the sterile rationalism of analytical philosophy and the equally sterile nihilism of various strands of "postmodernism" (or better, "frustrated modernism"; cf. Plato, *Phaedo* 189c-190c).

What is objectionable about Nozick's position—what makes it a form of aestheticism—is not that he seeks to unify the beautiful, the true and the good, but that he does so incorrectly, allowing the beautiful to arbitrate what is accepted as true and good, but failing to allow the true and the good to arbitrate what is accepted as beautiful. This is the central failure of *The Examined Life*. It is, though, at heart, a noble failure.

It is truly a shame that *The Examined Life* is sabotaged by a false vision of speculative philosophy, for Nozick has always been one of analytic philosophy's most consistently stimulating practitioners. His other books, *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* and *Philosophical Explanations*,[5] *have* dealt with deep and relevant questions with great rigor. Especially effective is *Anarchy, State, and Utopia*'s Wilt Chamberlain example, which argues that skill and the freedom to use it tend to upset imposed egalitarian distribution patterns (ASU, 160-4). Also brilliant is Nozick's discussion of the rhetoric of "coercive philosophy" in the introduction to *Philosophical*

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Explanations. It would have been a pleasure to have seen the critical and dialectical powers manifested in these passages applied to the important questions of life. As such superb philosophers and lucid writers as Robert Sokolowski, John D. Caputo, Errol E. Harris and J. N. Findlay so clearly demonstrate, there is no incompatibility between clarity, rigor, and speculative depth. Indeed, it is the depth of clear water that we can gauge most accurately.

NOTES

1. For a brilliant "analysis" of analytic philosophy, see Stanley Rosen, *The Limits of Analysis* (New York: Basic Books, 1980).
2. Many analytical philosophers deny that this situation exists today. See "In Pursuit of the Big Questions," *Insight*, September 25, 1989: 48–9.
3. See Wallace Matson, "Rand on Concepts," in *The Philosophic Thought of Ayn Rand*, ed. Douglas J. Den Uyl and Douglas B. Rasmussen (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984), 36.
4. Jim Holt, "Is *The Examined Life* Worth Reading?" *The American Scholar* 59, no. 3 (Summer 1990):461.
5. Robert Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1981).

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Struan Jacobs

POST-LIBERALISM VS. TEMPERATE LIBERALISM

John Gray's recent critique of liberalism, and his case for an apparently relativistic "post-Pyrrhonian" political philosophy, are shown to be wanting. Weaknesses in Gray's critique are identified and discussed: the characterization of liberalism as universally prescriptive, confusion about whether liberalism is a genuine tradition, and misunderstanding of the relation between conduct and the value of freedom. A formulation of liberalism that is not universalist ("temperate" liberalism) is offered, and it is shown that one of liberalism's vital concerns — controlling political power in order to protect freedom — is a hiatus in Gray's theory.

John Gray, a recent champion of classical liberal thought, has now, most notably in his "Postscript: After Liberalism," declared his hostility to it.[1] Readers acquainted with Gray's career may react to this development with a sense of *deja vu* rather than surprise, realizing that his intellectual loyalties tend to be transient. John Stuart Mill, for example, was lauded by Gray in *Mill on Liberty: A Defense* (1983), and then spurned. In *Hayek on Liberty* (1984), Gray presented that thinker as liberalism's authentic contemporary voice, and *Liberalism* (1986) was in part a paean by Gray to classical liberalism. Now, however, Mill, Hayek, and virtually the entire liberal tradition are anathematized. In their stead we are offered a position Gray calls "post-liberalism" or "post-Pyrrhonian philosophy."

It is not part of my plan in this paper to comprehensively cover Gray's "Postscript," at least some of which appears to me unexceptionable and

CRITICAL REVIEW, Summer 1990. ISSN 0891-3811. © 1990 Center for Independent Thought.

Struan Jacobs, School of Humanities, Deakin University, Geelong, Victoria 3217, Australia, thanks Rafe Champion and David Tucker for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

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unobjectionable. My purpose is to bring to light certain weaknesses in his case, and to show that liberalism remains intact.

Is There a Liberal Tradition?

It is disappointing for the reader of the "Postscript" to find Gray confused about the referent or ontology of the term "liberalism." This may call the coherence of his critique of liberalism into question; at the very least it vitiates his claim that there is no discernible liberal tradition in the first place.

Early in the essay, Gray repeatedly presents liberalism as a unified tradition, distinguishable without difficulty. This is apparent in such locutions as "No aspiration is more peculiarly liberal," "It is characteristic, and perhaps definitive, of liberalism," and "it is distinctive of liberal thinkers. . . ."[2]

These (and other) indications by Gray that he has no problem identifying a liberal tradition are soon forgotten. In the last section of the "Postscript" he talks about a deep self-deception in twentieth-century liberalism:

> It is common among latter-day liberals to represent themselves . . . as heirs to an intellectual tradition that is centuries old. . . . [But] Pocock, and others inspired by him . . . [have shown] that this self-image of ourselves as heirs of a long and cohesive intellectual tradition is an illusion. The liberalism of Locke has little in common with that of Mill and it is an error to see the two liberalisms as moments in a continuous historical process. The upshot of this recent work has been to effect a historical deconstruction of liberalism as an intellectual tradition and to retrieve for us the discontinuities, accidents, variety, and historical concreteness of the thinkers indifferently lumped together under the label of liberalism.[3]

The point at issue—How much vicissitude and variety can there be, beyond which thinkers cease to form a tradition?—admits no simple answer. But this much can be noted and surely agreed on: "discontinuities, accidents, variety, and historical concreteness" abound in all cultural traditions, and if they prevent one from sensibly speaking of "liberalism" or "the liberal tradition," the same holds for "Christianity," "Roman Catholicism," "Buddhism," "empiricism," "socialism," "Marxism," "mechanism," "existentialism," "Darwinism" and probably any other tradition one cares to name. Philosophers and historians of ideas would have to forfeit these and a host of other abstract cultural categories, were

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they to adopt Gray's implicit criterion of the coherence of traditions. Better to follow custom and common sense, recognizing that while doctrines and values change over generations, continuities and family resemblances enable intellectual traditions to be distinguished.

In fact, and of course, *most* of Gray's "Postscript" accords with the advice I have just given. For were the denial of a liberal tradition not confined to the finale but expressed throughout Gray's paper, its critique of liberalism would have no object.

Needless to say, there is no essential liberalism, no single simple way to conceive the tradition. How could it plausibly be otherwise, given that liberalism has been sustained and developed over centuries by scores of thinkers? Yet if we follow Gray and principally consider English liberalism over the last two hundred years, the most important contributions may be said to approximate the following ideal type. At the center is *negative freedom,* the commitment to minimizing interference from fellow citizens and governments, assuring among other things security of possessions. Freedom depends on the *rule of law*: it is delineated and protected by general laws before which all people are ideally equal and from which departures have to be justified. While negative freedom is its fundamental good, liberalism affirms a plurality of values besides the rule of law: *individuality, equality,* and *tolerance.* Crucial for liberalism is *constitutional democracy*, itself comprising strategic freedoms to: organize political parties, assemble, express opinions critical of governments (freedom of the press is included), and vote for the party of one's choice.

Gray's Feyerabendian Approach

Gray's critique of this tradition draws inspiration from "post-Pyrrhonian," Oakeshott-influenced[4] theorizing. Elucidating our social-political inheritance, it provides "self-understanding."[5] It refrains from giving "a foundation to practice,"[6] which suggests to me a non-prescriptive discipline. But later, after telling us that "for the political Pyrrhonist, by contrast with the liberal, there are few universal political dilemmas and no universal solutions," Gray indicates that the Pyrrhonist's inquiries might "have a practical aim . . . [although] they need not."[7] There is on the face of it a tension between his remarks in the last two sentences and it will be examined below, but I want now to present his critique of liberalism.

Normative *universalism,* for Gray, is a fatal feature of liberal thought. Prescribing their philosophy universally, liberals misconceive the func-

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tion of political theorizing and promote intolerance of other forms of political life. Gray reasons along the following lines. Common among liberals is the illusion that their philosophy rests on "universally valid principles." They see it upholding the only social order with "universal authority," compared to which all other social-political forms are morally inferior. Gray admits that "in its *applications to personal conduct*" liberalism aspires at "toleration and even pluralism . . . [but] its *political demands,*" he believes, are blatantly intolerant in denying "the evident truth that many very different forms of government may, each in its own way, contribute to an authentic mode of human well-being."[8]

Gray's aversion to universalism is interestingly reminiscent of the view of science advocated by Paul Feyerabend, to whose work Gray refers approvingly. In his principal study, *Against Method* (1975),[9] an exuberant and arresting work (although one marred by its author's superciliousness and his need to play the smart-aleck), Feyerabend argues against universal philosophies of science, holding that any philosophical method-rule (e.g. inductive confirmation, or falsification) applied universally serves only to obstruct scientific progress. On any conception of it, says Feyerabend, scientific progress could not historically have occurred had scientists not on occasion deviated from the directives of methodologists, from which he infers that no method-rule is of universal scope.

Feyerabend further denies that any ground exists on which to pronounce science superior to other forms of knowledge. (This is on account of the "incommensurability" of cultures, which term—applied to values—recurs through Gray's "Postscript.") In later works, *Science in a Free Society* (1979) in particular,[10] Feyerabend's epistemological relativism blossoms into "democratic relativism," a relativism of social-cultural traditions none of which (not even science) is privileged over others.

Must Liberalism Be Universalist?

It may be that some liberals of note (Locke for instance) have endorsed liberalism as universally valid, ascribing legitimacy to liberal society alone. Yet Gray to the contrary,[11] nothing in liberalism necessitates such extravagance, and for Gray to suggest otherwise is to caricature rather than characterize the philosophy. In the final endnote of the "Postscript" he effectively admits as much, in saying of Joseph Raz and Richard Flathman that, while they defend "a liberal view of government and society . . . since neither claims for this view an apodictic [universal] character, it is no longer liberalism as *a doctrine* that is being defended."[12]

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But this comment of Gray is *ad hoc* in the following sense. He commences the "Postscript" with the claim that liberal philosophies are generically universalist. Noting later that some of them are not universalist, he tries to save the original claim by introducing the idea of "liberalism as a doctrine," suggesting that liberalism so qualified has been his concern throughout. I reject the suggestion. Contrast the sentences with which Gray opens his paper, in which universalism is a feature of liberalism *simpliciter*: "It is characteristic, and perhaps definitive, of liberalism that it should seek to ground the historical contingencies of liberal practice in a foundation of universally valid principles. No aspiration is more peculiarly liberal."[13] That, of course, is false, there being many liberals, some of them featured in chapters of Gray's *Liberalisms,* who have not prescribed universally. Hume, for example—who is recognized as a liberal by Gray and is, in Hayek's eyes, the greatest of all liberals—is no advocate of universal liberalism.[14] (We should add, however, that Gray's characterization is not uniform, because he also elsewhere contradictorily describes Hume as a "post-Pyrrhonian," offering a phenomenology of existing "forms of moral and political life.")[15] Another non-universalist liberal is John Stuart Mill who, early in the essay *On Liberty,* writes of his principles being inapplicable to

> backward states of society in which the race itself may be considered in its nonage. The early difficulties in the way of spontaneous progress are so great, that there is seldom any choice of means for overcoming them; and a ruler full of the spirit of improvement is warranted in the use of any expedients that will attain an end. . . .[16]

Nor does Mill's predominantly liberal philosophy for contemporary society straightforwardly extend into the future, as a supposedly "universal" philosophy should. He and his wife, he tells us, perceived as "the social problem of the future . . . how to unite the greatest individual liberty of action, with a common ownership in the raw material of the globe, and an equal participation of all in the benefits of combined labour."[17] The later Hayek, not surprisingly, is another exception to Gray's proposition about liberals issuing universal political prescriptions. In *Law, Legislation and Liberty,* Hayek's defense of liberalism occurs in the context of an evolutionary philosophy. Institutions and values are seen as embedded in traditions, there being no criterion to comparatively evaluate traditions themselves. Relative to particular values, Hayek agrees, certain practices and institutions may prove better adapted than others, but the institutions (those of liberalism in this case) are only feasible when certain attitudes,

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mores and values obtain.[18] It is a mistake to say that Hayek looks on liberalism as the only legitimate form of social life.

Non-Universalist Liberalism

We earlier noted that Gray equivocates on whether the sole purpose of political thought is to promote "self-understanding." His permitting political theory "a practical aim"[19] appears to conflict with his saying that it offers no "foundation . . . [for] practice."[20] Admittedly the last quoted phrase is vague enough to allow different interpretations, but on one plausible reading it suggests that prescription ought to be abjured, which chimes with a concept that Gray terms "flourishing" and which, while expressly affirmed by him only once, seems implicitly to recur throughout the "Postscript" in his insistence on the "legitimate variety of frameworks for human well-being."[21] But what precisely is meant by this and other like locutions? Is Gray supporting political permissiveness as a counterpart to the leitmotif of Feyerabend's *Against Method,* according to which—so far as scientific practice is concerned—literally "anything goes"? Is Gray's aversion to universalism tantamount to relativism, such that any political order—custodian of its own traditions—is valid in its own right, and to be judged only in light of its own standards? Indeed, this seems to be the implication. Does Gray on this basis accept as valid the regimes of Hitler, Pol Pot, Mengistu, Ceausescu, and Stalin?

We undoubtedly need from Gray clarification on key points. If his general proposition about various forms of government serving different kinds of well-being is to be more than tautologically true, the onus is on him to specifically indicate the kinds of polities that serve different forms of well-being and to explain how they accomplish it. He needs also to indicate which polities are destructive of well-being. In thus giving content to his position Gray would be prescribing certain forms of government and proscribing others, and this surely would be giving at least some "foundation to practice."[22] Assuming Gray's tolerance does not extend to every kind of polity, and assuming he does not accept every condition or state of society as constitutive of well-being, his "post-Pyrrhonism" must implicitly have an evaluative character. As such, it differs only in degree, rather than in kind, from what will here be termed "temperate" liberalism, the prescriptions of which are restricted, not universal. "Temperate" liberalism has one broad social-political ideal, that of liberal democracy, but recognizes that this ideal is not appropriate to all societies. "Post-Pyrrhonism," as rendered in this paragraph, suggests

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that different types of government are equally valid and that well-being can take many different forms. "Temperate" liberalism agrees that well-being is diverse, but insists that liberal democracy is its ideal political basis.

Freedom as a Means, Not an End

The lion's share of Gray's paper is devoted to rebutting three lines of argument for the priority of liberty and liberal society: arguments from ignorance (Mill, Popper, Hayek); rational choice or agreement (Rawls, Buchanan, Gauthier); and flourishing (von Humboldt, Mill). But what to my mind is the most compelling argument for liberalism and for the priority of freedom is unnoticed by Gray. Clearly expressed by Popper and implied by many others, this argument is that while freedom cannot secure other values, save tolerance and security—with which it is conceptually connected—without freedom almost every other value is placed in jeopardy. When "freedom is lost," says Popper, "everything is lost."[23]

This argument goes hand in hand with support for democracy, which itself is (but not only) an assertion of freedoms in the political sphere (freedom of the press, of association, of choice between parties, of secret voting, etc.). Obviously, democracy is not conceptually monopolized by liberalism, but one interpretation of it may be regarded as peculiarly liberal, according to which democracy's primary purpose is the protection of freedom. This view of democracy is advanced in the writings of Bentham, James Mill, John Stuart Mill, Popper, Mises and Hayek.

As freedom underlies most other values, so it underlies most traditions, and this has special significance for our response to Gray. Adhering to traditions presupposes that subjects are free to so do; it depends on governments tolerating, not proscribing traditions. When Gray presents as "evident truth" the proposition "that many very different forms of government may, each in its own way, contribute to an authentic mode of human well-being,"[24] my response is that under forms other than democracy "human well-being" exists in spite, not because, of the *form* of government. "Well-being" in non-democracies exists—if at all—precariously, subjects having no control over rulers, and traditions being at their mercy. To this general vulnerability Gray is oblivious; the verity of Lord Acton—"power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely"—is never mentioned in Gray's *Liberalisms*, and that I regard as an indictment.

Embedded in Acton's immortal dictum is what Popper identifies as "the fundamental problem of a rational political theory"—namely: "How is the state to be constituted so that bad rulers can be got rid of without

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bloodshed, without violence?"[25] In *The Open Society and Its Enemies* Popper, correctly in my view, recognizes freedom "as the basis of everything else. This 'mere formal freedom' [so disparaged by Marxists], i.e. democracy, the right of the people to judge and to dismiss their government, is the only known device by which we can try to protect ourselves against the misuse of political power; it is the control of the rulers by the ruled."[26] As Gray is mistaken in thinking that non-democratic *forms* (institutional frameworks) of government themselves contribute to human well-being (although the policies of individual dictators or oligarchs might), he fails altogether to see that *only* democracies afford institutional protection against destruction of well-being—however it be conceived.

Gray is guilty also of grossly exaggerating the extent to which liberalism-cum-democracy is inimical to traditions other than its own. Liberalism is not averse to, say, Judaism, Roman Catholicism, or Islam, in relation to which, and to most other traditions, it stands as a metatradition, according freedom on condition that people tolerate those of other persuasions. The traditions that liberalism does not tolerate, or which at least it is not in principle required to tolerate, are ones that foment hatred and violence. No major political philosophy is more embracing of traditions than liberalism, because none is so respectful of tolerance and freedom. If, as he suggests, Gray favors variety, no tradition will better foster it than liberalism; and other than democracy, no form of government can protect it.

"Temperate" liberalism is not universalist; it does not present liberalism as the only ideal for all polities. It recognizes that liberalism is unsuited to, and is in this sense not an ideal for, societies marked by major fratricidal social divisions, widespread intolerance, antipathy to private property, absence of support for constitutional restraints on rulers, etc.[27] Liberals who ignore such requirements and present their theories as universal prescriptions are mistaken and naive. But "temperate" liberals like Mill and Hayek are untouched by this part of Gray's critique.

Must Liberalism Be Libertarian?

Gray sees as a serious weakness of liberalism that no principle yet conceived has satisfactorily distinguished a sphere of inviolable freedom. There is no "coherent or determinate" principle of liberty, he complains; all pretenders dissolve "into indeterminacy."[28] I respectfully suggest, however, that he is mistaken in believing such a principle desirable (a mistake Mill also made). This error owes, I suspect, to a misunderstanding of the

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way values influence agents. Freedom is not an absolute in the sense of admitting a principled specification of an inviolable sphere. Like most other values, freedom is dispositional, not categorical, in its effects. My valuing freedom *disposes* me now and later to support certain policies and behave in certain ways, without foreordaining it. There are two reasons for this. First, the liberal supports not only freedom, but other (dispositional) values (tolerance, equality, security, democracy, individuality, responsibility) which at times conflict with freedom.[29] While the liberal esteems freedom more highly than other values, this does not entail that in cases of conflict other values are required always to bow to freedom. The liberal, for example, regards democracy as subordinately serving freedom, but would be unlikely to say that the latter should always be supported ahead of democracy. Sacrifices of freedom (certain freedoms of anti-democrats, say) may occasionally be required for democracy to continue effectively to protect freedom.

The second reason for regarding freedom (and other values) as dispositional is ignorance. Without knowing future circumstances, the liberal cannot specify by what means she will support freedom and other values. Popper is right to say in *The Open Society and Its Enemies* that "the important and difficult question of the limitations of freedom cannot be solved by a cut and dried formula." And this he believes is no great loss. Rather, "the fact that there will always be borderline cases must be welcomed, for without the stimulus of political problems and political struggles of this kind, the citizens' readiness to fight for their freedom would soon disappear, and with it, their freedom."[30] For Gray to complain that liberalism is flawed because the bounds of freedom cannot be precisely delimited is analogous to saying that the concept of fragility is impaired because we cannot be certain about all circumstances in which glassware or crockery will break, or to arguing that scientific theories are inherently flawed because scientists never know all their implications, or the problems they will be able to solve.

The foregoing discussion suggests that liberalism should not be seen as a fixed principle or set of principles. It is a program for action, a theory-in-practice, significantly analogous to a "paradigm" in the broad sense assigned that term by Thomas Kuhn. An evolving complex of theories, values, concepts, ontology, solutions to past problems, provides the liberal with resources for dealing with present problems, and future ones of which many—societies being causally open, emergent systems—cannot be anticipated. The difference is that whereas Kuhn's ("normal") scientist knows, in light of his paradigmatic theory, what solutions need

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to be generated to solve problems, rarely do resources of the liberal "paradigm" prescribe unique solutions for problems.

* * *

Few liberal readers of the "Postscript" of Gray's *Liberalisms* are likely to be converted to "post-Pyrrhonism." Caricaturing liberalism and ignoring crucial considerations in its favor, Gray's "case" against liberalism carries no conviction. When one recognizes that liberalism need not be, and often has not been, formulated as a universal philosophy, the teeth are drawn from much of Gray's critique.

I have argued for freedom's primacy on the grounds that it and the adjunct of democracy underpin and protect most other values and traditions. The fact that no satisfactory principle of freedom has been nor is likely to be framed vitiates neither freedom nor liberalism. Being dispositional, the value of freedom admits no precise circumscription.

Awareness of and determination to deal with the problem of abuse of power are a vital part of liberalism, and indispensable requirements of any successful political philosophy. Although Gray has ignored this problem, it might still be asked whether "post-Pyrrhonism" can provide a solution. The trouble is that ambiguity in Gray's account makes it difficult to tell what "post-Pyrrhonism" implies for political practice. It may, as noted, mean that political orders are self-validating, in which case abuse of power may be perceived as a problem in certain political traditions but not in other (authoritarian) ones. On the other interpretation, "post-Pyrrhonism" appears implicitly to prescribe practices and institutions as efficacious for particular kinds of well-being.

The "temperate" liberal would say that regardless of which of these interpretations one chooses, the apparently central contention of "post-Pyrrhonism," that "many very different forms of government may, each in its own way, contribute to an authentic mode of human well-being," does not properly recognize that without freedom and democracy, well-being, no matter how it is conceived, exists only on the sufferance, and is at the mercy, of rulers. According to "temperate" liberalism, people cannot pursue their own well-being without freedom, and cannot protect it without democracy.

NOTES

1. John Gray, "Postscript: after liberalism," in *Liberalisms: Essays in Political Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1989).

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2. Gray, "Postscript," 239.
3. *Ibid.*, 262
4. See especially Gray, "Oakeshott on law, liberty and civil association," *Liberalisms*, ch. 11.
5. Gray, "Postscript," 262-3.
6. *Ibid.*, 262.
7. *Ibid.*, 264.
8. *Ibid.*, 239.
9. Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method* (London: New Left Books, 1975).
10. Feyerabend, *Science In a Free Society* (London: New Left Books, 1979).
11. *Ibid.*, 239-40.
12. *Ibid.*, 266 n35, emph. added.
13. *Ibid.*, 239.
14. For example: David Miller, *Hume's Political Thought* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 144ff.; Chandran Kukathas, *Hayek and Modern Liberalism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), 21-3, 203.

    The falsity of Gray's generic ascription to liberalism of "universalizing doctrinal zeal" is matched by that of his claim that this feature is more marked in liberalism than in "any other intellectual tradition in Western political thought (save the aberation of Marxism)" (239). What, one asks, about the tradition of natural law? Concerning its universalism, the reader will find informative A. P. d'Entreves, *Natural Law* (London: Hutchinson, 1977).
15. Gray, "Postscript," 263.
16. John Stuart Mill, *On Liberty* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), 11.
17. John Stuart Mill, *Autobiography* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 196; see also *On Liberty*, 43.
18. F. A. Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty*, vol. 1 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982), 55.
19. Gray, "Postscript," 264.
20. *Ibid.*, 262.
21. *Ibid.*, 239.
22. *Ibid.*, 262.
23. Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, vol. 2 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), 130.
24. Gray, "Postscript," 239.
25. Karl Popper, "Popper on Democracy," *The Economist*, April 23, 1988: 24.
26. Popper, *The Open Society*, vol. 2, 127.
27. For instructive discussion see J. Roland Pennock, *Democratic Political Theory* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), ch. 6, 206ff., and Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).
28. Gray, "Postscript," 240.
29. For a famous expression of a similar point of view see Isaiah Berlin, *Four Essays on Liberty* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), lvi ff.
30. Popper, *The Open Society*, vol. 1, 110-11.

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James D. McCawley

THE DARK SIDE OF REASON

In his Farewell to Reason, *Paul Feyerabend advocates radical pluralism in all intellectual endeavors and disputes the widely held belief that all issues can and should be resolved rationally. For Feyerabend, it is desirable that mutually incompatible approaches to scientific and scholarly research proliferate. Even an approach that one's favored school of thought dismisses as loony is likely to yield ideas and factual observations that its derogators will find of value and would otherwise have missed. To derive intellectual benefit from an alternative tradition, one need not accept its premises and values; likewise, to ignore uncongenial ideas, one is not obliged to construct a refutation of them, which is just as well, since such a refutation usually can be constructed only by stacking the cards against adversaries about whom one is grossly ignorant.*

I hope that those who are put off by the title of Paul Feyerabend's *Farewell to Reason* (New York: Routledge, 1988) can nonetheless be persuaded to read a book that has things to offend everyone but which also offers its readers an exciting, enlightening, and liberating experience of a sort that few books provide, as well as considerable entertainment. Feyerabend is the only living philosopher whose writing often reminds me of H.L. Mencken, Mike Royko, and Bakunin,[1] a judgment that I back up with the following samples: "Xenophanes was one of the first Western intellectuals. Like many of his successors he was a conceited bigmouth" (91); "I have the uneasy feeling that when speaking in your abstract manner about 'autonomy,' miles removed, apparently, from anything so low and filthy

CRITICAL REVIEW, Summer 1990. ISSN 0891-3811. © 1990 Center for Independent Thought.

James D. McCawley, Department of Linguistics, University of Chicago, 1010 E. 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637, is the author of *The Syntactic Phenomena of English* and *Eater's Guide to Chinese Characters.*

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as money, you actually want the public to pay artists (and scientists, and great 'feelers') to live and work as they, the artists, etc., see fit, i.e. *as parasites*: academics, using the magic hood of 'academic freedom,' have succeeded, long ago, in making parasitism respectable—now the artists want a piece of the action" (278); " 'Primitive' tribes knew how to deal with natural disasters such as plagues, floods, droughts. . . . This knowledge was severely damaged and partly destroyed, first by the gangsters of colonialism and then by the humanitarians of developmental aid. The resulting helplessness of large parts of the so-called Third World is the result of, not a reason for, outside interference" (298); "The best education consists in immunizing people against systematic attempts at education" (316).

Farewell to Reason (henceforth cited as FR) consists of revised versions of twelve articles, most of them previously published,[2] covering a variety of topics in the history, philosophy, and ethics of science, and united principally by their author's passionate involvement in the issues that he discusses: Feyerabend villifies arrogance, myopia, and irresponsibility in all the many places where he finds them, and combines his historical studies with polemics against the granting of political power to any particular intellectual tradition.[3] In the course of FR, he condemns a large number of forms of imperialism, ranging from that in which "the form of life that has the power imposes its rule and eliminates behaviour contrary to it" (25) to the ostensibly benevolent form in which academics discuss alternative world views (usually ignorantly and superficially) but never treat them as serious competitors to their own views (26–8).

In the title of this book (and of the article with which it closes), what Feyerabend opposes is not the use of the diverse faculties that are commonly lumped together under the term "reason" or "intelligence," but rather what Robert Nozick[4] calls "coercive argument": reasoning that is supposed to enable a person not just to draw conclusions in which he can have confidence, but to force others to accept those conclusions under the threat of ridicule or ostracism. In practice, "reason" takes in not just the neat patterns of inference that are commonly taught in logic courses, but also policies of accepting certain premises without question (even though to call anything "self-evident" is merely to confess a lack of imagination) and of ignoring supposedly irrelevant factors (only by ignoring a great deal can one ever follow Sherlock Holmes in drawing the only possible conclusion that has not yet been ruled out). Even formal logic's neat patterns of inference are the sites of major controversies among logicians, and only through arrogance or ignorance do logicians palm off any single full system of logic as unchallengeable. (In the version of logic that

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currently rules as "standard" among Western philosophers, one can prove many results that are widely regarded as counterintuitive, such as the theorem that from contradictory premises one can draw any conclusion at all, even one to which the premises are irrelevant; instructors in logic courses typically indulge in apalling sophistry to get their students to swallow results such as that one.)[5] Reason does not establish that a conclusion is true, but at most that it involves no errors beyond those that one is already committed to. Since coercive arguments, even when they are valid in the technical sense, are usually directed at persons who do not already share all the relevant commitments of the arguer, their success often depends as much on the arguer's prowess at bullying as on the deftness with which he marshalls uncontroversial principles of inference.

Feyerabend repeatedly attacks scientists and philosophers for a particular narrowness of vision that is epidemic among those whose work relies on the "rigorous" use of logic: that of paying little if any attention to considerations that have not yet been subjected to "rigorous" analysis. "Reason" confers no immunity against myopia;[6] if anything, it increases the likelihood of myopic concentration on what one's reason has so far been able to tame,[7] and thus of the common tendency of scientists and intellectuals to assume universality for their particular ways of doing things, as when, for example, medical authorities systematically ignore approaches such as acupuncture and herbal medicine whose successes in healing are not tied to a rationale that the authorities can accommodate in their current frameworks.[8]

As in his earlier *Science in a Free Society*,[9] Feyerabend is especially concerned in FR with the status that Western science has acquired as not just a[10] productive and deservedly respected intellectual tradition but a political force with the power to suppress other traditions. There is a depressingly common belief that science consists in an inherently virtuous activity that, if done properly, is guaranteed to yield truth and understanding that are free of all error and confusion. This belief commonly takes a form according to which scientists, provided they are sufficiently virtuous (= "scientific"), agree with one another, and that any apparent disagreement among them must result from insufficient scientificness among some of the parties to the disagreement.

Over the years, Paul Feyerabend has produced a formidable body of arguments against the attitude that science is something that people should have faith in (rather than something that people should take advantage of while maintaining a critical attitude towards it). For both epistemological and political reasons, he regards with horror the granting of "establishment" status to any particular approach to science: he holds

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that scientific research is more productive when multiple, mutually inconsistent approaches to research coexist (among other things, because any approach, no matter how loony it may appear to outsiders, is likely to identify phenomena that its derogators would otherwise overlook), and he regards scientists as no better than government and religious officials in their potential for imposing totalitarianism when the opportunity arises.

Much of FR is a plea for the particular variety of "relativism" that Feyerabend advocates: recognition that ideas exist not on their own but as parts of diverse traditions, that they can be judged not absolutely but only relative to particular traditions, that no particular tradition has a right to speak for humanity as a whole (or for "Reason" as divorced from all the diverse reasoning individuals and traditions of reasoning) rather than just for itself, and that different traditions can profitably exploit one another's ideas without necessarily adopting them. It is worth emphasizing at this point that the equality among traditions that Feyerabend preaches is equality of rights, not equality with regard to the truth or the inherent value of the ideas that form parts of those traditions. Individuals are free to make their own decisions about the truth or worthwhileness of any ideas, whether of a tradition in which they participate or of one to which they are outsiders, but (according to Feyerabend, with whom I concur on this point) they have no right to demand suppression of disfavored traditions. Moreover, the proponents of a dominant tradition generally do a wretched job of arguing against a disfavored tradition, in view of their often abysmal ignorance of the disfavored traditions that they oppose, as Feyerabend illustrated earlier[11] with his dissection of a 1975 "Statement of 186 leading scientists" against astrology.[12] I, who am as ignorant as the 186 scientists about astrology, am entitled to say that I see nothing of any value in astrology and to dismiss it as worthless so that I can concentrate on ideas from which I expect to derive some intellectual benefit; but I'm not entitled to dismiss it on other people's behalves and would be guilty of disgraceful arrogance if I expected dismissal of it to count as an argument against it rather than merely as an allocation of my mental resources. Feyerabend's attitude towards astrology, witchcraft, and other disfavored traditions is liberating: one is entitled to ignore any intellectual tradition without being obliged to refute it, which is just as well, since constructing a refutation is liable to be a waste of time and to yield only a dishonest rationalization for returning to one's normal intellectual business. Thus, to a critic who, in shocked response to Feyerabend's tolerant remarks about witchcraft, "asks why I use aeroplanes and not brooms to get from one place to another," Feyerabend

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simply answers "because I know how to use planes but don't know how to use brooms, and because I can't be bothered to learn"[13]

Many readers will find Feyerabend's thoroughgoing pluralism hard to take, and even those who find his views generally congenial are liable to throw up their hands when he says things such as that in ancient Greece "The Greek gods were a living presence; 'they were there' " (104).[14] However, before dismissing Feyerabend as a crackpot, one should recall that even in our supposedly enlightened Western society, many entities whose existence or whose relevance to reality is dubious are commonly treated as "living presences." For example, Robert Sternberg, in *The Triarchic Mind*,[15] discussing tests of reasoning ability in various different domains, gives as his sole example of "medical diagnosis problems" a set of problems about Rorschach tests: the test-taker is to pick diagnoses on the basis of rules about what kinds of responses indicate hypomania, paranoia, hysteria, etc. Sternberg introduces this section of his book with the words "People often think of lawyers and doctors as being similar in little other than their professional status and income. However, there are striking similarities in the kinds of reasoning they need to do on the job. Medical diagnosis problems are in many respects similar to legal reasoning problems." The fact that no reviewer has to my knowledge criticized Sternberg for identifying psychiatry as medicine and paranoia as a disease is evidence that the psychiatric pantheon of psychopathologies counts as "a living presence" among Western intellectuals.

Most of what Feyerabend says here and in his earlier books can be given a plausible interpretation in terms of a free market for ideas, in which entry into the market should be unrestricted and intellectual traditions survive only by attracting enough buyers to remain viable; suppression of disfavored intellectual traditions, for example, is an exact counterpart to protectionist economic policies. At times, however, his offhand references to "democracy" leave me quite unclear as to the role of a state in his conception of a market for ideas. He speaks of "the decentralising tendencies inherent in every genuinely democratic society," but seems to have a fairly centralized society in mind when he says "societies dedicated to freedom and democracy should be structured in a way that gives all traditions equal opportunities, i.e. equal access to federal funds, educational institutions, basic decisions" (39) and advocates that "citizens, and not special groups have the last word in deciding what is true or false, useful or useless for their society" (59). Why need anyone have the last word about anything for a society? Is Feyerabend, the self-proclaimed methodological anarchist,[16] unwilling to take political anarchism seriously? I was much happier with Feyerabend's statement[17] that "science is

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one ideology among many and should be separated from the state just as religion is now separated from the state."

Not surprisingly, given Feyerabend's obvious enjoyment of polemics about issues that are important to him, FR contains many replies to critics. He elegantly debunks several arguments that are widely but erroneously thought to have refuted some of his ideas. For example, the fact that adherents of different world views apparently communicate with one another does not invalidate his claim[18] that their conceptual schemes may be semantically incommensurable: the illusion of communication is often sufficient to allow for an interchange that disputants find mutually satisfying (even if you and I systematically misunderstand each other, you can still successfully direct my attention to phenomena of which I was unaware and which pose serious problems for me [54]),[19] and the incommensurability of my conceptual scheme with yours does not prevent me from learning about your conceptual scheme (in the process, probably altering mine but not necessarily adopting yours) and speaking intelligibly about it (266–7).

One of the angriest articles that Ayn Rand ever wrote was one[20] devoted largely to denouncing a paper by Paul Feyerabend. This is appropriate, since of all the billions whose lives overlapped in time with that of Rand, the person that she would have found the least congenial may well have been Feyerabend.[21] The biggest difference between Rand and Feyerabend is perhaps Rand's unreserved acceptance and Feyerabend's equally unreserved rejection of the goal of being a "rationalist," in the sense of "a person who claims to have arguments for every move he makes" (303). In this phrase, Feyerabend gives a marvelous description not only of Ayn Rand but also of her great nemesis, Immanuel Kant. An amusing but pathetic aspect of Kant's rationalism[22] is that Kant, demanding that every action be justified by a universally applicable maxim, arrived somehow at maxims such as that one pipe of tobacco is the quantity that it is permissible to smoke per day. Here Kant avoided first-order arbitrariness only by embracing large-scale second-order arbitrariness: to live one's whole life by the book, one has to make many arbitrary decisions in writing that book. I surmise that Feyerabend shares my view that the avoidance of first-order arbitrariness is a worthless goal and that second-order arbitrariness is an absurd price to pay to achieve it. Since whatever work of Feyerabend's Rand read first would probably have sufficed for her to consign him forever to her philosophical inferno, it is unfortunate that the only work of his that she commented on in print (surely the only one that she ever read) is the early, short, and fairly uncharacteristic article "Science without experience." It is inconceivable

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that Rand would have had any real dialogue with Feyerabend, but if she had read and denounced a more interesting and substantial work of his such as *Against Method*, she might have been stimulated to write a new novel in which her alter egos engaged in dialogues with an intellectual villain modeled after Feyerabend.

NOTES

1. Feyerabend writes as entertainingly in German (his native language) as he does in English; readers who know German are likely to derive considerable pleasure from his *Erkenntnis für freie Menschen* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1980) and *Wissenschaft als Kunst* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1984).
2. For all I know, all of them may have been published previously, but I can't tell, because the publisher doesn't provide details of where the essays originally appeared. In the interests of confining to a single note my complaints about the production of the book, I will remark here that there are a distressingly large number of typographical errors, including whole lines that are repeated, and infelicities of layout in the placement of footnotes in relation to the text.
3. The many philosophers of science who dismiss Feyerabend as a clown or worse cannot afford to ignore the first-rate historical research that FR contains, including, among other things, a detailed demonstration that Aristotle and his medieval followers had a richer conception of space than that which has been standard in Western science since Galileo's day; a rehabilitation of the often maligned Ernst Mach, who Feyerabend describes as "one of the forerunners of gestalt psychology, constructivism in mathematics, Piaget, Lorenz, Polanyi and Wittgenstein" (208; he adds that Wittgenstein, "unfortunately, is much more longwinded than Mach"); and a surprisingly sympathetic portrayal of Galileo's adversary Cardinal Bellarmine, who Feyerabend maintains was quite willing to alter his religious beliefs in the face of sufficiently solid scientific results. He bases this last contention on passages from Bellarmine's correspondence such as the following: "If there were any real proof that the Sun is in the centre of the universe and that the earth is in the third heaven, and that the Sun does not go round the Earth but the Earth round the Sun, then we would have to proceed with great circumspection in explaining passages of Scripture which appear to teach the contrary, and rather admit that we did not understand them than declare an opinion to be false which is proved to be true" (255). This section is one of a number of places where Feyerabend's pluralism leads him to consort with unexpected bedfellows.
4. Robert Nozick, *Philosophical Explanations* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1981), 4–8.

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5. For a worthwhile discussion of the sophistry with which logicians commonly defend the less plausible details of "standard" logic, see A.R. Anderson and Nuel D. Belnap, Jr., *Relevance*, vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).
6. Reliance on "standard" logic itself fosters myopia, in that logicians commonly take an extremely narrow view of the subject matter of logic: logic textbooks rarely take up the inferential properties of any elements of meaning other than those corresponding to "if," "and," "or," "not," "all," "some," and perhaps "must" and "may." One textbook that takes a considerably broader view of what logic deals with is my *Everything that Linguists have Always Wanted to Know about Logic (but were Ashamed to Ask)* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
7. The joke about the man looking under the lamppost for his keys because the light is better there is an accurate description of research practices in many fields.
8. By contrast, "The speedy acceptance of prefrontal and transorbital lobotomy by large sections of the medical establishment in the absence of any even half way decent evidence about results shows that professional acceptance still does not mean excellence and that the argument from professional agreement must be used with great caution" (32). A less pernicious but equally disturbing case is the organized suppression of opposition to fluoridation that is documented in detail in Brian Martin, "Analyzing the Fluoridation Controversy: Resources and Structures" (*Social Studies of Science* 18 [1988]: 331–63).
9. Paul Feyerabend, *Science in a Free Society* (New York: Schocken Books, 1978), henceforth cited as SFS.
10. More accurately, Western science is not one tradition but a set of overlapping and interlocking traditions; in speaking (sometimes, though not always) of Western science as *a* tradition, Feyerabend indulges in the same sort of inaccuracy that one perpetrates in speaking of Christianity as *a* tradition.
11. SFS, 91–95.
12. Feyerabend contrasts the "Statement" unfavorably with a 1484 Catholic Church textbook on witchcraft: Pope Innocent VIII and his theologians "know the subject, they know their opponents, they give a correct account of the positions of their opponents, they argue against these positions and they use the best knowledge available at the time in their arguments. . . . Both the Pope and the '186 leading scientists' deplore the increasing popularity of what they think are disreputable views. But what a difference in literacy and scholarship!"(SFS, 92).
13. SFS, 190.
14. The quotation within this quotation is from Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff, *Der Glaube der Hellenen* (Darmstadt, 1955).
15. Robert Sternberg, *The Triarchic Mind* (New York: Viking, 1988), 165–9.
16. See his *Against Method* (New York: Schocken Books, 1975).
17. SFS, 106.

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18. *Against Method*, ch. 17.
19. There is in fact no connection between whether there is semantic incommensurability and whether disputes can be resolved "rationally." My remark above shows that even with semantic incommensurability, "Popperian criticism" (Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, eds., *Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970]) can result in what for practical purposes is the refutation of one of two competing views; and even without any semantic incommensurability there can be unresolvable disputes, as when shared goals are ranked differently by two factions and each faction accuses the other (correctly!) of throwing out the baby and keeping the bathwater when each sacrifices a different goal in the face of newly discovered facts showing the goals to be in conflict. See my "Kuhnian paradigms as systems of markedness principles" (in A. Makkai and A. Melby, eds., *Linguistics and Philosophy: Studies in Honor of Rulon S. Wells* [Amsterdam: Benjamins, 1985], 23–43) for examples of disputes in linguistics that fit this description.
20. Ayn Rand, "Kant versus Sullivan," *The Objectivist* (March 1970): 1–10.
21. By contrast, Feyerabend thinks quite highly of Rand: "Ayn Rand is OK. Actually, she is much better than most academics. Instead of defending her point of view in dreary essays she writes juicy tales full of sex, industrial espionage, murder, mystery, and at the climax introduces her beloved Aristotle (*Atlas Shrugged*—a story I read with considerable pleasure). And Aristotle, as far as I can see, by far exceeds all existing 'thinkers' in versatility and depth. Also, Ayn Rand admired Mickey Spillane and said so on TV, on the old Mike Wallace show. I prefer her to Derrida and Foucault any time" (personal communication, Nov. 30, 1988).
22. Noted by Walter Kaufmann, *Without Guilt and Justice* (New York: Wyden, 1973), 239.

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*Laurence Dickey**

PRIDE, HYPOCRISY AND CIVILITY IN MANDEVILLE'S SOCIAL AND HISTORICAL THEORY

This paper seeks to show that Bernard Mandeville's primary purpose in The Fable of the Bees *was to historicize the concept of self-love (*amour-propre*) articulated by seventeenth-century French Jansenists and* moralistes*; that in doing so Mandeville constructed a theory designed to explain the inter-subjective constraints and forces of social discipline which characterize commercial societies; and that a full understanding of Mandeville's achievement depends upon an appreciation of the way in which pride in his theory becomes socialized into hypocrisy at a decisive moment in the civilizing process, a moment after which, Mandeville argues, cultural institutions themselves can contain that unfettered self-interest which his contemporaries fearfully associated with the triumph of commerce.*

The aim of this essay is to draw attention to certain interrelated aspects of Mandeville's social and historical theory that have not been properly appreciated. In particular, I argue that much of Mandeville's thinking can be interpreted as an attempt to historicize what various French thinkers had been saying about

CRITICAL REVIEW, Summer 1990. ISSN 0891-3811. © 1990 Center for Independent Thought.

* I would like to thank David Wootton and an anonymous peer reviewer for their comments, and Jeffrey Friedman for his expert editorial assistance.

Laurence Dickey, Department of History, 3211 Humanities Building, 455 North Park Street, University of Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706, phone (608) 263-2364, fax (608) 262-2150, is the author of *Hegel: Religion, Economics and the Politics of Spirit, 1770–1807* (Cambridge University Press, 1987).

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"self-love" (*amour-propre*) throughout the seventeenth century. As is well known among Mandeville scholars, many of these thinkers had been affiliated with Jansenism. Even so, the connection between the Jansenists and Mandeville has not been pursued with vigor by Mandeville scholars since the days of F. B. Kaye and A. O. Lovejoy.[1] I try, therefore, to illuminate that connection in this essay.

My reason for doing so is threefold. First of all, I wish to show how Jansenism provided Mandeville – as early as 1705 – with sophisticated ideological tools with which to fashion an egoistic psychology that did not require the development of a Hobbesian political mechanism to sustain it. Second of all, and more specifically, I wish to explain how seventeenth-century French discussions of *amour-propre* enabled Mandeville not only to socialize egoism, but also to develop an evolutionary perspective on the civilizing process that explained major changes in Western history in terms of the various forms *amour-propre* had assumed in human affairs. Finally, I focus on Mandeville's relationship to the Jansenists because the social theory of both has been identified as crucial to what would subsequently become the ideology of commercial society. As I try to show, however, Mandeville's social theory contains some unexpectedly conservative elements, elements that raise questions about how to explain his position in the intellectual history of the eighteenth century.

Mandeville's Context: A Problem of Interpretation

In 1705, after having resided in England for only a few years, Dr. Bernard Mandeville, a thirty-five-year-old Dutch physician, published a six-penny pamphlet entitled *The Grumbling Hive*. Although this was not his first literary effort in England, Mandeville's now famous doggerel poem later became the centerpiece of what we know today as *The Fable of the Bees*.

As we now have it, *The Fable* is a massive two-volume collection of writings that Mandeville put together between 1705 and 1729.[2] *The Fable*, though, first appeared under that title in 1714 as a one-volume edition in which Mandeville used a set of "Remarks" and several essays to illuminate themes he had adumbrated in 1705 in *The Grumbling Hive*. Then, during the years 1714–1729, while defending his views against various critics, Mandeville added material to the volume of 1714, with the result that by 1729 he had enough for a second volume, which appeared together with the first one in 1733. Owing largely to the superb editorial work of F. B. Kaye, it is that edition that we know today as *The Fable of the Bees*.

It is precisely because of the gradual way *The Fable* was pieced together over time that the book we have today is so difficult to contextualize. Just as England changed between 1705 and 1729, so too did some of Mandeville's main intellectual concerns.[3] Even so, *The Fable* would lend itself to the contextual strategy of intellectual history if we knew more about Mandeville's authorial intentions during these years. As Donald Kelly has observed, despite the apparent conflict between contextual-historical and textual-intentional approaches to intellectual

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history, knowing something about an author's intentions very often helps us contextualize his thinking.[4] In Mandeville's case, however, this way of proceeding is impossible because we know almost nothing about Mandeville's life after he settled in England in the late 1690s.[5] That is not to say that Mandeville's work cannot be contextualized—only that for the contextual strategy to be an effective tool of inquiry in his case, it must be adjusted so as to take account of the particularities (really the lack of them) of Mandeville's life.

In the absence of the kind of biographical information that would be necessary to gauge Mandeville's intentions as a thinker, what needs to be done to historicize him is to first reconstruct the ideological context in which he worked in England. The key to doing this, however, lies in realizing that placing Mandeville in his English setting is not the same as locating him in his ideological context.[6] Mandeville, after all, was not English. In addition, he was almost thirty years old when he arrived in England—which is to say, many of his ideas were probably fixed in his mind when he settled in England and the likelihood of those ideas having a non-English character is quite good.

Many of the ideas Mandeville brought with him to England in the late 1690s are manifest in his work from at least 1703 on—in the language he uses, in the argumentative thrust of his reasoning, and in the rhetorical strategies he uses to frame his arguments. These ideas, moreover, can be rather easily identified by way of a close reading of Mandeville's work up to and including *The Grumbling Hive*. Since we can readily discern the ideological traditions Mandeville chose to write in from quite early on, it is with these traditions that we must start in order to contextualize Mandeville's work.[7]

Still, identification of the traditions in which Mandeville was working early in the eighteenth century only helps us get an ideological fix on him up to a point. For while he was clearly giving expression to these traditions in his work, he was also adapting them to his new English circumstances. As is the case with the ideological traditions manifest in Mandeville's early works, it is relatively easy to identify what circumstances he was trying to cope with intellectually during his early years in England.

M. M. Goldsmith's recent *Private Vices, Public Benefits* focuses precisely on this problem.[8] Specifically, Goldsmith analyzes Mandeville's contribution to *The Female Tatler* in 1709 and 1710, with an eye to the English circumstances that prompted Mandeville to use this forum for his opposition to the so-called Augustan "ideology of private and public virtue"—an ideology that Richard Steele and Joseph Addison were disseminating at the time to the public through *The Tatler* and its fictional mouthpiece, Isaac Bickerstaff.[9]

As Goldsmith sees it, the Augustan ideology of virtue was formed by the convergence of "two distinct types of thought."[10] On the one hand, there was "a pattern of ideas" in which emphasis was placed on "civic or public virtue."[11] As is now well known, this pattern had its roots in civic humanist, republican, Harringtonian, and radical Whig traditions of political discourse. In Mandeville's day, moreover, the pattern was associated with the so-called "Country" ideol-

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ogy—the ideology that became the "language of the opposition" to the Whig government during the Augustan period of English history.[12]

On the other hand, the ideology of public and private virtue drew strength from the Christian conception of "human sinfulness."[13] The various societies formed in England after 1690 to promote the "reformation of manners" prided themselves on the propagation of a social religiosity in which selfless acts of public virtue were marks of a properly directed Christian life. Whether the corruption of public morals was measured in terms of declining virtue or increasing sin the result was the same: a growing alarm over the "moral degeneracy" of Englishmen that could only be stemmed by a renewal of private and public virtue.[14]

The work J. G. A. Pocock has done (and inspired others to do) on early eighteenth-century England leaves no doubt that much of the thought of this period took place in the context of that debate.[15] Similarly, there is no denying that *The Tatler* and Bickerstaff represent this ideology on a microcosmic historical level.[16] Thus, when Mandeville becomes involved in *The Female Tatler*, it is easy to see why Goldsmith interprets his polemical encounters with Bickerstaff as a response to, and as a criticism of, "Augustan ideas about rationality and morality" in general and about the benefits of public and private virtue in particular.[17]

By extension of this argument, moreover, Goldsmith holds that Mandeville's social theory, which by 1714 had progressed beyond the satires of 1709–1710 to become a "single social theory," constituted a "rejection of [Augustan] political and social ideology" as well.[18] Summing up his view of the relation between Mandeville's writings and this context, Goldsmith concludes that in order to "ridicule Bickerstaff's pretensions," Mandeville had to develop "an account of society hostile to the fusion of civic and Christian virtue contained in *The Tatler*."[19] In doing this, Mandeville called into question values that were dear to Britons in the early eighteenth century. Hence, the notoriety of Mandeville's views during this period.

Now as far as Goldsmith's argument goes there is nothing wrong with locating Mandeville in this rather general historical setting. A basic problem of interpretation arises, though, when so much significance is attached to Mandeville's contributions to *The Female Tatler*. The problem is that these writings become the axis of Goldsmith's interpretation of Mandeville as a thinker—the point of historical mediation, that is, between Mandeville's ideas and what Goldsmith regards as his English context.

But what of *The Grumbling Hive* of 1705? As Goldsmith well knows, for better or worse that famous verse fable did more in the long run for Mandeville's reputation than did all the pieces he wrote for *The Female Tatler*.[20] And what of the ideological traditions Mandeville brought with him to England from the Continent? How do they figure in the contextualization of Mandeville's thinking?

To my mind it is the interaction between these discursive traditions and his English setting that needs to be explained if Mandeville is to be placed in proper historical context. That is to say, we need to try to identify the ideological

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traditions which inform the poem of 1705 before we can begin to contextualize Mandeville in England.

The Political Context of The Grumbling Hive

How, then, may *The Grumbling Hive* be contextualized? To begin with, the poem can easily be read as a commentary on the predicament in which the English government—that is, Whig government—found itself from the 1690s on. Kaye understood this very well, remarking that in England after 1690

> commerce and manufacture were growing enormously, and, as a result, the consumption of luxuries. The interest of the state being thereby involved in this increasing trade, the safeguarding of this activity became naturally a chief end of political theory. But, although the inevitable result of worldly interests was thus to foster the development of production and consumption, and thereby the spread of luxury, yet, in the face of this actual activity, popular opinion still denounced luxury as evil in itself and corrupting in its effects.[21]

Indeed, in Kaye's view the dilemma of the government lay in setting a policy that encouraged "the actual pursuit of wealth" and yet did not offend "the current moral condemnation of luxury."[22]

Mandeville's verse fable of 1705, I think, confronts this moral-economic problem directly. The poem, for example, is organized in binary terms that reflect the predicament of the Whig government. To that end, the first part of the poem stresses the economic benefits that follow for a society if it can come to terms with a certain amount of moral corruption among its members. By contrast, the second part of the poem speaks to the consequences that follow for a society when it purges its citizens of immoral and immoderate behavior. As Mandeville's poem is read from left to right—along a line that could be said to run from "wealth to virtue"[23]—readers develop a clear sense of moving from a hive that, in Mandeville's words, is "great and wealthy" to one that is "good and honest."[24]

And yet, if the poem is read carefully, it becomes clear that above all else Mandeville meant to draw attention to the hypocrisy that permeated the wealthy hive. For in the wealthy hive even knaves who had gotten rich by means of fraud and deceit "boasted of their honesty." So "brazenly," in fact, did these "rogues" grumble about the dishonesty of others that "Jove" intervened to rid the wealthy hive of "fraud" and "cheats." With this intervention, which triggers the transformation of the one hive into the other, the grumbling about hypocrisy ceased.[25]

Specifically, what happened was that the "mask" of hypocrisy worn by all the bees in the wealthy hive was "flung down" as their "hearts" were filled with "honesty." Without that mask to hide behind, vanity was exposed for what it was, and "deceit" and "fraud"—in a word, dishonesty—vanished from the hive. And as honesty became the norm of social behavior, frugality and moderation came to characterize life in the hive.[26]

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According to Mandeville, the upshot of this dramatic change was twofold. First, Jove's intervention ensured that an ethic of private and public virtue would pervade this new and "glorious hive." And yet, as the bees internalized this new moral code, a second change permeated the hive, for as vanity became anathema to the bees their appetite for luxury gradually disappeared. In turn, as the bees' avarice diminished, so too did their industry slacken. Soon the economic prosperity of the "fruitful" hive came to an end, with the result that the bees fled their once teeming cities to take up more primitive residence in a hollow tree trunk.[27]

We need to understand, therefore, that Mandeville's description of the principles governing life in the two hives can be read in two ways. On a left-to-right reading axis, the poem makes a rather obvious point about the economic costs of pushing an ideology of private and public virtue too far. There is even a suggestion that a nation's place in the international political order will be threatened by a downswing in its economic fortunes.

On a deeper level, however, Mandeville wished to make an extremely subtle point about the relationship between morality and hypocrisy in human affairs. Read with that focus, Mandeville's poem seems to emphasize the disastrous consequences that follow for a society if haughty moralism informs movements of social reform. What Mandeville is saying, I think, is that in a modern commercial society (i.e., one organized along the lines of the wealthy hive), in which the consumption of luxury items has an important economic function, there will invariably be a great deal of ethical posturing by many members of society. Mandeville implores society to live with that hypocrisy because it is the moral price that must be paid for economic prosperity. Read this way, the poem has less to do with condoning vice than with suggesting that hypocrisy is the tribute paid by selfish individuals in a prosperous society to accepted norms of social behavior.[28]

What are we to make of this argument about social hypocrisy? And how might we go about contextualizing it? With little recourse but to interrogate the text itself, we might begin by asking why Mandeville chose to compare Englishmen to bees rather than, say, frogs or ants; and why he conveyed his message in the form of a fable.[29]

The Metaphor of the Hive

As early as 1703, in a work entitled *The Pamphleteers*, Mandeville used the phrase "grumbling nation" to describe the hostility Englishmen felt toward their Dutch ruler, William III.[30] Given this reference, it becomes obvious that there is a political subtext to the grumbling going on in the hive. This cannot be all that surprising. Mandeville, after all, was Dutch, and from early on he was a supporter of an English-Dutch alliance against France.[31] Hence, it would have been highly unlikely for him to consider the attacks on William with anything other than great dismay.

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That *The Grumbling Hive* has a political dimension becomes all the more apparent when we recall how fables, especially Aesopic fables, were being used in the 1690s in England as vehicles for Whig, Tory, and Jacobite political propaganda. As S. Daniel has shown, the politicization of the fable genre in England began when Sir Roger L'Estrange, a clever and influential Tory polemicist of long standing, added some "Tory-verging-on-Jacobite" reflections to a collection of fables he published in 1692.[32] Thereafter, L'Estrange's political rivals responded to his initiative with their own collections of fables—fables to which Whig-inspired political commentaries were attached. Thus, by the early eighteenth century, the English reading public had been inundated with fable collections in which the political legitimacy of William's government was a key issue.

Since we know that Mandeville never had any truck with the kind of absolute monarchy that so appealed to L'Estrange, it is easy to read *The Grumbling Hive* in a Whig political key. But why were the English grumbling and why were they portrayed as bees?

The answer to these questions lies in the work of L'Estrange and Thomas Hobbes, both of whom regarded grumbling as a characteristic feature of societies on the verge of social anarchy—"civil war," in the pointed political language of Hobbes.[33] On this matter, Hobbes is crucial, for at the beginning of Part II of *Leviathan* he discusses the need men have "for a common power, to keep them in awe, and to direct their actions to the common benefit."[34] Here, of course, Hobbes is developing his famous theory of modern absolutism, the theory whereby men, for the sake of the political guarantees of the "laws of nature," "confer all their power and strength upon one man."[35]

It cannot be irrelevant to our purposes that Hobbes presents this argument while discussing the differences between societies of bees and men. There was, to be sure, nothing unusual about Hobbes's use of the image of the beehive to make political points. The hive, after all, had long been a symbol of the orderliness and industriousness that inhered in societies in which sovereignty resided in a single absolute monarchical authority.[36] The beehive was, according to W. Greenleaf, a "particularly common" idiom in the political discourse of seventeenth-century England.[37] And, as had traditionally been the case—at least from Aristotle on—the hive in that discourse served as a model for a "harmonious" social life under a single monarch.[38]

In *Leviathan*, however, Hobbes explicitly contested this ancient wisdom—especially as it had been formulated by Aristotle, who had held that the beehive operated according to basic principles of political wisdom.[39] Hobbes's view, by contrast, was that ants and bees were not like people: they lived in social harmony not because their ruler politically directed the insects' "actions to the common benefit," but because the "particular judgments and appetites" of each insect were instinctually exactly the same as every other.[40] As Hobbes put it, "being by nature inclined to their private, they procure [without knowing it] . . . the common benefit" by allowing their instincts to determine their behavior.[41] Human society, Hobbes then pointed out, functioned very differently. Men, he maintained, were

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not capable of living in natural harmony with each other because "the common benefit" differed significantly from the "private" interest of every individual.[42]

To explain why this was the case, Hobbes simply noted that man's "natural passions" incline him to "partiality, pride, revenge, and the like."[43] Because man was naturally inclined to over-value himself relative to others, each individual was "continually in competition" with everyone else for "riches, honor, command" or other forms of "praise" the public might bestow upon him.[44] According to Hobbes, this competition, which is especially vicious in "flourishing" states, gives rise to "envy," "hatred," and "finally [civil] war."[45] Constantly "comparing" themselves with one another, all "think themselves wiser, and abler to govern the public, better than . . . them that govern the common-wealth."[46] According to Hobbes, the grumblings of these ambitious men sowed seeds of social discontent and political sedition in the commonwealth. Very often the result of such agitation was civil war.[47]

The juxtaposition Hobbes makes in *Leviathan* of the societies of political insects and men has an obvious political edge: to establish order among contentious men, absolute political power is necessary (this was L'Estrange's view, too). In light of the use of the theme made by the seventeenth century's great iconoclastic social theorist, the emphasis Mandeville placed on the social and political tolerance of grumbling becomes less puzzling. Like Hobbes, Mandeville recognized dissension as a characteristic feature of human society, especially in the modern commercial age. And like Hobbes, he knew that disorder very often followed when society acted upon the pie-in-the-sky reform proposals of the disaffected. But to avoid Hobbes's absolutist political imperative, Mandeville in *The Grumbling Hive* urged men to pay no heed to such reformers.[48] Or, to put it the other way around, Mandeville thought it prudent policy for society to learn to tolerate the ethical posturing of hypocrites. Thus, if social "grumbling"—on the part of hypocrites—was the social price society paid for prosperity, political "grumbling"—the agitation of reformers—was a phenomenon that society had to learn to live with if Hobbesism was to be avoided.

Economic and Moral Discourses in The Grumbling Hive

Now this was not a normal English way of talking about politics or about man's relationship to his fellows in society. Not for nothing was Mandeville viewed by his contemporaries as the expounder of a deviant social doctrine—as Hobbes had been.

Yet, as the always astute Kaye well understood, Mandeville has many more predecessors than the infamous Hobbes, and unlike the latter, these predecessors thought there were socio-psychological mechanisms that could convert private vices into public benefits.[49] On the one hand, the seventeenth-century French moralists, a group of thinkers whom Mandeville had read closely by 1705, had written extensively on the functional aspects of social hypocrisy.[50] On the other

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hand, talk about turning things private into things of public benefit had been a discursive preoccupation of English economic thinkers throughout the seventeenth century. In the main, these thinkers were, as J. Gunn has noted, mercantilists of one sort or another.[51] From 1690 on, moreover, economic thinkers like Barbon, North, and Child, as well as a group of thinkers whom Charles Wilson has identified as "social mercantilists," began to allude to the economic benefits society derived from the greed and vanity of its members.[52] Thus, in the early eighteenth century two well-established, albeit controversial discourses, one psychological and moral, the other economic and social, were available to Mandeville when he sat down to write *The Grumbling Hive*.[53] In fact, one could argue that *The Grumbling Hive* is a textual point of mediation between these two discourses.

It is easy enough to gauge the impact the economic discourse had on Mandeville's thought. Once again we can start with Mandeville's decision to offer the beehive as a model for a prosperous society. For not only political but economic issues would have been conjured up in seventeenth-century English minds by the beehive imagery.[54] In England's so-called "Discourse of Trade" literature of the seventeenth century,[55] the "Dutch economic miracle" was very often explained in terms of the bee-like industry of frugal Dutch citizens who lived in teeming cities of plenty.[56] Many early seventeenth-century writers, to be sure, had noted Dutch industriousness and frugality (e.g., Bacon, Raleigh, Mun, and Misselden); but it was not until after 1660 that such thinkers as Child, Houghton, the still-unknown author of *Britannia Languens*, Barbon, Defoe, and Mackworth explicitly used the imagery of the hive to express the dynamic of Dutch economic activity.

None of these writers, however, did as much to perpetuate the image of the Dutch as industrious, frugal, and ingenious as William Temple.[57] In 1672, in his *Observations Upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands*, he argued that Dutch prosperity, at least until the 1660s, was founded on "habitual industry, parsimony and simplicity."[58] Citing the "voluntary poverty" of the Dutch, a poverty that allowed them to traffic in all the delights of the world without consuming any of them, Temple inveighed against the claim that the "encouragement of excess and luxury" among citizens could prove an "advantage to trade."[59] In this, Temple had the experience of many years of living among the Dutch to draw upon; and what he said about Dutch industry and frugality was also what such Dutch propagandists as Pieter de la Court were saying about themselves.[60] Small wonder, then, that a generation of economic writers would use the beehive, in conjunction with the voluntary poverty argument, as a model for economic enterprise.

Kaye and Wilson have noted how important this commonplace view of Dutch prosperity is for understanding Mandeville's work.[61] For when Mandeville depicted the prosperous hive as teeming with "lust and vanity" as well as "industry," he was specifically contesting this conventional wisdom and the economic implications for English economic development that followed from it. He even explicitly refuted the notion that "voluntary poverty" was crucial to sustaining economic

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growth.[62] Others before him—Fortrey, Coke, and Houghton in the 1670s, and Barbon and North in the early 1690s—had questioned that conventional wisdom; and several had hinted that the Dutch were spenders as well as savers.[63] But in *The Grumbling Hive*, especially in the section entitled "The Moral," Mandeville went further than his predecessors. Indeed, rather than just mention in passing the economic benefits of luxury and vanity, Mandeville seemed to organize the entire poem around the thesis that private vices could be skillfully exploited to promote commercial prosperity.

In stating this in 1705, Mandeville was taking sides in the debate over the reasons for Dutch economic growth. For, like Barbon before him, Mandeville argued that frugality was an overrated force in economic development. Later, in 1714, when he added Remark Q to his annotation of the 1705 poem, he directly rebutted Temple's view of the Dutch.[64] In any event, by 1705 Mandeville seems to have committed himself to a vanity rather than frugality argument for economic development. And as any number of scholars have recently observed, this meant that Mandeville had made consumption the basis of economic growth.[65]

Here, though, Mandeville encountered a theoretical and practical problem. The problem was that, by giving economics a consumption focus in which avarice, vanity, and luxury played such crucial roles, he came dangerously close to confirming a view of human nature that had informed Hobbes's writings and made them so compelling politically. Indeed, Hobbes's absolutism was predicated on the kind of selfish egoism that Mandeville himself had identified as the driving force behind commercial expansion.

Thus, Mandeville had to structure his argument so as to vitiate the possibility of readers giving Hobbesian punctuation to his work. That is to say, somehow the psychology that drove men in the sphere of economic activity had to be framed so as to give rise to a social situation in which anarchy did not prevail. Mandeville's project, therefore, was to socialize egoism so that a political regime of absolutism would not be necessary to ensure social cohesion and political order. The question, then, is what textual moves did Mandeville have to make in order to acquiesce in economic egoism and yet avoid playing into Hobbes's hands politically?[66]

As will become apparent in the next few sections of this essay, the answer to that question is indicated by Mandeville's complicated relation to seventeenth-century French moral thinking. Mandeville's contemporary critics sensed this, pointing out time and again the alien, French aspects of his thought.[67]

What we need to know, then, is how Mandeville's appropriations from French moral thinking allowed him to become Mandeville rather than an eighteenth-century Hobbesian. As we shall see, the French claim that self-love (*amour-propre*) in its various forms could be construed as a socially stabilizing force among civilized men was crucial for his project, as was the French emphasis on the social utility of hypocrisy. For hypocrisy was, as we have already seen, the social price the prosperous hive had to pay for economic prosperity in a non-Hobbesian political environment.

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Self-Love and the Civilizing Process

Such seventeenth-century French theologians and moralists as Pascal and Nicole among the Jansenists; Jean-Pierre Camus among the non-Jansenists; the moralists La Fountain, Esprit, and La Rochefoucauld; and Calvinists like Jacques Abbadie wrote extensively about *amour-propre*.[68] In these writings, a theory of human relations is developed in which social utility is said to derive from the selfish forms *amour-propre* had assumed in human history. How did their views inform Mandeville's?

For Mandeville, self-love provided the initial impetus for man's passage from a savage to a civilized condition.[69] As he saw it, man in his savage state was an "untaught animal"; in his civil state, by contrast, man was a "taught animal."[70] While fleshing out this distinction, Mandeville insisted that in the savage state there was little to distinguish men from animals:[71] instinctually, both were creatures whose sole concern lay with the "business of self-preservation."[72] This concern, Mandeville argued, was rooted in self-love—in "the love which all creatures . . . bear to themselves."[73] Man in society, however, initially became a social being because he had learned from experience that he needed the cooperation of others to survive in a world where a "thousand mischiefs" threatened him daily.[74] It was Mandeville's view, in other words, that man entered into social relations with others less for human companionship than for physical security.[75]

Yet, if experience forced society upon man, man was not by nature given voluntarily to society. For that reason, Mandeville conjectures, man had to be socialized (i.e., had to become a taught animal, as it were) even after he had entered into society with others. According to Mandeville, this process of socialization—a long, drawn-out affair—began when punitive laws were developed to ensure peace among men who, having been habituated to violence in their savage condition, still automatically resorted to it when their desires were impeded or thwarted by others.[76] Fearful of the "severe punishments" these laws meted out to those who engaged in untoward social behavior,[77] men gradually learned to abandon their violent ways for more peaceful ones. It was, therefore, an interplay between man's fear of punishment and his instinct for self-preservation that eventually enticed him to become a peaceable being as well as a social one.[78]

In this context, it is instructive to note that Pascal and Nicole had discussed the socialization of otherwise asocial men in very similar terms.[79] At the core of their thought they posited a triangular interplay between fear, law, and self-preservation. Just as instructively, both thinkers maintained that at some point in the socialization process, society's leaders realized that it was easier to govern men with "flattery" than with "force."[80] The reason flattery became a tool of government, Pascal and Nicole said, was man's *amour-propre*—the tendency in each man to value himself above all others.[81] Because of this predilection for self, it was a simple matter, Pascal and Nicole thought, for "masters" of opinion to find ways to flatter man's pride so that he would act in ways that would serve the public

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interest.[82] If this flattery had the effect of validating a man's exaggerated sense of his own self-worth, then so much the better for manipulating him next time.

What Pascal and Nicole were saying about the transformative capacity of *amour-propre*, about the way *amour-propre* exhibited itself in progressively more enlightened forms as men became more socialized, was not lost on Mandeville.[83] In fact, the account Mandeville offered of the evolution of society in *The Fable* could be interpreted as an historicized version of Pascal's and Nicole's "force-to-flattery" progression.[84]

In Mandeville's conjectural history, for example, the impulse towards society arises first from a fear of physical danger—that of death. Then later, as men become more accustomed to society, this fear fixates on the force of law as an agent of punishment. In both instances, Mandeville says, self-love qua the instinct for self-preservation explains the acquiescence of men in the socializing process.[85]

In these first two steps to society, Mandeville's sequence of development parallels the Pascal-Nicole progression. An even more exact parallel is to be found between Pascal's and Nicole's force-to-flattery argument on the one hand, and Mandeville's so-called "third step to society" on the other. For in Mandeville's conjectural history flattery becomes the crucial agent not only in the further socialization of man but in his moralization as well.[86]

Pride and Flattery as Wellsprings of Morality

Mandeville fleshes out this aspect of his conjectural history by focusing first on that moment in the civilizing process when "lawgivers" (Pascal's "masters" of opinion) realized that the task of governing society would be easier if men could be persuaded voluntarily to subordinate their private interests to those of the public.[87] At this moment, Mandeville claims, lawgivers decided to forsake coercion as a means of establishing obedience among men. Instead, these "wise" and "cunning" politicians enlisted "moralists" and "philosophers" in their effort to tame their fellows.[88] They did this, Mandeville conjectured, by propagating the notion "that it was more beneficial for any body to conquer than indulge his appetites, and much better to mind the public than what seemed his private interest."[89]

Such propagandists, Mandeville argued, urged individuals to do "violence" to the "natural inclination" each had to prefer his own welfare to that of others.[90] Since putting public ahead of private interest obliged men to deny their self-love, society's "leaders" contrived to compensate them for such acts of self-denial by bestowing public honors on these "men of merit."[91] Given this consciously devised "policy," which Mandeville maintains developed after the socialization process was well under way, societies resolved "to give the name virtue to every performance, by which men, contrary to the impulse of nature, should endeavor to the benefit of others, or the conquest of his own passions out of a rational ambition of being good."[92] Indeed, man's capacity for virtue came to be identified

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as what distinguished a truly human being from a mere animal.[93] Men, in other words, were told that virtue was a distinguishing mark of the human race. On that score, virtuous activity was held to be something in which men could take great pride.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the notion that men should be proud of such acts of self-denial was being heatedly debated by theologians and moralists.[94] This was especially true in France where, from the 1640s on, Jansenists and moralists alike regarded acts of self-denial as one of the sophisticated ways *amour-propre* insinuated itself into the collective conscience of modern societies.[95] In their eyes, pride in whatever from was simply a manifestation of man's inherently sinful nature—proof that he drew more satisfaction from loving himself than from loving God.[96] Mandeville agreed with this assessment; but he qualified it by arguing that self-love was so pervasive among men that it allowed skillful politicians—men who recognized "the power which flattery has upon pride"—to moralize men.[97]

Like the Jansenists, Mandeville believed that man was moralized through his self-love (i.e., through his pride) rather than against it. Because of their self-love men were willing to believe just about "anything that [was] said in their praise";[98] and if "public encomiums" accompanied such praise, then there was even more likelihood that a man would accept the "imaginary awards" society offered him as sufficient compensation for whatever act of self-denial he had engaged in to advance the public interest.[99] Thus, for Mandeville, the virtuous acts politicians elicited from men were the "offspring which flattery begot upon pride."[100] As flattery bewitches pride, pride becomes a moralizing agent in the civilizing process.[101]

Here Mandeville articulates a dualistic view of human nature which expressed itself among the Jansenists in the debate about *amour-propre*. As an untaught animal, man was a creature governed by self-love (i.e., *amour-propre* in the mode of self-preservation). In his capacity as a taught animal, however, he acted according to a principle of "enlightened self-love," an orientation that Nicole associated with *amour-propre* in its most sophisticated social form.[102]

Now as self-love is understood today, it is invariably associated with egoistic desires. For this reason, we tend to read Mandeville's discussion of pride as betokening hedonism, individualism, or calculating utilitarianism. And from here it is but a short step to the view that Mandeville was the kind of egoistical social theorist who had made laissez-faire capitalism possible.[103]

In the seventeenth century, however, pride was understood by many thinkers in a very different way. As Lovejoy has brilliantly shown, pride was often construed as a surrogate for virtue—in his words, "the motive upon which the good behavior of men depends, and must depend."[104] If this is how Mandeville's appreciation of the interplay between flattery, pride, and morality is understood, his private vice/public benefit argument must be explained in ways that fly in the face of traditional wisdom about his social theory. And, by the same measure,

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such an interpretation of Mandeville's conception of pride raises questions about him as a laissez-faire theorist.[105]

Lovejoy is most helpful here. For more than any other scholar he has clearly seen how seventeenth-century thinkers used the term pride to express at least two quite different and complex views of man's social relations with his fellows.[106] On the one hand, pride referred to an "egoistic" and "hedonic" desire to enhance one's "self-esteem" (self-conceit, in seventeenth-century religious terminology).[107] On the other hand, pride was "frequently employed to designate approbativeness, the desire for some form of dependence on the approbation of others."[108] According to Lovejoy, "approbativeness tends in the main to compliance with social, that is, external requirements and standards"; by contrast, "the desire for self-esteem—in certain though by no means in all forms—may manifest itself outwardly in . . . defiance of social conventions and rules."[109] From this Lovejoy draws the conclusion—crucial to our purposes here—that a variety of seventeenth-century thinkers understood very well indeed how pride as approbativeness could "exercise a pressure upon the individual toward conformity with" social mores.[110] Lovejoy's splendid point: the gratification self-love derived from the approbation of others, though "undeniably . . . an egoistic or self-regarding motive," could inhibit the development of other egoistic desires within the individual.[111] Thus, depending on how one develops the argument, pride could be either a self-regarding or an other-regarding impulse.

In *The Fable*, Mandeville employs both conceptions of pride. As he saw it, one of the main reasons men were inclined to sacrifice their private for the public interest was that each desperately needed the approbation of others to validate his exaggerated sense of his own self-worth. Mandeville put it this way: "the approbation . . . of others . . . confirm us in the good opinion we have of ourselves."[112] Or again: "For that we have such extravagant concern in what others think of us, can proceed from nothing but the vast esteem we have for ourselves."[113] Finally, "The more pride [men] have and the greater value they set on [gaining] the esteem of others, the more they'll make it their study to render themselves acceptable to all they converse with."[114] Thus, insofar as clever politicians were able to exploit the inflated opinion each man had of himself, they could use man's pride qua his need for the approbation of others to channel his actions in socially beneficial directions.[115]

By presenting his argument about pride this way, Mandeville was able to establish a relationship not only between self-love and pride but also between pride and shame.[116] After all, the desire to gain praise by conforming to others' expectations of what constitutes socially acceptable behavior engenders fear of disapprobation—in Mandeville's words, "a continual dread of shame."[117] Indeed, for Mandeville, "a sense of shame" was necessary "to make us sociable."[118] Given this sense of shame, Mandeville writes, "men often will change their resolution, and act against their [private and natural] inclination, that they may appear in the opinion of some, what they are conscious not to be in reality."[119] Without that

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sense, he then declares, men will indulge in anti-social forms of "impudent and shameless" behavior.[120]

From this argument, in which man's desire for the approbation of others overrides his natural inclination to selfishness, Mandeville is able to give two different accounts of the role pride plays in social life. First, Mandeville can talk about manifestations of pride in purely egoistic terms; this, of course, is the view fastened on by those who regard Mandeville as a laissez-faire theorist. Second, he can emphasize how the desire for approbation, for the kind of public acclaim that enhances one's self-esteem, may wittingly or unwittingly express itself in eager, willing, and strict compliance with accepted norms of social behavior. In the first case, we get men who, Mandeville says, "indulge their pride in being shameless," in being indifferent to public opinions and social mores.[121] In the second case, we get a dynamic in which public opinion – the force that often determines rules of public behavior – exercises and enormous social influence on the actions of otherwise selfish individuals.

For Mandeville, then, as for some of his French predecessors, self-love in general and pride in particular lie behind social as well as anti-social forms of behavior. Even so, there can be little doubt, especially in light of what was said earlier about Mandeville's desire to avoid the Hobbesian political imperative, that it is the compliant form of behavior – the form that entails an individual's subordination of his private to the public's interest – that pervades Mandeville's work. Hence his telling observation, echoing Nicole and La Rochefoucauld, that in the pursuit of self-love "a man [may very well] destroy himself."[122]

Pride and Approbation in Mandeville's French Predecessors

The subtle distinction Mandeville develops between pride as the desire for self-esteem and as the need for the approbation of others is crucial to his social theory throughout his career as a writer. As we have seen, the approbation argument is what makes flattery satisfy pride and what makes fear of shame pertinent to pride as well. In a general sense, Mandeville's entire explanation of the moralizing moment in the civilizing process hinges on these two different but related dynamic interplays.

In developing this line of argument, however, Mandeville had to be careful, because by the early eighteenth century there were several very different ways of interpreting the precise social significance of the approbation argument. Again, Lovejoy is useful for explaining the issues at stake.

In his unjustly neglected *Reflections on Human Nature*, Lovejoy drew attention to the various ideological spins seventeenth-century thinkers gave to the approbation argument. As do many scholars today,[123] Lovejoy recognized that French writers since Erasmus had been exercised by the idea that pride qua the need for the approbation of others could be a stabilizing force in society. Pursuing that

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insight, Lovejoy went on to show how the approbation argument dominated the debate about human sociability in the seventeenth century.

Of the seventeenth-century views of the role of approbation discussed by Lovejoy, several are particularly important for our purposes here.[124] One of these views was ably articulated by Jacques Abbadie, a Protestant divine who Kaye and Lovejoy both suggest had an important influence on Mandeville.[125] For Abbadie, the human desire for approbation was part of God's plan for the gradual socialization and moralization of man, processes which are reflected in the historical progress of civilization. Abbadie's view, one that had roots deep in the accommodationist tradition of Christian thought,[126] was that man's behavior in society was governed by two basic "passions." One passion, Abbadie argued, expressed itself in man's "love of pleasure" (*la volupté*); the other, in his "pride" qua the need for the approbation of others (which Abbadie often called "the love of esteem").[127]

According to Abbadie, both of these passions came "from the same source, which is *l'amour-propre*."[128] Nevertheless, Abbadie continued, the two passions "have in them always some mutual opposition. The love of pleasure lowers us, pride seeks to raise us higher."[129] God, Abbadie then stated, programmed man this way for two reasons: first, He wished to use the "love of pleasure" to bring men together in society; and second, having brought this association into existence, He wished to use the "love of esteem" to "unite" men in a truly civilized way with each other. Taken together the two passions were "the means of which the Author of Nature made use for the perfection of society."[130]

Abbadie, to be sure, was not alone in thinking this way, for by the beginning of the eighteenth century the notion of *civilité* had acquired the meaning of "wise and disciplined [Christian] deportment" in certain French religious circles.[131] And yet, as Lovejoy shrewdly points out, it was precisely this dovetailing of religious and social values, this accommodationism, that had earlier provoked the emergence of Jansenist thought about 1640.[132] For as Pascal and Nicole argued—against the Christian Stoics and Renaissance Neoplatonists as well as the Jesuits—this confusion of the religious and the social enabled already corrupt men self-servingly to reverse the relationship between the city of God and the city of man. That is to say, men could now interpret advances of civilization—the development of what Abbadie called "gentle manners in social relations"—as integral to God's plan for mankind's redemption in history.[133]

For the Jansenists that was clearly not the case. In Nicole's view, for example, as civilization developed men merely showed increasing "dexterity" in the way they managed their *amour-propre*.[134] As a result, he detected shrewd and selfish calculations of interest rather than brotherly love behind the commerce in civilities that took place among men in civil society.[135] Thus, for Nicole—who seems to have coined the phrase "enlightened self-love" to describe this dexterity—the "gentle manners" of civilized men were but outward appearances, masks, behind which they had learned to hide their sinful natures.[136]

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Nicole, therefore, refused to equate *civilité* or *l'honnêteté* with authentic Christian values—with, say, *charité*, a Christian value that Roger Chartier has shown many seventeenth-century thinkers treated as synonymous with civility.[137] Indeed, in Nicole's estimation, civilized men had learned to "imitate" charity perfectly in their outward behavior without having any fellow-feeling in their hearts at all.[138] Insofar as Nicole insisted on measuring religious values in terms of human intentions, he could argue that civility was a "counterfeit" form of charity.[139]

Nevertheless, as Nannerl Keohane has observed, Nicole did identify men's need for the "esteem" of others as the main reason they had chosen to conduct themselves *as if* charity were the motivation behind their external actions.[140] This, Nicole argued, explained why societies had become more civilized in time despite the fact that *amour-propre* continued to motivate individual behavior. On those terms, he was completely willing to concede that pride qua the need for approbation could be an agent of socialization—even of moralization, in a this-worldly sense of the term.[141]

In explaining the approbation argument this way, Nicole reiterated much of the conventional wisdom of the seventeenth century. As had any number of French literary figures since Montaigne, Nicole acknowledged the gap that existed in civilized behavior between outward appearances and internal existence, between social seeming and Christian being.[142] Like Abbadie, it is true, he regarded the need for esteem as a motivation that could be exploited to socialize man—even to moralize him. But unlike Abbadie, and like his famous Jansenist predecessor Pascal, Nicole did not confuse the advances of the species in a social sense with mankind's salvation in a religious sense.[143] Indeed, while for Pascal and Nicole love of esteem might be a "bond" and mark of civil society, it was for them certainly not the appropriate measure of a *Christian* life. Finally, while Nicole joined with Pascal in denying any religious significance to the development of civility, and while he agreed that only grace could save man from himself, he did not aim—as Pascal, La Rochefoucauld, and Esprit surely did—at explaining every social virtue, even humility, as a disguise for sin—as a name men gave to their actions to conceal their vices from themselves as well as from each other.[144]

It is precisely because his writings lack Pascal's stridency that Nicole has been viewed as something of a humanist—indeed, as the most "accommodationist" of the Jansenist thinkers.[145] At times, in fact, it is difficult to distinguish his views from those of such non-Jansenist thinkers as Camus and La Placette, who both tended, like Abbadie, to regard *amour-propre* as a Christian agent of socialization.[146] Both indeed were willing to regard "well-ordered" *amour-propre* as a mark of Christian civility.[147]

Considered this way, Nicole's view of *amour-propre* appears to point in two directions at once: forward to Abbadie and La Placette—who together helped oversee the incorporation of *amour-propre* into Christian ethics in the eighteenth century; and backward to Pascal—who identified *amour-propre* as the motive behind human pride and as the main source of irreligion in men's lives.[148] In the former view, *amour-propre* was a psychological trait that could be manipulated so

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as to turn pride into a principle of social order. Hence, the widespread seventeenth-century notion that approbation was the key to taming the more socially destructive tendencies of *amour-propre.*[149] In the latter, *amour-propre* could never be more than an expression of man's incorrigible sinfulness. Thus the equally widespread seventeenth-century notion that even humility was sinful and a form of pride.[150]

Now, it could be argued that Mandeville follows Pascal in using the idea of hypocrisy to draw attention dismissively to the gap between appearance and reality in human behavior. But while Pascal exploits the interplay between pride and approbation to stigmatize hypocrisy as the behavior of sinners who sought a social diversion for their religious "wretchedness" in the "good opinion" of others, Mandeville had no such intention.[151]

To see this, we need first to look closer at Pascal, recalling that for him men are sinners primarily because "We are not satisfied with the life we have in ourselves and our own *being.* We want to lead an imaginary life in the eyes of others, and so we try to make an impression. We strive constantly to embellish and preserve our imaginary [outer] being, and neglect the *real* [inner] one."[152] Orienting ourselves to this "empire" of opinion, Pascal contends, "is the greatest of [our] miseries."[153] For it is precisely man's other- and outer-directedness, his obsession with securing the approval of others, that "prevents" him both from accepting himself as a sinner and from getting back in touch with his true being, and thence with his Maker.[154]

The religious disdain Pascal shows for approbation goes far to explain why the hypocrisy argument figured so prominently in his thought. It presented him with a religio-psychological way to raise disturbing questions about the equation some seventeenth-century French religious thinkers were drawing between religious fulfillment and well-organized *amour-propre.*[155] This kind of reasoning, Pascal thought, was itself diversionary activity, the kind of thinking in which sinners engaged to rationalize their sinfulness. He maintained that "the will of man is divided between two principles: cupidity and charity. . . . [B]ut cupidity makes use of God and delights in the world while charity does just the opposite."[156]

By using religious language to describe mankind's social achievements, Pascal showed how men were indulging in a collective act of "deliberate self-delusion."[157] What particularly galled him about this was that they had succeeded in this endeavor; they had, that is, convinced themselves that well-organized *amour-propre* was part of God's plan for the perfection of man and society. Whatever men called it, though, Pascal saw it all as an elaborate "masquerade."[158] For behind the masks people wore for each other in society lay *amour-propre*—the "evil stuff of which we are made" and which keeps us from learning the "truth" about ourselves:[159] "[W]e are treated as we want to be treated; we hate the truth [about ourselves] and it is kept from us [by our fellows]; we desire to be flattered and we are flattered; we like being deceived and we are deceived."[160] Because we keep all this deliberately concealed from each other as well as from ourselves, Pascal felt

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justified in arguing that "Man is . . . nothing but disguise, falsehood and hypocrisy, both in himself and with regard to others."[161]

In light of what Pascal says about the relationship between pride, approbation, and hypocrisy, and, conversely, about the need for more truth-telling and transparency in human relations, it becomes clear that he regarded the gentle yoke of civil society—the yoke Abbadie later asked men proudly to wear—less as a step in the divine plan for the perfection of man and society in history than as a device *amour-propre* was using to insinuate itself into the institutions and values of social life.[162] Insofar as this form of social life became a diversion from Christian life, Pascal condemned it outright—which is to say, he made the hypocrisy argument central to the purpose of separating Christian values from civil ones.[163] Civil society, with all its "false" delicacies, was one thing; Christian society quite another.[164]

As was noted earlier, Mandeville had himself used the appearance/reality distinction in *The Fable* to explain how men had been moralized through the power flattery has upon pride. In this, as Lovejoy remarked, Mandeville resembled Abbadie.[165] But Mandeville also used the distinction to draw attention to human hypocrisy. This would suggest a kind of Pascalian revulsion against man's need for the approbation of others. How can Mandeville simultaneously embrace Abbadie's and Pascal's views of the approbation argument?

The answer to this question lies in Mandeville's conception of the civilizing process. For he was quite specific about the socio-historical circumstances which gave rise to the split between the inner and outer dimensions of the human personality. Indeed, as Mandeville saw it, the split arose concurrently with the moralizing moment in the civilizing process. While some men had no difficulty conducting themselves in accordance with the exacting socio-moral standards urged upon them by manipulative politicians, a large majority were incapable of "mortifying" their private interests for the sake of public ones.[166] So, to avoid bringing a "troublesome sense of shame" upon himself,[167] each of the latter, being "ashamed" of his inherent selfishness,[168] learned to hide his self-love behind a "specious cloak of sociableness, and . . . [false] concern for the public good."[169] To that end, these men "cry-up self-denial and public-spiritedness as much as any" in order to conceal from others (perhaps even from themselves) their own "incapacity . . . to tread the arduous, rugged path of virtue."[170]

Now, if we try to fit this hypocrisy argument into Mandeville's conception of the civilizing process, we quickly see that hypocrisy arises as a *social* phenomenon *after* men had been subjected to the process of moralization. That is to say, the impulse towards hypocrisy emerges when men find it socially necessary to hide their "imperfections" from their fellows.[171] Mandeville used interesting language to express this idea. Incapable of "mortifying . . . what was dearest to them . . . [they] would yet be ashamed of confessing themselves to be those despicable wretches that . . . were only reckoned to be so little removed from the brutes. . . . [T]herefore in their own *defence* they would say as others did."[172]

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In this passage, it seems clear, Mandeville is suggesting that dissimulation is less a constant feature of human nature than an acquired historical characteristic—it is something that the taught animal learned at a late stage in the civilizing process, something he developed to protect himself against the high moral expectations society imposed on him. In that sense, social hypocrisy was a strategy for avoiding the stigma of shame.

That Mandeville approached hypocrisy historically and socially rather than religiously and personally distances him from Pascal. Indeed, for Mandeville man has no real, inner being in a religious sense. All man has is *amour-propre*; and that takes on different social forms in different historical periods. Mandeville, of course, did not hold that there were no hypocrites before a certain stage of history had been reached. But he was saying that dissimulation did not become a social strategy until the moralizing moment of the civilizing process had taken root in public opinion—which is to say, Mandeville reconciled Pascal and Abbadie on the approbation issue by historicizing the theme of *amour-propre*.

To summarize, then, the opposition between the inner and outer man was, for Mandeville, less an inherent aspect of human nature than a social feature of civil society that arose at a relatively late stage in the civilizing process. Prior to its emergence in civil society, man's need for the approbation of others had drawn him outside himself and into conformity with others: men were moralized through the power flattery had upon pride. Here, as Lovejoy noted, Mandeville is similar to Abbadie. Mandeville then gave the approbation argument a Pascalian turn when he observed how what frequently passed for moral behavior often involved nothing more than feigned, outward conformity to social norms.

Yet, if we look even more closely at what Mandeville says in *The Fable* about social hypocrisy—about it being essential to all "civil commerce"[173]—then we can see that he is giving still another twist—truly a Mandevillean twist—to the approbation argument. Indeed, when Mandeville writes that "it is impossible we could be socialized creatures without hypocrisy,"[174] he has something very specific in mind—a theory of "good manners" that as we shall presently see has little to do with hypocrisy in the Pascalian sense.[175]

Mandeville's Economization of Pride

We have already seen how Mandeville's conception of the civilizing process mainly revolved around three moments of human experience. He discussed these moments sequentially—in terms of the socialization, moralization, and dissimulation of man. Much that Mandeville said about these moments constituted an historicization of and variation on things said by Pascal, Nicole, and Abbadie about the forms *amour-propre* assumed in human society. We have seen, too, that Nicole and Abbadie construed this sequence as evidence of man's historical and conscious advance beyond a life of simple pleasure.[176] As Abbadie revealingly observed, God used "the love of esteem" to perfect society *after* He had used "the

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love of pleasure" to form it.[177] In fact, Abbadie regarded the development of the former not only as an advance beyond the latter but also as a check on it—a non-political form of economic police, as it were.[178] Like Pascal, moreover, Mandeville appears to have seen hypocrisy as a mask for economic vanity—the disguise civilized men wore to conceal their avarice and cupidity from each other.[179] This line of interpretation is bolstered by the conventional view of Mandeville as a cynic who delighted in unmasking the pretensions of moralizing Englishmen, and as a hedonist who wished to give full freedom to egoism in economic affairs.

But if Mandeville had argued this way, he would have been playing right into Hobbes's political hands. Evidence from Remarks O, C, M, and R of *The Fable* suggests, though, that Mandeville was less concerned to show that hypocrisy was a social cover for economic vanity than that it was a means to contain it.[180]

In Remark O Mandeville inserts the hypocrisy argument into a lengthy discussion in which the main theme is the role conspicuous consumption plays in the commercial life of modern nations.[181] He contends that during the moralizing moment of the civilizing process, the enjoyment of "sensual" pleasure—what Mandeville terms "real" or "worldly" pleasure—came to be stigmatized as the bodily pleasure of "low-minded" men.[182] Conversely, and from at least the time of the Stoics on, the pursuit of pleasures of the mind became the mark of men with noble souls who delighted in "the conquest of their own passions." Consequently, "voluntary poverty," a life of deliberate self-denial of the sort practiced by the bees in the honest hive, became the measure of a truly moral life.[183]

But, as Mandeville put it in Remark O, the age-old antithesis between individual pleasure and social morality changed as commercial forms of social organization developed in history. Indeed, during the seventeenth century, "worldly-minded, voluptuous, and ambitious" men—first courtiers of the great kings of Europe and then men of all social classes—learned to derive great personal satisfaction from the attention they drew to themselves through conspicuous displays of their wealth.[184] This way of gratifying their pride, Mandeville writes in Remark M, manifested itself in myriad ways:

> people . . . are [now] generally honored according to their clothes and other accoutrements they have about them; from the richness of them we judge of their wealth, and by their ordering of them we guess at their understanding [taste]. It is this which encourages every body, who is conscious of his little merit, if he is in any ways able, to wear clothes above his rank, especially in large and populous cities, where obscure men may hourly meet with fifty strangers to one acquaintance, and consequently have the pleasure of being esteemed by a vast majority, not as what they are, but what they appear to be. . . .[185]

Continuing the thought, Mandeville notes that during the "last century" the "standard of ancient honor" gradually eroded, giving way in the process to "a new standard" of esteem that compelled pride to take on the form—literally, wear

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the fashionable clothes of—economic vanity.[186] When Mandeville draws attention to this process—the process by which pride was "economized" in the seventeenth century—he is telling us something about the historical transition by which a martial society held together by feudal honor evolved into a commercial society held together by conspicuous consumption.

Before the seventeenth century, pride was fulfilled through honor: satisfied by gaining the esteem of others through acts of self-denial, especially acts of martial valor. But according to Mandeville, pride's aim since then has been to secure esteem by way of accumulating as many economic "tokens of pride" as were possible.[187] What Mandeville is talking about, therefore, are two different forms of pride which manifest themselves through the actions of differently constituted men in different historical ages. On the one hand, there are men of honor who take great pride in self-denial; on the other hand, there are men of fashion who take pride in conspicuous displays of their wealth.

It is true, of course, that on an abstract level pride lies behind both modes of social activity.[188] By stressing that fact, the two different forms of social action can be collapsed into each other and an aspect of historical continuity established between feudal and commercial societies. In both instances, pride governed the behavior of men. But in Mandeville's view—and here his sense of how circumstances of time and place shape human behavior triumphs over his view of man as a creature driven by the singular impulse of self-love—the one form of pride is clearly giving way to the other. On that reading, his twofold conception of pride delineates the poles of a period of historical transition. That, I think, is the historical perspective that lies behind his statement that "all the symbols of [pride] are not easily discovered; they are manifold and vary according to the age, humor, circumstances, and often constitution, of the people."[189]

Pride and Economic Vanity in Commercial Societies

Mandeville had three different views of the role pride played in the transition from feudal to commercial society. First of all, he recognized how commercial expansion had increased opportunities for material indulgence for many people.[190] These people, who were eager to construe fashionableness as a measure of social distinction and as a mark of personal pride, obviously held no brief for the doctrine of voluntary poverty and the conventional wisdom that equated public-spiritedness with self-denial. Thus, to counter the social ethic of self-denial, whether in its classical moral or feudal honor form, they contrived, in Mandeville's words, to "put a favorable construction" upon their economic vanity[191]—which is to say, while wallowing in "a sea of lust and vanity," they concocted an apology for luxury in which "indulging [one's] appetites" was presented as an activity that "set people to work."[192] In this way, Mandeville remarked, pride in its economized form was declared to be an agent of "public welfare."[193] Outfitted with this declaration, Mandeville cynically observed, "the fashionable part of the people"

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could "enjoy [the real pleasures of] the world" and make claim upon "the good opinion" of their fellows at the same time.[194]

Second of all, even though Mandeville regarded the apology for luxury as "a cloke and pretense" for economic vanity,[195] he concurred that pride, luxury and fashion were "spurs to industry."[196] On that score, he interpreted the economization of pride as crucial to increased consumption and commercial expansion.

By interpreting the economization of pride in these two different ways, Mandeville has made it easy for scholars to depict him as a theorist of economic development who, while seeing the hypocrisy of the apology for luxury, nevertheless acquiesced in it for economic reasons. Hence, his reputation as a libertine who flaunted the moral and religious conventions of Augustan England for the sake of an indulgent and hypocritical individualism.[197]

But in *The Fable* Mandeville develops a third perspective on the interplay between pride and economic vanity in seventeenth-century England, one that raises questions about Mandeville's reputation as an economic liberal and apologist for luxury.

This perspective emerges in Remark M.[198] There, while discussing the life of the bees in the wealthy hive (i.e., commercial society), he refers to a passage in *The Grumbling Hive* in which "prodigality," "luxury" and "odious pride" were said to have "employed a million of the poor."[199] He observes that

> We are possessed of no other quality so beneficial to society, and so necessary to render it wealthy and flourishing as [pride], yet it is that which is most generally detested.[200]

A correct reading of this crucial statement, I think, requires us to realize that in it pride has two different meanings at once. On the obvious level, "odious pride" is being associated with economic vanity and the apology for luxury. In that form, it creates jobs, which Mandeville supported. On a deeper level, though, the economic form of pride was recognized by Mandeville as "generally detested"—that is, it was socially shunned by groups that had previously been flattered into thinking that voluntary poverty was the appropriate form of social behavior for self-denying, public-spirited people. In other words, the meaning of this passage turns on setting one form of pride over against another. Thus, luxury and the ethic of conspicuous consumption are undermining the ethic of asceticism and the doctrine of voluntary poverty at the very moment that the latter are serving to check the advance of the former.

Had he left things at that, it might be thought that Mandeville would have liked to see old values give way to new ones. If that were the case, Mandeville would be a "bourgeois" thinker slightly ahead of his time.[201]

But Mandeville most assuredly did not leave things at that. For in *The Fable*—especially in Remarks R, C and M—he discussed two different ways in which pride as self-denial might be used to contain economic vanity in the modern world. On first inspection, the two discussions appear to have little in common. In one the subject scrutinized is what Mandeville calls "modern honor";[202] in the

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other, his topic is "good manners."[203] As we shall see, however, both arguments aim to achieve the same thing: namely, to develop a surrogate for self-denial in modern commercial societies.

In Remark R, speculating on the need large commercial states will have in the future for a "tie of society,"[204] Mandeville conjectures that without such a tie these states "would soon degenerate" into villainy and treachery.[205] Then, while claiming that neither religion nor virtue had been "half so instrumental to the civilizing of mankind" as "the principle of honor,"[206] Mandeville proceeds to show how honor, which is built upon pride and rooted in the need for the approbation of others, acts as a "check" on all sorts of "unworthy" desires in human beings.[207] Not wanting to seem unworthy of the honor paid to him by others, a man of honor automatically engages in acts of "self-denial" for the sake of his (or his family's) reputation.[208] Thus, in feudal society men learn to abate their "avarice" for the sake of their "pride." For Mandeville, then, urging commercial society to develop an ethos of modern honor was a call for preserving the non-political policing of avarice that had served society well during the feudal age.

Needless to say, this is a curious argument for someone of Mandeville's supposedly libertine disposition to make. But there can be no mistaking Mandeville's intention here, for while admitting that "we are beholden to our frailties [i.e., to our pride] for the chief ingredient of it,"[209] he insisted on the efficacy of honor as a form of social discipline. Indeed, even though he acknowledged that in some sense men of honor were animated by "pretended" principles of conduct,[210] he did not think that those who acted on such imaginary principles were being governed by "false rules."[211] Thus, although flattery and honor were in Mandeville's mind wholly contrived "means to rouse man's pride," they were also the means society used to contain man's anti-social impulses.[212]

Given the anti-Hobbesian political cast Mandeville chose to give *The Fable*, it is not hard to see what he was groping for in his conception of modern honor. Surely what intrigued him about the principle of honor was that it functioned as a *social* check on behavior and operated independently of political agencies. Honor demanded of men that they abnegate their inner drives for the sake of outward appearances, that they impose upon themselves a behavioral regimen that was determined by the rules governing men of a certain social station. This kind of behavior involved not only much posing and posturing but also an enormous amount of self-discipline—inner constraint, that is.[213] As such, it was an ethos that could be enlisted to contain avarice and vanity in modern commercial societies.

The alacrity with which Mandeville read rules of inner constraint into his conception of honor should not be viewed as momentary nostalgia on his part for the lost values of the past. For as it turns out, what Mandeville says abut modern honor is similar to what he says about good manners elsewhere in *The Fable*. Indeed, as he observed several times, neither honor nor good manners had anything to do with religion or virtue; both were driven by pride; and both policed the behavior of citizens in non-political (i.e., in truly social) ways.[214]

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Mandeville develops his conception of good manners at several points in *The Fable*.[215] As he sees it, good manners are rooted in pride—in a form of pride, however, that registered the advance of civilized man beyond classical morality, feudal honor, and the teachings of the Christian religion.[216] In predictable fashion, he begins by asserting that "all civil commerce" among men entails "hypocrisy."[217] As he develops this theme, however, it becomes evident that what Mandeville is referring to here has less to do with hypocrisy in the conventional sense of deceiving others than with living by the rules of civility in a modern socio-cultural sense.[218]

At this point Mandeville's work begins to anticipate Montesquieu far more than it reflects the wisdom of the seventeenth-century French moralists.[219] As was previously noted, Mandeville does not wish to stigmatize human beings as inveterate hypocrites. Rather, his view is that "in all civil societies [men] are taught insensibly [from birth] to become hypocrites."[220] That is to say, all civil societies try to inculcate "a sense of shame" in men for the purpose of social control.[221]

For the sake of "their own defense," however, men learn to "avoid bringing shame upon themselves" and, in the process, become adept at deceiving each other.[222] They do this by developing "good manners," by acting according to rules society sets for civil intercourse among men. These rules, Mandeville argues, constitute a "bond of society" that "exacts from every member a certain regard for others."[223] As such, good manners are for Mandeville synonymous with sociability and tolerance.[224] As he explains,

> All the precepts of good manners . . . are no more than the various methods of making ourselves acceptable to others, with as little prejudice to ourselves as is possible: by which artifice we assist one another in the enjoyments of life, and refining upon pleasure; and every individual person is rendered more happy by it . . . than he could have been without such behavior.[225]

Good manners, in other words, promote the common good without having anything to do with virtue or religion.[226]

Like honor, then, good manners hold society together. In fact, just as honor was the "established" form of pride in pre-commercial societies, so good manners could fulfill an equivalent function in commercial societies. Now it is certainly true that the exercise of good manners may create a gap between inner being and outer behavior. And at places in *The Fable* Mandeville seizes the opportunity to ridicule the pretentions of overly polite, "well-bred" gentlemen.[227] Obviously, when he is writing in this vein Mandeville continues to take his cues from the seventeenth-century French moralists who delighted in exposing the hypocrisy of the fashionable men who crowded the court of Louis XIV.[228]

For the most part, though, Mandeville cast his discussion of good manners in a rather different light. For instead of interpreting the display of good manners as a form of hypocrisy, instead of drawing attention to the gap between intention and behavior, he endeavored to show how this gap was essential to "all civil commerce" among men.[229]

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The argument Mandeville makes here—prefiguring Montesquieu's later discussion of the "rules of civility"[230]—grows out of two uniquely Mandevillean insights: that hypocrisy arose as a social form at a relatively late stage of the civilizing process; and that since its emergence as a social form hypocrisy had become something of a "habit" among civilized men.[231] According to Mandeville, the fact that the majority of civilized men had managed to avoid being moralized explained why a gap existed between man's inner and outer self in civil society. By the same measure, the fact that this gap had become habitual explained how civility could be mistaken for hypocrisy in the modern world.[232]

For Mandeville, therefore, hypocrisy had two dimensions. On the one hand, there was hypocrisy of the usual sort. On the other hand, there was that "hypocritical commerce" among men that Mandeville called good manners.[233] The latter, he said, was a social convention that, while requiring no moral disposition in men, enabled egoistic men to live agreeably with each other in society.[234] That is to say, the socialization of hypocrisy had fostered the emergence in history of yet another form of pride—the pride men could now take in their civility. In that form, pride, like honor before it, could act as a check on untoward social behavior. Accordingly, Mandeville singled out this new form of pride, this all-pervasive cultural hypocrisy, as a stabilizing social force in the civilizing process. Thus, Mandeville equates the "habit of hypocrisy" with "civil commerce" in order to point out the role civility and good manners play in moderating behavior in commercial society.[235]

Viewed in this context, the historical meaning of Mandeville's conception of good manners begins to reveal itself: as a civilized form of social dissimulation, it redounds as much to society's as to the individual's interest.[236] True, good manners had their origin in the attempt of fine gentlemen to avoid the social stigma of shame; but over time the manners of those gentlemen became the basis of social intercourse, the basis of *doux commerce*, among civilized men of other social ranks.[237]

It is, of course, man's pride, his incessant need for the approbation of others, that compels him to heed the rules of good manners.[238] And it is certainly true that constant display of good manners involves putting on a social mask of sorts. Yet, without the establishment of this new civilized form of pride, odious pride in the sense of economic indulgence would go socially unchecked in modern commercial societies. For Mandeville, then, the historical fact that hypocrisy had become socialized testified to the existence in civil societies of a code of conduct that not only policed the behavior of individuals but did so without requiring men to be moral. In that respect, tolerance of hypocrisy in the new form of civility could be taken as an expression of a civilized rather than hypocritical attitude toward life.

It is, I think, Mandeville's awareness of the socially stabilizing aspect of good manners qua civilized hypocrisy that explains why he has the bees in the prosperous hive complain about the dishonesty of others. For, according to Mandeville, that kind of grumbling is less a cover for immoral behavior than a visible

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cultural sign that a set of social rules—civil society's functional equivalent of the principle of honor—was acting to constrain certain destructive, egoistic tendencies of the human personality. Tolerance of such grumbling, in short, is the price that must be paid to avoid the perils of shame on the one hand and Hobbesian absolutism on the other.[239]

In the end, then, Mandeville's dovetailing conceptions of modern honor and good manners suggest that, while he may have been an economic apologist for luxury, he was anything but a social libertine. It follows from this that in Mandeville's scheme good manners are a surrogate for the principle of honor and that, in that form, he meant for good manners to act as a police mechanism for odious pride and economic vanity.

Countervailing Vices and Laissez-Faire

If Mandeville meant for modern honor and/or good manners to act as non-political mechanisms for policing avarice, then it is incumbent on Mandeville scholars to re-think much that has been written about him as a social theorist.

The need for such a re-evaluation becomes obvious as soon as we realize that Mandeville's decision to treat pride and hypocrisy socially and historically rather than psychologically and religiously made him, in effect, a theorist of countervailing vices. In *The Fable*, Mandeville used the language of countervailing vices on several occasions,[240] so there is no reason to doubt that he was aware of the particular configuration around which so much of the text was organized.

This comes out clearly if we consider Mandeville's famous private vices/public benefits argument in the context of the economization of pride. To wit, in a feudal society pride is a vice that is translated into honor through the mediating agency of self-denial.[241] As we have seen, the result of this conversion is the emergence of a social (i.e., non-political) check on untoward behavior in feudal society. By contrast, in a commercial society odious pride is translated into employment opportunities for the poor through the mediating agency of self-indulgence.[242] Clearly, the dynamic of the private vices/public benefits argument is very different in the two cases: one depends on self-denial, the other on self-indulgence. The reason for this difference, of course, is that Mandeville recognized the different historical forms pride assumed in feudal and commercial societies. That, in turn, explains why the private vices/public benefits argument is different in the two cases.

In addition to the two historically grounded versions of the private vices/public benefits argument, there is another less historical version of it—one which is hinted at by Mandeville in *The Fable* and is later more fully developed in Hume's economic writings.[243] This version, which after Hirschman and Pocock I shall call the *doux commerce* thesis,[244] holds that just as commercial expansion enhances the opportunities for material indulgence, so too does it foster the refinement of appetites.[245] The claim here is that as commercial development takes place, men

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have more leisure time to cultivate themselves,[246] and the inclination towards odious pride becomes transformed into good manners. Good manners, in turn, act as a check on the distasteful manifestations of odius pride. As such, good manners can be said to moderate man's appetites.[247]

Again, the mechanism that converts a private vice into a public benefit is personal indulgence, but in this version the transformative capacity of the conversion mechanism extends its reach beyond the individual to the cultivation of social taste. Or to put it another way, in this version the apology for self-indulgence has a broad cultural rather than a narrow economic face.[248] As commercial societies evolve, in other words, cultural values are supposed to set limits to self-indulgence and displays of odious pride. In that respect, the *doux commerce* thesis holds that commercial societies are capable of policing themselves without the assistance of intervening governmental agencies.

What is striking about Mandeville's treatment of the various private vices/public benefits arguments is that in each instance, pride generates the countervailing dispositions (i.e., honor and good manners) that ultimately serve to contain the harmful force pride initially unleashed. The private vices/public benefits argument, therefore, only works because Mandeville allows different forms of pride to counterbalance each other.[249] Thus, by playing one form of pride off against another, Mandeville creates what he regards as a stable social environment within which commercial society may develop in a civilized way.[250]

In this regard, F. A. Hayek's essay on Mandeville is most instructive.[251] As is well known, Hayek viewed Mandeville as primarily a theorist "of evolution and of the spontaneous formation of . . . [social] order."[252] To that end, Hayek argued that, for Mandeville, "the whole order of society, and even all that we call culture, was the result of individual strivings which had no such end in view, but which were channelled to serve such ends by [rules of conduct and codes of manners] which also had never been deliberately invented but had grown up by the survival of what proved successful."[253] And as Hayek goes on to demonstrate, it was with this "wider" socio-cultural context in mind that Mandeville "developed all the classical paradigmata of the spontaneous growth of orderly social structure: of law and morals, of language, the market, and of money."[254]

Hayek is certainly right about this. And, with some important qualifications, he is also right about the continuity of development between Mandeville and Hume as social theorists.[255] Yet, in one respect the terminology Hayek uses to describe Mandeville's social theory creates more problems than it solves.

What I have in mind here is Hayek's decision to use the phrases "spontaneous growth" and "laissez-faire" to characterize Mandeville's overall social theory.[256] The problem is that, while adequately capturing Mandeville's reluctance to assign responsibility to government for the creation of rules of conduct, Hayek's terminology obscures the deliberate way in which Mandeville used the doctrine of countervailing vices to reconcile divergent tendencies in his own social theory.

On several occasions, moreover, Hayek equates spontaneous order and laissez-faire with what "the market produces" economically."[257] Whether that is an

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appropriate way to characterize Mandeville's economic thinking is debatable;[258] but, by using the same terminology to describe what Mandeville is doing in his wider social theory, Hayek creates the impression that, for Mandeville, things economic and things social are products of the same spontaneous dynamic. What is lost in this formulation, of course, is the sense in which Mandeville meant for the latter to counterbalance the former. Appreciation of the doctrine of countervailing vices, I think, helps us avoid collapsing into each other the wider social and narrower economic considerations that informed so much of Mandeville's thinking.

Granted, it could be argued that the reason Mandeville wished to contain odious pride was that he had been unable as a theorist to free himself from outmoded social conceptions of the destructive tendencies of unfettered self-interest. Like Locke before him, so this argument would run, Mandeville's thought had some "residues" in it that prevented him from completely breaking with either traditional social values or what Hayek identifies as "constructivistic rationalism."[259] But it was not unfettered self-interest *in the economic realm* that Mandeville feared. Rather, what exercised him as a theorist was the prospect of economic self-interest encroaching upon the social and cultural values that provided commercial societies with the precious social ties they need to sustain themselves. Hence, one of the things Mandeville's theory of social hypocrisy allows him to do is keep the pursuit of unfettered self-interest in its appropriate conceptual place—the realm of economic activity.[260] There it could be contained by wider socio-cultural considerations—by honor and good manners, in Mandeville's case.[261]

Mandeville and the Enlightenment: Between the Doux Commerce *and Feudal Blessing Theses*

If the presence of the doctrine of countervailing vices in Mandeville's social theory raises troubling questions about his credentials as a libertine social theorist, it also creates difficulty for how we explain his relationship to the Enlightenment.

It has long been the received view that Mandeville's ideas on human nature, economics, social evolution, and religion prefigure mainline ideological themes of the Enlightenment.[262] For that matter, most twentieth-century scholars have agreed with Hume that Mandeville was an economic and ethical libertine, who, through his apology for luxury, oversaw the emancipation of avarice from political *and* social control.[263] Indeed, from Kaye through Polanyi to Goldsmith, Mandeville has been depicted as a spokesman for the egoism and greed of an emergent capitalist society.[264] Goldsmith even characterizes Mandeville as a defender of "the capitalist way of life."[265] In the eighteenth century, what could be more progressive and enlightened than that?

Clearly, our analysis of Mandeville—which demonstrates his indebtedness to the French moralists for much of his social theory and which focussed on the

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roles modern honor and good manners played in his thinking—enables us to view Mandeville's relationship to the Enlightenment from a different perspective.

This perspective can be elucidated by appreciating some of the recent work that has been done on the role commercial modes of thought and value played in eighteenth-century thinking—specifically, in the thought of thinkers such as Montesquieu, the principal intellectual figures of the Scottish Enlightenment, and Burke. In this body of literature, much of it written by economists, a main theme is what Fred Hirsch has called capitalism's "depleting moral legacy."[266]

The Hirsch thesis, recently made well-known through the work of Albert Hirschman,[267] turns on the question of whether capitalism can sustain itself as an economic system without "a supporting social morality."[268] The question is pertinent, Hirsch thinks, because capitalism as an economic system undermines the moral values around which it has organized itself as a social system.[269] For the most part, Hirsch claims, these values derived from "prebourgeois conventions and values,"[270] values that personally inhibited and socially restrained extreme forms of economic self-seeking by individuals.[271] As Hirsch sees it, these prebourgeois values "provided the necessary social binding for an individualistic, nonaltruistic market economy." Hirsch, like Irving Kristol and Daniel Bell before him, contends that, as these values are slowly undermined by economic processes,[272] capitalist society becomes progressively more unstable, gradually losing its legitimacy as a system of value. Since in Hirsch's estimation that is the predicament of contemporary capitalism, he speculates on and seems to welcome the need for the "re-entry" of moral values into late twentieth-century capitalist societies.[273]

In Hirsch's (as well as in Kristol's and Bell's) scheme religious values—of the sort Weber associated with the Protestant ethic—provided much of the motivation for altruistic behavior in prebourgeois societies.[274] But, as we have seen, Mandeville was not inclined to appeal to Protestant values to prevent the large nation-states of Europe from degenerating. Nonetheless, Mandeville's conception of modern honor allows for—indeed encourages—the persistence of the principle, if not the substance, of feudal honor into the world of modern commercial societies. We could say, therefore, that while Mandeville's doctrine of countervailing vices allows him to acquiesce in commercialism as an irreversable historical process, it also permits him to designate modern honor as a restraining social principle that would serve as the functional equivalent of the feudal principle of self-denial.[275] Under no circumstances, of course, did Mandeville counsel return to the good old days of feudalism; but he did wish to make a place for certain aspects of the feudal ethos in the value systems of modern commercial societies. If, therefore, Mandeville was a forward-looking, progressive economic thinker, there was also a backward-looking, conservative dimension to his social thinking.[276]

Hirschman and Pocock have theorized about how such conservative thinking might be related to the influence commercial modes of thought and value had on some key eighteenth-century thinkers.[277] According to Hirschman, there was a

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tendency among some European thinkers from the early eighteenth century on to regard the presence of feudal values in modern commercial societies as salutary.[278] Though Hirschman never identifies him as such, Mandeville was surely one of the first of the so-called "feudal blessing" theorists. Montesquieu, too, though also omitted by Hirschman in this regard, is a thinker who appreciated the role honor could play (especially in large monarchies) in preventing luxury and corruption.[279] And in *The Spirit of the Laws*, Montesquieu also developed the idea of *doux commerce* as a check on egoism in international affairs.[280] Pocock, moreover, has noted how Edmund Burke appealed to "manners" as a way of containing social as well as political anarchy.[281] And there are tell-tale signs of this pattern of thinking in no less a modern figure than Adam Smith.[282]

All of this suggests that Mandeville's relationship to the Enlightenment must be reconceptualized so as to take account of the reservations he clearly had about some of the non-economic implications of commercialism. He seems to use the idea of modern honor the way he does because, like Hirsch, he distinguishes between commercialism as an economic system and as a socio-cultural value system. Thus, while the economic dimension of his work clearly comes out of the 1690s environment that produced the apology for luxury in England, the non-economic aspects of his writings continually strive to develop an authentically *social* (i.e., non-Hobbesian) way to prevent commercial society from encroaching self-destructively upon all areas of social life. In that endeavor, Mandeville draws heavily on the ideological resources of Jansenist social theory.

But what of Mandeville's alternative claim that good manners may act as a non-political police mechanism for society? Is that not a mainline Enlightenment argument? Yes and no. Yes, because in this Mandeville certainly prefigured Hume's *doux commerce* argument; no, because the same argument figured prominently in Burke's attack on the Enlightenment. That is to say, Mandeville's handling of the good manners argument can be interpreted in two different ways. On the one hand, it can be viewed as testimony of Mandeville's faith in commercial society's capacity for long-term cultural development – for generating and sustaining its own system of moral values.[283] On the other hand, it can be interpreted as a sign of his concern that, if commercial societies do not provide cultural incentives for the development of good manners, they will sooner or later self-destruct.[284] If the former, Mandeville can be viewed as a proponent of what Pocock has called the "Whig" conception of the civilizing process.[285] If the latter, Mandeville can be said to be *reversing* the *doux commerce* thesis – alleging, it would seem, that commerce can advance only so long as civility and good manners provide society with bonds that will hold it together in the face of economic egoism.[286]

Given the linguistic and functional similarities we have noted in *The Fable* between Mandeville's modern-honor and good-manners arguments, it would appear that both occupy the same conceptual space in Mandeville's thinking: both indeed are designed to contain odious pride. Yet, despite their conceptual convergence, the terms *modern honor* and *good manners* refer to discrete historical entities –

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the former to a pre-commercial social ethos; the latter to what for all intents and purposes is a post-commercial, cultural one. In that respect, Mandeville's social theory simultaneously registers a pessimistic and an optimistic vision of the future prospects of commercial societies in the modern world.[287]

By employing the language of manners as a containment principle, Mandeville was using what Pocock has called the language of "commercial humanism," and what Hirschman has called the language of *doux commerce,* against itself. Montesquieu used this strategy in *The Spirit of the Laws* when he designated the "spirit of commerce" as the socio-cultural agent that would prevent commerce from leading to the self-destruction of commercial societies. Mandeville, I think, prefigures that aspect of Montesquieu's work when he permits modern honor and good manners to fulfill the functions they do in *The Fable.*

NOTES

1. See F. B. Kaye's magnificent introduction to his edition of Mandeville's *The Fable of the Bees*, 2v. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), and A. O. Lovejoy, *Reflections on Human Nature* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1961). I realize, of course, that Pierre Bayle may be a source for many of Mandeville's arguments. By not discussing the Bayle-Mandeville connection in this paper, I do not mean to suggest that it is unimportant. Kaye and others (e.g., E. D. James) have shown that the connection is significant. Still, Mandeville can be discussed independently of Bayle, and I have chosen to do that here. Bayle, by contrast, cannot be discussed independently of Jansenism.
2. For details of the composition process, see Kaye, *ibid*, v. 1, xxxiii–xxxvii.
3. For example, from 1714 on Mandeville wrote a great deal on the problem of the origins of society. He did so from an evolutionary historical perspective. These two themes are not developed in *The Grumbling Hive*. For a full appreciation of the development of Mandeville's thinking after 1714 see M. M. Goldsmith, *Private Vices, Public Benefits* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), ch. 3.
4. See D. Kelley, "Horizons of Intellectual History," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 48, no. 1 (1987): 162.
5. Kaye, v. 1, xvii–xxx, contains most of what we know about this.
6. I develop the distinction between setting and context in my *Hegel: Religion, Economics, and the Politics of Spirit* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), ix.
7. The idea that traditions of discourse may act as ideological contexts for thinking is now widely accepted.
8. See reference in n3 above.
9. Goldsmith, *passim.*
10. *Ibid.*, 3.
11. *Ibid.*, 9.

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12. *Ibid.*, 27.
13. *Ibid.*, 4.
14. *Ibid.*, 3.
15. Among other works, see J. G. A. Pocock, *Virtue, Commerce, and History* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
16. Goldsmith, 44–5, 78.
17. *Ibid.*, 158, 160–4.
18. *Ibid.*, 77, 123.
19. *Ibid.*, 160.
20. Goldsmith, 46, 143, tries to finesse this problem by assimilating *The Grumbling Hive* of 1705 to *The Fable* of 1714. With this move, he can treat Mandeville's contributions to *The Female Tatler* (1709–10) as the beginning point of a developmental sequence that culminates in the emergence of Mandeville's "serious" social theory in 1714. Obviously I disagree with this line of interpretation. Mandeville was an accomplished theorist in 1705.
21. Kaye, v. 1, xcvii.
22. *Ibid.*, xcviii.
23. In addition to Pocock's work (n15 above), see *Wealth and Virtue*, ed. Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), for discussion of this important theme.
24. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 223.
25. All these phrases appear in *ibid.*, 17–37.
26. *Ibid.*
27. If Mandeville is read on the "wealth to virtue" thematic axis, he is obviously casting aspersions on the primitivistic economic thinking of the republicans.
28. See n239 below for another aspect of this argument.
29. Goldsmith, 33, comments on the difference implied by Mandeville's selection of bees rather than frogs.
30. On Mandeville's early writings, see Goldsmith, 28–32, 79, and H. T. Dickinson, "The Politics of Bernard Mandeville," in I. Primer, ed., *Mandeville Studies* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1975), 84.
31. Dickinson, 81.
32. See S. Daniel, "Political and Philosophical Uses of Fables in Eighteenth-Century England," *The Eighteenth Century* 23, no. 2 (1982): 151–71.
33. For L'Estrange's views, see *ibid.*, 154ff; on Hobbes, see *Leviathan*, ed. C. B. Macpherson (New York: Penguin, 1968), 223–8.
34. Hobbes, 227; cf. 185, 196, 204, 225.
35. *Ibid.*, 188, 227; cf. 161, 186–8, 210, 214–15.
36. For the history of the idea of the hive, see J. Glock, *Die Symbolik der Bienen* (Heidelberg: T. Groos, 1897). Also see an unpublished essay by Jeffrey Merrick, "Royal Bees: The Gender Politics of the Beehive in Early Modern Europe." I wish to thank Professor Merrick for allowing me to see this essay before its publication.

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37. W. Greenleaf, *Order, Empericism and Politics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 24. Also see J. Gunn, "Mandeville and Wither: Individualism and the Workings of Providence," in I. Primer, 99; and Glock, 184–7.
38. Greenleaf, 24.
39. Hobbes, 225.
40. *Ibid.*
41. *Ibid.*, 226.
42. *Ibid.*, 225.
43. *Ibid.*, 223.
44. *Ibid.*, 185, 225, 161.
45. *Ibid.*, 98, 226.
46. *Ibid.*, 226.
47. *Ibid.*
48. Professor David Wootton has reminded me of the importance of Bayle for this aspect of Mandeville's argument. Nicole, however, made these points, too. See, e.g., *The Grounds of Sovereignty and Greatness* (London, 1675), 22; and *Moral Essays* 3rd ed. (London, 1696), v. 3: "Of Charity and Self-Love," 80–1.
49. It is important to distinguish between the social and political aspects of what L. Rothkrug has called "Jansenist utilitarianism." See his *Opposition to Louis XIV* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 50n66. For while the Jansenists were certainly supporters of the French monarchy in some sense, their overall attitude towards authority and their social views need not have led them in that direction. Mandeville, I think, developed the social side of the Jansenist argument.
50. Consult Kaye, v. 1, lxxvii–cxiii, and T. Horne, *The Social Thought of Bernard Mandeville* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), ch. 2.
51. J. Gunn, *Politics and the Public Interest in the Seventeenth Century* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969).
52. For a general introduction to these thinkers, see Joyce Appleby, *Economic Thought and Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England* (Princeton: Princeton Unversity Press, 1978), and Charles Wilson, "The Other Face of Mercantilism," in D. C. Coleman, ed., *Revisions in Mercantilism* (London: Methuen, 1969), 8–39.
53. Gunn, "Mandeville," singles out the language of religious providentialism as another way of expressing the private vices, public benefits argument.
54. Glock, 187ff, discusses the hive as a symbol of economic activity.
55. Joseph Schumpeter, *History of Economic Analysis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), pt. 2, ch. 3, uses the phrase and discusses the reasons for its development in England rather than elsewhere.
56. For particularly good examples, see "England's Great Happiness" (1677) and "Britannia Languens" (1680), two tracts collected in J. R. McCulloch, ed., *Early English Tracts on Commerce* (Cambridge: Economic History Society, 1952).

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57. William Temple, *Observations upon the United Provinces of the Netherlands*, ed. G. N. Clark (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932).
58. *Ibid.*, 150.
59. *Ibid.*, 142–3. Temple may have had Fortrey (1663) and/or Coke (1670) in mind here.
60. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 185, addresses the Dutch self-conception and questions it. For Pieter de la Court's influential views, see his *Political Maxims of the State of Holland* (London, 1743), 31, 241. (This work was originally published in Dutch in 1662.) Most interesting, for purposes that will become clear later in this essay, is the distinction he makes (213–14) between "false" and "well-ordered self-love." The latter, he says, accounts for Dutch economic prosperity.
61. Kaye, v. 1, 189n2, and Charles Wilson, *The Dutch Republic and the Civilization of the Seventeenth Century* (London: Oxford University Press, 1968), 34.
62. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 157. Seneca had used the phrase. Surely it is no accident that Mandeville is criticizing Stoic asceticism in the section in which he uses it.
63. See, e.g., "Great Happiness," n56 above, 261–2; and D. North, "Discourses upon Trade," in McCulloch, 529. On the Dutch as spenders, see Simon Schama, *The Embarrassment of Riches* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), 295, 310, 321–2.
64. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 189–94.
65. In particular, see Appleby, n52 above, and N. McKendrick, J. Brewer, and J. Plumb, *The Birth of a Consumer Society* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), 11ff, 16ff.
66. Rothkrug, 45–55, and David Wootton in his introduction to *Divine Right and Democracy*, ed. David Wootton (New York: Penguin, 1986), 75, both treat Jansenism as important to the emergence of a philosophy of commercial society. J. Viner, *The Role of Providence in the Social Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), ch. 3, esp. 56ff., is another scholar who has investigated the connection between Jansenism and the modern commercial ethos. All, I think, are drawing upon Paul Benichou, *Man and Ethics*, trans. E. Hughes (New York: Anchor Books, 1971), 110n37.
67. See G. Bluet's comments, noted in Goldsmith, 60.
68. On this group of thinkers, see Lovejoy, n1 above; Nannerl Keohane, *Philosophy and the State in France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); A. Levi, *French Moralists* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964); and A. Krailsheimer, *Studies in Self-Interest* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).
69. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 143, 205–6; v. 2, 129, 261–9. Goldsmith, 66–73, offers a general overview of the subject.
70. *Ibid.*, v. 1, 41, 205.
71. *Ibid.*, 41, 198–208. And note Kaye's comment, 44n2.
72. *Ibid.*, 344.

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73. *Ibid.*, 200; Hobbes, e.g., 188, equates this instinct for self-preservation with the law of nature.
74. Mandeville, *ibid.*, 345.
75. In this respect, Mandeville's view of the origins of society appears to derive from the natural-law theory of sociability. On this theory, see Daniel Gordon (now at Stanford University), "The Idea of Sociability in Pre-Revolutionary France," Ph.D. thesis, Department of History, University of Chicago, 1990, pt. 1. Later in this essay, it will become obvious that at a crucial point in the development of his social theory Mandeville begins to work a peculiarly French version of sociability into the argument of the *Fable*. Gordon's thesis discusses the implication of this move for seventeenth-century French thinkers and, in the process, explains how and why French sociability differs from that found in so much natural law theory.
76. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 41–2, 206. Mandeville's discussion of the process provides Goldsmith, ch. 3, and Hayek (n251 below) with material for the view that Mandeville was a theorist of historical evolution.
77. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 206.
78. *Ibid.*
79. For Nicole, see *Grounds of Sovereignty*, 18–20; "Charity and Self-Love"; and *Moral Essays*, 2nd ed. (London 1696), v. 2: "Of Christian Civility." Dale Van Kley, "Pierre Nicole, Jansenism, and the Morality of Enlightened Self-Interest," in A. Kors and J. Korshin, eds., *Anticipations of the Enlightenment in England, France, and Germany* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1987), provides an excellent introduction to this aspect of Nicole's work. Also of special interest is Jacob Viner, *Religious Thought and Economic Society*, ed. Donald Winch (Durham: Duke University Press, 1978), ch. 3. For Pascal, see his *Pensées*, ed. A. Krailsheimer (New York: Penguin 1966), 277–8 (#828).
80. Nicole, "Charity and Self-Love," 81ff.; Pascal, 77 (#149), 241 (#665), 277–78 (#828).
81. Especially clear in Pascal, 77–8 (#149) and 299 (#597); cf. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 130.
82. Pascal, 277 (#828).
83. In "Charity and Self-Love," 92, 102–3, 105–6, and 110–11, Nichole argues, for example, that civility is an enlightened and/or harmless form of self-love, a form that actually marks an advance in man's consciousness of where true pleasure lies. Also see Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 333–47.
84. It is here that the French idea of sociability (n75 above) as a characteristic of social relations among civilized men begins to dominate Mandeville's social thinking. Kley, 74, offers an extremely interesting account of Nicole's conception of the three "bonds" of society: "fear," "gross interest," and "esteem." It is not clear whether Kley thinks Nicole has an historical sequence in mind. Mandeville clearly does; but in the process of developing the sequence he re-arranges it slightly, placing interest at the end of the sequence.

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85. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 42–3, 51–2; v. 2, 230–1, 261–9. See Goldsmith, 47–54, 62–7, for Mandeville's conjectural history.
86. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 334, where he speaks of the movement to society out of fear and then out of pride. For the three steps to society, see v. 2, 26–69. On the way flattery works upon pride to moralize man, see v. 1, 42–3, 51–2.
87. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 42, 51, 145, 208.
88. *Ibid.*, 42, 52, 151.
89. *Ibid.*, 42.
90. *Ibid.*
91. *Ibid.*, 42, 51; cf. 137–8, 145, 214.
92. *Ibid.*, 51, 48.
93. *Ibid.*, 43–4.
94. Lovejoy, 131, 141.
95. Levi and Keohane (n68 above) discuss the French debates in the 1630s. An important English source for several of the Jansenists was Daniel Dyke. His *Mystery of Self-Deceiving* (London: T. Snodham, 1615), went through several editions before it was translated into French in 1634. Lovejoy, 26 and 31n37, notes Dyke's influence on the Jansenists, but his remarks indicate that he was not familiar with the contents of Dyke's work.
96. A common theme in Dyke, Pascal and Nicole.
97. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 52.
98. *Ibid.*, 208.
99. *Ibid.*, 51. The idea of material exchange is evident in Mandeville's statement that in accommodating others, "self-love" is "overpaid" with "interest" for its momentary sacrifice. See *Fable*, v. 1, 68 and 78. Nicole, "Christian Civility," 138, similarly uses economic language to make this point about sociability as exchange.
100. Mandeville, *Fable*, 51.
101. *Ibid.*, 43.
102. Nicole uses the phrase in "Charity and Self-Love," 102. Kley, 72–3, argues that Nicole coined the term *amour-propre eclaire*. Recall de la Court (n60 above) using the phrase to mitigate the alleged egoism of Dutch commercial prosperity.
103. A recent addition to this ever-growing body of literature: Goldsmith, 123, 136–7.
104. Lovejoy, 207–8.
105. I discuss Mandeville as a theorist of laissez-faire later in this paper. As Lovejoy, 179, observed: Mandeville's paradox "was no novelty and, so expressed, was hardly a paradox."
106. See, esp., Lovejoy, 97–104, 129–31, 178–9.
107. *Ibid.*, 99, 103.
108. *Ibid.*, 131.
109. *Ibid.*, 101–2.

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110. *Ibid.*, 104; cf. 102, 131. Gordon, "Sociability," 96–9, notes how over the course of the seventeenth century this became associated with the morality of the *bonnête homme*.
111. *Ibid.*, 103; cf. 109. Throughout the seventeenth century there was a tendency to associate civility with an advanced form of Christian humility. See, e.g., Nicole, "Charity and Self-Love," 100; and "Christian Civility," 148. Also see Jacques Abbadie, *The Art of Knowing One-Self* (London, 1695), 272–3. Gordon, "Sociability," offers many other examples.
112. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 2, 130. Cf. Nicole, "Charity and Self-Love," 137; and Abbadie, *Art*, 222.
113. *Ibid.*, v. 1, 67.
114. *Ibid.*, v. 2, 65.
115. Especially clearly put in *ibid.*, v. 1, 145.
116. *Ibid.*, 66, 68, 145, 339.
117. *Ibid.*, 339.
118. *Ibid.*, 68.
119. *Ibid.*, 52.
120. *Ibid.*, 66.
121. *Ibid.*, v. 2, 91. In v. 1, 231, Mandeville, anticipating Rousseau, offers this as a description of himself.
122. *Ibid.*, v. 2, 90. See François duc de La Rochefoucauld, *The Maxims of La Rochefoucauld*, trans. L. Kronenberger (New York: Random House, 1959), 84 (#268). Nicole, "Charity and Self-Love," 104, offers a similar formulation — "martyrs of vanity" is his equivalent phrase.
123. See R. Chartier's extremely important essay, "From Texts to Manners," *The Cultural Uses of Print in Early Modern Europe*, trans. C. Cochrane (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 71–109.
124. I should note here that Lovejoy's book discusses themes of crucial importance to Rousseau's thinking in the 1750s.
125. Lovejoy, 29–31, 146, 160–63. Abbadie is also discussed in Keohane, 307–11; and in Ruth Whelan, "Between Two Worlds: The Political Theory of Jacques Abbadie (1656–1727)," *LIAS* 14, nos. 1 and 2 (1987): 101–17, 143–56.
126. That Abbadie's theology of history was accommodationist is obvious in *Art*, 24–32, and in many of the other formulations in that book. He is, as it were, a theorist of progressive revelation.
127. *Ibid.*, 181.
128. *Ibid.*
129. *Ibid.*, secs. ix and x.
130. *Ibid.*, 229–31.
131. Chartier, 89. On this theme, also see the excellent discussion of Bellagarde in Gordon, "Sociability," 192ff.
132. Again for particulars, consult the literature in n68 above as well as Benichou, *Man*, 75ff, and Viner, *Religious Thought*, 130ff.

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133. Abbadie, *Art*, 229. While I cannot develop the point here, the fact is that at some point in the seventeenth century the Christian idea of gentleness was appropriated by advocates of "enlightened self-love" and turned into a socio-religious (i.e., cultural) ideal of civilized refinement. In that form, the idea was used to celebrate the economic and non-economic aspects of the rise of commercial civilization, a civilization that was said to be an agent of Christian progress in history. Abbadie's use of "gentle manners" needs to be understood with that context in mind.
134. Nicole, "Christian Civility," 144–45. Gordon, "Sociability," 111, suggests that the idea of "dexterity" was a code for how to succeed at court. The language of dexterity as well as the notion of self-love "counterfeiting" charity can be found in Dyke, 20, 29, as early as 1615. Abbadie, *Art*, 200 and 237, uses the idea too. Mandeville frequently resorts to this language in the *Fable*: e.g., v. 1, 68; v. 2, 134.
135. Nicole, *ibid.*, 145–6.
136. In addition to n102 above, see Kley, 72, who discusses the origins of the phrase. Not insignificantly, Nicole often wavers as to whether or not to set Christian "gentleness" and "enlightened self-love" against each other.
137. At other times Nicole appears to run civility and holiness together. See Nicole, "Christian Civility," 147–9. Kley, 75, elaborates on Nicole's view of *l'honnêteté*. For the French ideological context, see Chartier, 91–6. Keohane, 287, identifies A. Méré as someone who regarded *l'honnêteté* as important for salvation. Paul Benichou, *Man and Ethics*, 75ff, provides an excellent introduction to the whole subject.
138. Nicole develops the idea in "Charity and Self-Love," 85–8. A similar argument can be found in Pascal, 97–8 (#210).
139. Nicole's use of the phrase in *ibid.*, 86 and 92, suggests a connection with Dyke (n134 above) who, most likely, was following Luther (see Luther, cited in Anders Nygren, *Agape and Eros*, trans. P. Watson [New York: Harper and Row, 1969], 728n1). The continuity here speaks to the issue of the alleged crypto-Protestant tendency in Jansenist thought.
140. Keohane, 286–7, 294–5; Kley, 74.
141. Nicole, "Charity and Self-Love," 80–2; and "Christian Civility," 147–9. Dyke, 121, makes a similar point. Of obvious importance is the fact that with this formulation one can argue that *amour-propre* can create order and civility in society without the aid of political authorities.
142. On the tradition, see Chartier, 82–7.
143. In their works, however, neither Nicole nor Abbadie has a clear-cut position. Both waver as to whether society and the civilizing process should be explained with reference to God's plan for man's redemption.
144. This is why Rothkrug's discussion of Nicole as a Jansenist utilitarian is useful. See n49 above, 45–55.
145. This is the main theme of E. D. James, *Pierre Nicole, Jansenist and Humanist* (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1972). Cf. Kley, 78; Keohane, 295.

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146. Levi, 229.
147. The phrase was used by Damien Mitton, a friend of Pascal in the 1650s. It can be found in his "Pensées sur l'honnêteté," included in H. Grubb, *Damien Mitton* (Princeton: Elliott Monographs, 1932), 55. Abbadie, *Art*, 134, also used the phrase. Pascal, however, attacked Mitton in *Pensees*, 229 (#597), for suggesting that "well-ordered self-love" and *l'honnêteté* may be important to one's salvation.
148. Well understood by Keohane, 295; Kley, 78; and Levi, 227.
149. Clear in Nicole, "Charity and Self-Love," 88, 92, 103–5, 110–11; and in Abbadie, *Art*, 46, 7–8 and 224–6.
150. Clear in La Rochefoucauld, 81 (#254); in J. Esprit, quoted in Lovejoy, 155; and in Nicole, quoted in Benichou, 89.
151. Pascal's view is set out in *Pensées*, esp. 178 (#460), 179–80 (#470) and 270 (#806). Krailsheimer, *Studies*, 135ff, offers a useful discussion of the relationship between wretchedness and social diversions in Pascal's thought.
152. Pascal, 270 (#806).
153. *Ibid.*, 148 (#414), 241 (#665).
154. *Ibid.*, 76–80 (#149).
155. The reference to Mitton in n147 above is relevant here.
156. Pascal, 206 (#502).
157. *Ibid.*, 348 (#978). Nicole, "Christian Civility," 138, actually focuses on the misuse of language as the source of the problem.
158. *Ibid.*, 41 (#44).
159. *Ibid.*, 98 (#978).
160. *Ibid.*, 349 (#978).
161. *Ibid.*, 350 (#978); cf. 240 (#655).
162. My comment in n133 above is relevant here.
163. Clear in Pascal, 246 (#693), 206 (#502).
164. *Ibid.*, 349 (#978).
165. Lovejoy, 170ff.
166. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 45.
167. *Ibid.*, 68.
168. *Ibid.*, 234.
169. *Ibid.*, 235.
170. *Ibid.*, 45, 235.
171. *Ibid.*, 45.
172. *Ibid.*, my emph.
173. *Ibid.*, 349.
174. *Ibid.*
175. See n203 below for Mandeville's references to good manners.
176. See n149 above for references to Nicole and Abbadie on civility as a form of higher pleasure that polices the behavior of men with appetites for lower pleasures. Kley, 76, is right, therefore, to note the "moderate asceticism" Nicole read into his notion of "enlightened self-love." In fact, as Gordon,

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"Sociability," 192ff, has shown, it was common practice among Christian thinkers to use the distinction between types of pleasures to finesse the charity/civility argument.

177. Abbadie, *Art*, 230.
178. *Ibid.;* cf. Lovejoy, 162.
179. Pascal, 98, (#2); Abbadie, *Art*, 201; and Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, esp. 72–80, 131–2, all use the mask of hypocrisy metaphor.
180. Lovejoy, 208, hints at this theme without developing it. He does show there, however, how Thorstein Veblen's work helps illuminate late seventeenth-century thinking. For a treatment of the same process in late medieval thought, see L. Little, "Pride Goes Before Avarice," *American Historical Review* 76, no. 1 (1971): 16–49. And it is not insignificant that in his famous book on the French Revolution, Edmund Burke identifies conflict between the two forms of pride as pivotal to the revolutionary upheaval.
181. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 42–4 and 147–68; v. 2, 36–8.
182. *Ibid.*, v. 1, 150, 166; cf. 43.
183. *Ibid.*, 157, 153; cf. n62 above.
184. *Ibid.*, 148.
185. *Ibid.*, 127–8.
186. *Ibid.*, 218.
187. *Ibid.*, 131.
188. Little, n180 above, shows how avarice was assimilated to pride in much late medieval thinking.
189. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 130. Cf. La Rochefoucauld, 39 (#35), 81 (#254), 139–42 (#563).
190. Mandeville, *Fable*, 129–30.
191. *Ibid.*, 149; cf. 80.
192. *Ibid.*, 149–50, 124–6, 129–30. Pocock, n15 above, has much to say about the apology for luxury.
193. *Ibid.*, 126.
194. *Ibid.*, 150.
195. *Ibid.*, 165; cf. 80.
196. *Ibid.*, 130.
197. Note, e.g., Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1944), 109.
198. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 124–34.
199. *Ibid.*, 25.
200. *Ibid.*, 124.
201. C. B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), does this in his well-known study of Locke.
202. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 218–22.
203. *Ibid.*, 72–80, 132; v. 2, 145–7.
204. *Ibid.*, v. 1, 218.
205. *Ibid.*, 219.

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206. *Ibid.*, 221–2.
207. *Ibid.*
208. *Ibid.*, 222. I use "automatically" here for Mandeville's "without thinking." Cf. v. 2, 139, 141; v. 1, 216.
209. *Ibid.*, 218.
210. *Ibid.*, 216.
211. *Ibid.*, 219.
212. *Ibid.*, 216.
213. Following Norbert Elias, Chartier, 99, develops the idea of civility as a restraint upon anti-social behavior. As Gordon demonstrates, "Sociability," 183–5, there is much evidence for this in late seventeenth-century French thought.
214. See, e.g., *Fable*, v. 1, 79, 218–22; v. 2, 146.
215. See n203 above.
216. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 2, 129–47. This is exactly what Nicole said about civility in "Christian Civility," 90, and Abbadie about good manners in *Art*, 229.
217. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 349.
218. In "Sociability," 83–5, Gordon notes the distinction late seventeenth-century French thinkers drew between *flatterie* and *complaisance*. As he develops the point, it becomes clear that the former implies hypocrisy and the latter civility. In *Art*, 229, Abbadie exploits this distinction to assimilate civility to Christian discourse.
219. C. Montesquieu, *The Spirit of the Laws*, trans. T. Nugent (New York: Hafner, 1966), 24–5, 300–1, discusses honor and good manners in ways that are strikingly similar to Mandeville. Chartier, 96–101, is excellent on this aspect of Montesquieu's thought.
220. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 349.
221. *Ibid.*, 68.
222. *Ibid.*, cf. 77, 79, 132.
223. *Ibid.*, 79.
224. *Ibid.*, v. 2, 145–7.
225. *Ibid.*, 147.
226. *Ibid.*, v. 1, 79.
227. *Ibid.*, 77–80, 132, 152–4, 165.
228. La Rochefoucauld is an obvious example.
229. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 349.
230. See n219 above.
231. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 135; cf. v. 2, 79. Also see Nichole, "Charity and Self-Love,"107, and La Rochefoucauld, 49 (#87).
232. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 135.
233. On the use of this phrase in the eighteenth century, see Chartier, 96–8.
234. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 2, 146.
235. *Ibid.*, v. 1, 135.

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236. Very clear in *ibid.*, v. 2, 147.
237. My guess would be that Mandeville's low-wage theory hinged on his belief that manners would not act as a check on behavior in the lower orders of society.
238. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 2, 129.
239. When Daniels, 159, says *The Grumbling Hive* "recommends that men not grumble" he is missing the point. As Nicole saw, *Grounds*, 22, grumbling was inevitable in an advanced commercial society. In line with that, Mandeville focuses on the tumultuous consequences that follow for a society when it *acts* on that grumbling.
240. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 75, 145, 222.
241. *Ibid.*, 218–22.
242. *Ibid.*, 124–6.
243. See David Hume, *Essays*, ed. E. F. Miller (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1987), 268–80. The essay in question is "Of Refinement in the Arts."
244. See Albert O. Hirschman, *The Passions and the Interests* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977), 56ff; id., *Rival Views of Market Society* (New York: Viking Press, 1986), 105–41, esp. 106–9; and Pocock, 49–50, 114–5, 210.
245. Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 184–5, v. 2, 129ff, 146–7; Hume, 271.
246. Pocock, 49–50.
247. Hume, 271: "The more men refine upon pleasure, the less will they indulge in excesses of any kind." Need I point out how similar to the Christian notion of civility this is?
248. For an early (1922) anticipation of recent work on this subject, see Frank Knight, "The Ethics of Competition," in his *The Ethics of Competition and Other Essays* (New York: Harper and Row, 1935), 19–40. Aside from bringing the "cultural concept" to bear on economic discourse (27), Knight makes the key distinction (34) between man as "an aspiring" and as "a desiring being." That is the distinction upon which the *doux commerce* thesis has turned since Hume (n247 above).
249. For a possible source for this idea, see Pascal, 242 (#674). Also see Hirschman, *Passions*, 20–31, for other possible sources.
250. In response to a query of David Wootton, I should point out that Mandeville assumes that the countervailing of vices will take place on a social rather than individual level (I develop the point below). But I do not think—as perhaps Wootton does—that this makes Mandeville something of a pluralist.
251. F. A. Hayek, "Dr. Bernard Mandeville," *New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics, and the History of Ideas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 249–66.
252. *Ibid.*, 250.
253. *Ibid.*, 253; cf. 257, 262.
254. *Ibid.*, 250.

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255. *Ibid.*, 252, 263–4; the qualification, of course, is that Hume goes out of his way in his work to distance himself from Mandeville, whom he represented as a libertine. See, e.g., Hume, 280.
256. *Ibid.*, 259.
257. *Ibid.*, 258.
258. Goldsmith, 123–4, cites the relevant literature.
259. See Hayek, 255–6, on Mandeville's struggle to overcome "constructivistic rationalism."
260. Hinted at by Hirschman, *Passions*, 18.
261. Failing this, Mandeville would resort—in turn—to low wages and state intervention as remedies for indulgence on a social level.
262. See, e.g., Hayek, 264, where Mandeville is cited as a main influence on key figures in the Scottish Enlightenment. Also see Glock, 339.
263. Louis Dumont, *From Mandeville to Marx* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), ch. 5.
264. Kaye, v. 1, ciii; Polanyi, 109; Goldsmith, 123.
265. Goldsmith, 137.
266. Fred Hirsch, *Social Limits to Growth* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pt. 3. Also see Irving Kristol, *Two Cheers for Capitalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1978), 64–6; Daniel Bell, *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (London: Heineman, 1976); and Raymond Plant, "Hirsch, Hayek, and Habermas: Dilemmas of Distribution," in A. Ellis and K. Kumar, ed. *Dilemmas of Liberal Democracies* (London: Tavistock Publications, 1983).
267. Hirschman, *Rival Views*, 110–17.
268. Hirsch, 12.
269. *Ibid.*, 117, 137–41.
270. *Ibid.*, 176–7.
271. *Ibid.*, 142.
272. See n266 above.
273. Hirsch, ch. 10. It is not clear whether Hirsch is as serious about religion as some of the neo-conservatives. For he casts the moral re-entry argument in an "as if" form, 138–41.
274. In this, Hirsch, Kristol and Bell are opposed by Hirschman, *Passions*, 129–30.
275. Given Mandeville's ties to Jansenist thinking, it is not unimportant that Nicole, "Charity and Self-Love," 92, 110–11, seemed willing to assimilate *honnêteté* and civility to the Calvinist argument in which certain forms of social behavior served the purpose of a "restraining grace." Dyke, 42, makes much of the difference between "restraining" and "renewing grace." While recognizing the utility of the former, he denies it any role in salvation. Abbadie appears to rely on the distinction as well. With their usual penetration, Viner, *Providence*, 56ff, and Kley, 78, have appreciated what is at issue here very well.
276. Some of this is implicit in Hayek, 264, where Mandeville and Burke are set in alignment with each other.

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277. See n15 and n244 above.
278. Hirschman, *Rival Views*, 2.
279. Montesquieu, 25, 318.
280. Hirschman develops the point in *Passions*, 56–81.
281. Pocock, 210.
282. See my essay, "Historicizing the 'Adam Smith Problem'," *The Journal of Modern History* 58, no. 3 (1986): 579–609.
283. If this is the argument, then Mandeville could be said to expect commercial society to generate its own system of restraining values. This is the position Hume later took in 1752.
284. If this is the argument, then Mandeville could be assimilated to Kristol's and Hirsch's (as well as Habermas's) depleting moral legacy argument. On that reading, commercial society would be unable to generate its own system of restraining moral values.
285. Pocock, 210; cf. 49. See Mandeville, *Fable*, v. 1, 184–5.
286. On the reversal of the *doux commerce* thesis, see Pocock, 210, who is commenting on Burke.
287. Insofar as Mandeville holds to both views at once it has been difficult to assimilate him to the traditional view of the Enlightenment. Given Mandeville's overall importance for eighteenth-century thought, that view of the Enlightenment must change so as to accommodate certain aspects of his social and historical thinking.

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Ian Shapiro

J. G. A. POCOCK'S REPUBLICANISM AND POLITICAL THEORY: A CRITIQUE AND REINTERPRETATION

A growing sense of the exhaustion of both liberalism and Marxism has fueled a revival of interest in civic republicanism among historians, political theorists, and social commentators. This turn is evaluated via an examination of the normative implications of J. G. A. Pocock's account of civic republicanism. Arguing that what is at issue between liberals and republicans has been misunderstood by both sides in the debate, the author shows that the turn to republicanism fails to address the most vexing problems liberalism confronts in the modern world, and that it is and has been compatible with much of what critics of liberalism dislike. He argues, further, that the civic republican view involves an instrumental attitude to outsiders that cannot be justified in today's world and has other unattractive dimensions of which too little account has been taken by defenders and detractors alike.

A central fact of our time is the exhaustion of liberalism and Marxism both as philosophical systems and as political ideologies. The diminished theoretical usefulness of Marxism is evident from its inability to account for the momentous

CRITICAL REVIEW, Summer 1990. ISSN 0891-3811. © 1990 Ian Shapiro.

Ian Shapiro, Department of Political Science, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06520. This article is extracted, with trifling amendments, from chapter six of the author's *Political Criticism*, to be published by the University of California Press in 1990. He gratefully acknowledges financial support from the Social Science Faculty Fund at Yale, the Guggenheim Foundation, and the Center for Advanced Study in Palo Alto. Part of his support at the Center was paid for by National Science Foundation grant number BNS87-00864.

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political events of the last hundred years: the persistence and consolidation of modern nationalisms, the rise of fascist and other totalitarianisms, and the capacity of capitalism to adapt, expand, and endure in ways of which no nineteenth-century theorist could have dreamed. The bankruptcy of Marxism as a political ideology has also been in evidence for some time, both from the failures of decades of attempts at centrally planned economies and from the inability of socialist systems to deliver anything that can credibly be called political liberation. The recent reforms in the Soviet Union under Gorbachev and the dismantling of communist systems in Eastern Europe are among the final nails in the coffin of socialism as the world hitherto has known it.

The troubles of liberalism are more difficult to pin down, but no less serious. The systems of the West are also living through periods of unprecedented social dislocation and economic change. Although the Reagan era seemed for a time to be heralding the arrival of a new age of optimism, by the mid-1980s its fervor was mainly spent on superficial symbolism and the underlying political and social problems of the postwar era had begun to reassert themselves. Public discussion focuses increasingly, once again, on a litany of seemingly intractable problems: social dislocations caused by the demands of modern industrial production, growing political demands and economic competition from the third world, potentially catastrophic changes in the environment wrought by the imperatives of modern technological production, manifest corruption and concomitant declining legitimacy in the political process and the financial system, and accumulating evidence of major rifts in the social fabric wrought by the interconnected problems of a growing urban underclass, rampant crime and drug use, and apparently intractable fiscal problems for the maintenance of the welfare state. Many of these problems seem increasingly to reinforce one another, producing a growing sense of social and political unease. Despite little agreement concerning precise diagnosis or cure, few in the late twentieth century would dispute the claim that America and the Western world face social, economic, and political problems at least as serious as at any time since the Second World War.[1]

Liberalism as a theoretical system has been held by many of its critics to be at least partly responsible for these developments. In *After Virtue* Alasdair MacIntyre indicted its destruction of all forms of traditional attachment, arguing that liberalism's ennobling of instrumental reason has generated an alienated individualist culture. From different ideological perspectives the authors of *Habits of the Heart* advanced a similar thesis to wide critical acclaim, as did Allan Bloom in a book that rapidly climbed the bestseller lists. Michael Sandel sums up the core of the philosophical reaction against liberalism when he argues that its commitment to the primacy of justice, and to the priority of right it brings with it, make it an unsatisfying ideology of strangers. Divorcing public from private lives, it recognizes only in the latter the constituting roles of our cultural attachments. Neo-Kantian liberals like John Rawls give pride of place to the autonomy of the individual, assuming that although we may be "thickly-constituted selves in private, we must be wholly unencumbered in public." Yet for Sandel this

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characteristic tendency of the neo-Kantians analytically to separate the self from its cultural affiliations and purposes, in order to include these latter among the objects of moral and political deliberation, is thought deeply to distort social reality at the same time as it loads the dice in favor of familiar atomistic liberal outcomes. By placing the cultural self beyond the reach of politics, liberalism "makes human agency an article of faith rather than an object of continuing attention and concern, a premise of politics rather than its precarious achievement." By contrast, Sandel argues, extending the intimacies of our cultural commitments into an explicit theory of the political good would provide a more satisfying public community than the impoverished vision embraced by the neo-Kantians. The positive case that he and other communitarians wish to advance revolves around this goal (Sandel 1982, 11-14, 183).

The turn away from liberalism and Marxism that has sent contemporary political commentators in search of a third way exhibits interesting parallels with a number of debates that have preoccupied historians over the past two decades. Students of both the modern history of European thought and American revolutionary and postrevolutionary politics have believed for some time that the tyranny of the liberal tradition has stood in the way of an accurate understanding of the genesis of our circumstances. The stranglehold that Daniel Bell's "end of ideology" thesis and Louis Hartz's all-encompassing reading of *The Liberal Tradition in America* have had over the human sciences in recent decades is said to obscure rich alternative traditions of political thought and action, rooted in our past and potentially still available to us. "There is a conventional wisdom," J. G. A. Pocock tells us, "to the effect that political theory became 'liberal'—whatever that means, and whether or not for more or less Marxist reasons—about the time of Hobbes and Locke, and has in America remained so ever since" (Pocock 1981b, 364).[2] Although recent attempts to displace this orthodoxy have led to the discovery, or rediscovery, of alternative pragmatist and socialist traditions in the American past, the most sustained and influential one has centered on the rediscovery of republicanism in the Anglo-American political heritage.[3] For political theorists its central point of reference is *The Machiavellian Moment*. In this book and a series of subsequent essays Pocock has traced a civic humanist paradigm of political thought and action from the Renaissance revival of Aristotelianism, through seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England, to the American revolutionary period and beyond. His account is my central concern in this essay. I approach it as a contemporary political theorist taking seriously the possibility that the civic republican tradition offers superior conceptual resources for thinking about politics to those in the liberal tradition.

Most students of civic republicanism, including Pocock, are reacting not against neo-Kantian political theory, but rather against the Hartzian vision of American political thought and the readings of early modern European thought made popular by Leo Strauss and C. B. Macpherson. Yet the revival of interest in republicanism spawned by their work has increasingly been picked up on by theorists and social commentators as an alternative to neo-Kantian liberalism.[4]

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One reason for this is that people perceive a connection between the individualistic logic and agnosticism about theories of the good at the core of the Hartzian arguments, and the similar individualism and agnosticism that, perhaps mistakenly, they identify as integral to the neo-Kantian approach to political theory.[5] This "my enemy's enemy is my friend" impetus is reinforced by the fact that the civic republican paradigm is taken by many to be one of the most powerful and politically effective communitarian visions available in our political culture. And since anti-Kantian theorists are typically hostile to *tabula rasa* theorizing for methodological reasons, it is not surprising that they gravitate toward this tradition in search of conceptual and political resources.

The sheer breadth and comprehensiveness of Pocock's argument has made it an inevitable center of attention in the new historiographical-cum-philosophical debate. His critical project is to overturn the "individualist paradigm" wherein all significant developments in the history of ideas after about the time of Machiavelli are read as somehow contributing to the growth of modern liberalism. In that paradigm's terms, the "paradox of liberty and authority" is the central problem of politics, and the individual is seen as a "private being, pursuing goals and safeguarding freedoms which are his own and looking to government mainly to preserve and protect his individual activity." This is the view of liberalism identified by writers from a wide array of ideological camps, from followers of Macpherson, Wolin, McWilliams and Lowi, on the one hand, to the "classical conservative" followers of Strauss, Arendt and Oakeshott on the other (Pocock 1985, 59-60). As an alternative to this view, Pocock's constructive project is to describe the civic humanist view of politics, centered on fundamentally different problems, that is best traced to the early Italian Renaissance.

Pocock on the Renaissance Revival of Classical Political Thought

The defining problem of republican theory, on Pocock's telling, has always been the instability of political institutions. Polybius, a Greek exile in the second century B.C., developed what during the Renaissance came to be seen as a classic of republican theory in the course of trying to explain the unusual internal stability of imperial Rome. His analysis of stability and instability in cities was a modification of Aristotle's sixfold classification of regimes (monarchy, tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, and democracy, ochlocracy), transposed into a developmental sequence. Every regime, he declared, must pass through each of the Aristotelian forms (in the order just stated) "and from anarchy must return to monarchy and begin the cycle again." The cycle was a "*physis*, a natural cycle of birth, growth, and death through which republics were bound to pass." A special case of the rotation of Fortune's wheel, this cycle could be escaped only in a regime resembling Aristotle's polity, made up of mutually counterbalancing elements of monarchy, aristocracy and democracy (Pocock 1975a, 77-8).

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In its Roman usage *fortuna* had meant luck, and luck was highly unstable because circumstances could be neither predicted nor controlled. *Virtus* and *fortuna*, virtue and fortune, were commonly paired as opposites, "and the heroic fortitude that withstood ill fortune passed into the active capacity that remolded circumstances to the actor's advantage and thence into the charismatic *felicitas* that mysteriously commanded good fortune" (*ibid.*, 37). Yet when the Italian humanists revived these ideas in the fifteenth century, it was in the intellectual context created by an historical awareness of secular time. Central to the Florentine conception of republican government was the tension between universal aspiration and the inescapable particularity of historical self-consciousness; and in the battle to achieve permanency in the face of the degenerative effects of time, the idea of virtue inevitably became politicized. For the republic was now conceived of in the particular, a human and artificial construct "composed of interacting persons rather than of universal norms and traditional institutions." The *vivere civile*, "a way of life given over to civic concerns and the (ultimately political) activity of citizenship," displaced the *vita contemplativa* as the ultimate philosophical ideal (*ibid.*, 75–6).

Guicciardini: Balancing the Few and the Many

Italian humanists incorporated Aristotle's theory of internal balance via the myth that Venice exemplified the Aristotelian-Polybian mixture. Before the collapse of Medicean rule in Florence and the advent of the 1494 constitution, most Florentines thought of Venice as a conventional aristocracy. Now it was heralded as a "uniquely stable blend of democracy, aristocracy and monarchy," and the Florentine constitution was legitimated by comparison (*ibid.*, 102, 103).

Although strongly elitist in many respects, from the beginning Italian humanism contained the seeds of a populist component. Thus although a writer like Guicciardini had an explicit bias in favor of a political elite, this bias never amounted to support for a "formally closed oligarchy." The *ottimati*, the inner circle of powerful Florentine families who thought of themselves as the few in the Aristotelian scheme, saw their characteristic virtue as leadership. This could not be developed or exercised without the presence of a "participant non-elite or many for them to lead," which gave the masses an indispensable—if limited—role in the maintenance of an Aristotelian balance (*ibid.*, 118–9, 127).

Survival in a dangerous and hostile environment required a prudent realism based on an understanding of the art of governing. Florence could never exert dominant military strength and so must exist "by diplomatic subtlety in a world of princes and *condottieri*" (*ibid.*, 240).[6] In Guicciardini's world, "the city is disarmed and requires the rule of prudent men." Indeed, "the conduct of external relations in a world not determined by Florentine power is the most important single activity of government" (*ibid.*, 219; see also 225, 238).

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The central problem of constitutional design in these circumstances is how to give full rein to the political expertise of the few, explains Bernardo del Nero, the protagonist who argues Guicciardini's view in his *Dialogo*. It is essential to take "important decisions away from those incompetent to make them" while being careful not to "alter the substance of popular government, which is liberty"; one has to take care "that in curing the stomach one does not injure the head."[7]

In his attempt to resolve this problem Guicciardini articulates the two core terms of modern ideas of mixed government. The first results from historicizing the idea of *virtù*. Florentine reality exhibits an "acquired second nature," and the physician is limited by it in his prescription of medicines. This second nature consists of the "tissue of accidents built up through experience, use and tradition," knowledge of which is essential to prudent government, though it can only be acquired empirically. Bernardo thus consents to "erect a scheme of government based on civic *virtù* because it is prudent to acknowledge the facts of Florentine nature," of which *virtù* is one. The other predominant values are *equalità, libertà,* and *onore*. As values they are "less intrinsic than given," "which Florentines cannot afford (being what they are) not to acknowledge." This has implications for the few and the many. The *ottimati* must accept that "*ambizione* and the thirst for *onore* are part of their temporal natures, that they require to be satisfied but at the same time to be kept in check." Yet the exercise of prudence, which "may be the highest form of the display of *virtù*," entails a governmental scheme in which the pursuit of *onore* is limited by the power of others. This, it was argued, implied a competitive meritocracy within the elite, to make prudence identical with the free pursuit of excellence, "which is the essence of *libertà* and *virtù*." But it was also seen to imply a popular element, for the few "exist only in the many's sight" (*ibid.*, 251, 252, 253).

This conclusion dovetailed neatly, Pocock argues, with Bernardo's second argument that the dangers of *libertà* in the many justify a complex polity of "mixed government," a clearly recognizable grandparent of our conception of representative government. For Bernardo, one must balance *libertà* against prudence, the stomach against the head. The nature of *libertà* makes it essential that "the popular assembly be prevented from trying to exercise itself those virtues and functions whose exercise it oversees and guarantees in the few," just as the few must be prevented "from setting up an oligarchy, that is from monopolizing those virtues and functions within a rigidly closed *governo stretto*." The many are "not themselves capable of magistracy" but "can recognize this capacity in others; though not themselves capable of framing or even debating a law, they are competent judges of the draft proposals of others" (*ibid.*, 253, 129, 254–5, 128–35).

Machiavelli's Revival of the Civic Militia Tradition

Machiavelli's approach to the problem of instability is at once more radical, more audacious, and more idealistic, placing him at the other pole of civic humanist

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debate from Guicciardini. For Machiavelli the key to survival is not prudent negotiation in hostile waters, but imaginative innovation to control and subdue them. Where Guicciardini's elevation of prudence as a practical ideal rests on a forerunner of modern doctrines of negative liberty, Machiavelli's conception is decidedly positive. Faced with the choice between audacity and prudence in the *Discorsi* he opts for an armed popular state, redefining *virtù* as "the dynamic spirit of the armed many" (*ibid.*, 232). Machiavelli departs from conventional humanist interpretations of Polybian theory by taking Rome instead of Greece as his model. Rome impressed him because stability was achieved there as nearly as possible in the world of imperfect constitutions "by the disorderly and chance-governed actions of particular men in the dimensions of contingency and fortune." Thus Machiavelli rejected the conventional argument that Rome was inherently disorderly, managing to survive for so long only by good fortune and extraordinary military power. He equated civic virtue with disciplined military action and went so far as to suggest that stability is not the only value: a republic may pursue military expansion and empire by the employment of a popular militia, which might ultimately cost the republic its existence (*ibid.*, 190, 195, 197).

Thus, as Pocock interprets Machiavelli,

> All cities have enemies and live in the domain of fortune, and it must be considered whether a defensive posture does not expose one more to unexpected change than a bold attempt to control it; the antithesis between prudence and audacity is at work again. But the crucial association is that between external policy and the distribution of internal power. Sparta and Venice, for as long as they were able to avoid the pursuit of empire and to adopt the posture of the prudent man who waits upon events, did not need to arm the people or to concede them political authority; consequently they were able to enjoy stability and internal peace. Rome resolved upon empire, upon a daring attempt to dominate the environment, and consequently upon innovation and upon a *virtù* which would enable her to control the disorder which her own actions had helped to cause. (*Ibid.*, 198.)

Only a republic that was both perfect in its internal balance and completely insulated from its neighbors might "limit her arms and live in aristocratic stability for ever." But this is impossible; even Sparta and Venice could not escape trying—albeit in the end unsuccessfully—to defend their independence from the external encroachments of fortune. In these circumstances to reject expansion for fear of impermanence is "to expose oneself to fortune without seeking to dominate her" (*ibid.*, 198, 199).

Given the inevitable reliance on the military, Machiavelli's core concern becomes the relationship between military discipline and civic virtue. Because the characteristic virtue of the citizen as soldier is his capacity to preserve *libertà*, the military has to be organized so that this virtue will not become corrupted. Mercenaries and professional soldiers are too dangerous, and both are incompatible with Machiavelli's Aristotelian conception of citizenship. Just as a man who devotes all his energy to the *arte della lana* and none to participation in public affairs

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is "less than a citizen and a source of weakness to his fellows," so the full-time practitioner of the *arte della guerra* is likewise deficient, though vastly more dangerous. Consequently this *arte* must be a public monopoly; "only citizens may practice it, only magistrates may lead in it, and only under public authority and at the public command may it be exercised at all" (*ibid.* 200). The militarization of citizenship makes the *Discorsi* more "morally subversive" than *Il Principe*. For the prince existed "in a *vivere* so disordered that only if he aimed as high as Moses or Lycurgus did he undertake any commitment to maintaining civic virtue in others." Yet the republic can be virtuous "only if it is lion and fox, man and beast, in its relation with other peoples." Although Machiavelli had independent reasons for being mistrustful of Christianity (it taught men to value ends other than the republic's health),[8] the militarization of virtue made the clash between Christian and civic virtues inevitable, for "humility and the forgiveness of injuries could have no place in the relations between republics, where a prime imperative was to defend one's city and beat down her enemies." Civic virtue flourishes best where there is no mercy to enemies, whose defeat means death or enslavement (*ibid.*, 213, 214, 216).

In Pocock's view the Florentine debate transformed the civic republican tradition fundamentally. The core idea of a *vivere civile* had implications that were "pagan, secular, and time-bound." The dimension of grace was lost, the republic and its virtue became finite. In historical time and space "there were many republics and the virtue of each abutted upon the virtue of others" (*ibid.*, 214, 215).

Harrington and the Anglicization of Civic Republicanism

How could the language of civic virtue apply to England's hierarchical feudal structure of rights and obligations, rooted in its island past since at least the time of the Norman Conquest? Pocock rejects conventional explanations of the rise of English humanism as relying on stereotypically misleading conceptions of traditional society that blind their exponents to the dynamic side of English traditionalism.[9] Just as custom supplied the basis for Guicciardini's account of the Florentine "acquired second nature," so the English conception of an "historical and immemorial sovereignty over themselves" dovetailed with an historical understanding of their unique political circumstances (*ibid.*, 341). The parallel did not end there; in the emerging ideologies of the parliamentary gentry, the House of Commons held a special place in the preservation of liberty—now understood as rooted in immemorial custom and traceable to an ancient constitution, lost in the mists of time.[10] "[A]ll English law was common law, common law was custom, custom rested on the presumption of immemoriality; property, social structure, and government existed as defined by the law and were therefore presumed to be immemorial" (*ibid.*, 340–1).

The legal humanists invoked some of the vocabulary of civic humanism, but kept it within the hierarchical context of a feudal political structure. "This is not

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wholly incompatible with a classical vision of citizenship," Pocock argues, for "it is possible within limits to say that the Few and the Many are estates which must stay in their due places and practice their proper virtues, and to that extent the republic and hierarchy are one." Yet, as Pocock concedes, there is a fundamental difference between ranked elements "in a descending chain and elements balanced against one another." The former lacks the "kinetic" quality whereby the balance is maintained "by the counterpressures, the countervailing activities, of the elements" that "must practice a relationship among themselves as well as each remaining fixed to its prescribed nature" (*ibid.*, 349).

Ironically it was the Royalists who took the first step in declaring England to be a mixed government. In June 1642, two months before the civil war, Viscount Falkland and Sir John Colepeper persuaded Charles I to issue *His Majesty's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of Both Houses of Parliament*. Its immediate aim was to secure the support of the Lords against the Commons, but to do so it rejected the theory of condescending monarchy in favor of the modern idea of mixed government. To the dismay of his supporters and the surprised pleasure of his adversaries, the king was presented "as a part of his own realm, one of three 'estates' between which there must be balanced and (it followed) proportionate equality" (*ibid.*, 361–2). This political dynamite was immediately latched onto by anti-Royalists of various stripes. For once political authority was no longer depicted as a "direct emanation of divinely or rationally enjoined authority," it became "a contrivance of human prudence, blending together three modes of government." The basic political problem was no longer "one of adjusting descending to ascending authority, but one of sharing specifiable powers" (*ibid.*, 362). Still cast in the language of monarchy and order, the ideas of mixed government and constitutional balance quickly gained currency in English political argument and were read back into England's past.[11]

Neither the rhetoric nor the content of republican theory had won over the competing idioms of politics (most notably the Hobbesian argument that power is absolute and indivisible), but its seeds had been sown in English thinking about the political order. It was via the other wing of humanist theory, participation of the many, that republican rhetoric was indelibly to be stamped into English political argument. Harrington's *Oceana*, written to justify the military republic in England as a *popolo armato*, was the vehicle.

The terms of Pocock's analysis of Harrington are set by his critique of Macpherson's "possessive individualist" model, which was utilized to defend the thesis that from the mid-seventeenth century on a bourgeois ideology, characterized by the primacy of economic over political man and a favorable attitude toward unlimited accumulation of wealth, took increasing hold of English political thinking.[12] Pocock argues, by contrast, that there are at least two major traditions of argument about property and legitimacy, both having ancient and modern manifestations and both involving theories of the relationship between economics and politics. It is in the confrontations between them in the late

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seventeenth century that the origins of modern conceptions of property are to be sought.

First there is the jurisprudential tradition, which goes back to the Roman civilians, is present in the language of Aquinas to some extent, and is carried on by a succession of natural-law theorists into the late seventeenth century. In its terms property is that "to which you have a right" rather than that "which makes you what you are." In this tradition property—that which one owns—and propriety—that which is proper for a person or situation—become synonymous. Property relations are thus

> a system of legally defined relations between persons and things, or between persons through things. Since the law defined justice in terms of *suum cuique*, it was possible to define the good life in terms of property relations, or of human relations as the notion of property served to define them. . . . Because jurisprudence and the jurist's conception of justice were concerned with men and things, they were less concerned with the immediate relations between men as political actors or with the individual's consciousness of himself as living the good life. (Pocock 1985, 104.)

Then there is Pocock's Aristotelian tradition "in which property appears as a moral and political phenomenon." It is a prerequisite for the good life, which is "essentially civic."

> In the form of the Greek *oikos*, a household productive unit inhabited by women, minors and slaves, it provided the individual with power, leisure and independence, and the opportunity to lead a life in which he . . . could become what he ought to be. Property was both an extension and a prerequisite of personality. . . . The citizen possessed property in order to be autonomous and autonomy was necessary for him to develop virtue or goodness as an actor within the political, social or natural realm or order. He did not possess it in order to engage in trade, exchange or profit; indeed, these activities were hardly compatible with the activity of citizenship. (*Ibid.*, 103.)

We tend to associate the critique of market relations with Marxism, but Pocock is keen to establish that this tradition "displays an astonishing unity and solidarity in the uneasiness and mistrust it evinces towards money as the medium of exchange." In every one of its major phases, "there is a conception of virtue—Aristotelian, Thomist, neo-Machiavellian or Marxian—to which the spread of exchange relations is seen as presenting a threat." Because so many components of life can be had for money, "we are under a constant temptation to mistake money for the *summum bonum*, and an individual drawn wholly into the life of monetarised exchange relationships would be living in a commodified parody of the natural or divine order" (*ibid.*, 103-4).

Pocock argues against Macpherson that Harrington falls squarely into the second tradition. He took over the Machiavellian argument that possession of arms is essential to political personality, but where Machiavelli had simply stressed that if a man bore arms for others rather than himself he would be incapable of citizenship, Harrington developed this reasoning into an extended

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critique of feudalism. The key conceptual move (which Harrington believed Machiavelli had missed) was that the bearing of arms was critically dependent, in a system of feudal tenures, on the possession of property.

> The crucial distinction was that between vassalage and freehold; it determined whether a man's sword was his lord's or his own and the commonwealth's; and the function of free proprietorship became the liberation of arms, and consequently of the personality, for free public action and civic virtue. The politicization of the human person had now attained full expression in the language of English political thought; God's Englishman was now *zōon politikon* in virtue of his sword and his freehold. (Pocock 1975a, 386.)

For Harrington as for Machiavelli, then, "the bearing of arms is the essential medium through which the individual asserts both his social power and his participation in politics as a responsible moral being; but the possession of land in nondependent tenure is now the material basis for the bearing of arms." Harrington insisted that transmissible and hereditary property in land was essential to the independence necessary for participation in the commonwealth. Although servants were no part of this scheme, what Pocock sums up as the "economic autonomy of citizenship" did extend to wage-laborers as long as they inhabited cottages of their own (*ibid.* 390).

Pocock rejects conventional accounts of Harrington's economics as emergently bourgeois, arguing that they were backward-looking and based on the Greek view of the relations between *oikos* and *polis*. Although Harrington saw his arguments as applying to mobile property, the key to his conception was freehold land. "When land was acquired, it was in order to bequeath it: to found families or *oikoi* based on a security of inheritance, which set the sons free to bear arms and cast ballots in the muster of the commonwealth. As with Aristotle, the end of land is not profit, but leisure: the opportunity to act in the public realm or assembly, to display virtue." It was in these terms that the later seventeenth-century gentry and freeholders who composed the Country party could see themselves as a classical *populus*, "a community of virtue," which consisted in their freeholds because "freedom and independence consisted in property" (*ibid.*, 390, 408).

Harrington's arguments for freehold property had been attacked by Sir William Temple and others in the generation following the civil war. But Harrington's arguments were revived in the 1670s when the ideal of propertied independence was invoked against the crown's restored power of parliamentary patronage, which latter was increasingly identified with corruption in Country ideology (Pocock 1985, 107). Neo-Harringtonian political argument came into its own in opposition to the new monied interests, to which the crown seemed increasingly hostage, and which were effectively institutionalized by the mid-1690s through the system of public credit and the creation of the Bank of England. The debate between landed and monied interests generated a confrontation between "two modes of individualism,"out of which modern commercial consciousness was

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born (Pocock 1985; 107, 109). Opponents of the "monied interest" like Bolingbroke and Swift argued that, with the creation of a system of public credit, the new class of speculators and creditors had created a different kind of property that fundamentally altered the relationship between property and political power. They built on Harrington's argument that although in principle the function of ensuring arms and leisure could be discharged by mobile as well as real property, merchants and craftsmen would find it more difficult to leave their activities to engage in self-defense. (Pocock 1975a; 427–32. *See also* 1985; 68–9, 109–10).

It was the speculative, rather than the calculating, side of commercial capitalism that the landed gentry found most threatening, "the hysteria, not the cold rationality, of economic man that dismayed the moralists." It was "not the market, but the stockmarket, which precipitated an English awareness, about 1700, that political relations were on the verge of becoming capitalist relations; and this awareness could never have developed as it did without the unspecialized agrarian ideal of the patriot to serve as antithesis." Political relations were increasingly becoming relations between debtors and creditors, "and this was seen as leading not merely to corruption, but to the despotism of speculative fantasy." The Country view was that the specialization that resulted from the division of labor under commercial capitalism was incompatible with the "unity of the moral personality which can only be found in the practice of civic virtue" (*ibid.*, 113–4, 69, 110, 112–3).

The manner in which opponents of the Country party such as Wren, Addison, and Defoe answered its arguments revealed that both sides now shared the intellectual common ground of the Machiavellian problem of stability. The counterargument was that society "could defend itself better against its own professional soldiers by controlling the money that paid them than by sending its citizens to serve in their place." Both sides were concerned with the reconstitution and maintenance of a stable system of political authority, which had inevitably to be a problem for seventeenth-century Englishmen—indeed it was the defining problem of politics. But their common ground extended to the theory of property itself; both parties shared "an image of social personality" in which "the political individual needed a material anchor in the form of property no less than he needed a rational soul" (*ibid.*, 111, 53–61). The argument, which continued through the Scottish Enlightenment, was over which kinds of property best guaranteed independence and with it stability. The "Machiavellian Moment" of the eighteenth century, "like that of the sixteenth, confronted civic virtue with corruption, and saw the latter in terms of a chaos of appetites, productive of dependence and loss of personal autonomy, flourishing in a world of rapid and irrational change" (Pocock 1975a, 486).

The Americanization of Virtue

Pocock's narrative culminates in an account of the role of civic humanist ideas in American political thought. With Bailyn, Wood, and the other "ideological"

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theorists of the American Revolution and against older orthodoxy, Pocock argues that classical republican ideology was central—and essential—to the entire revolutionary project. But unlike Wood, for whom the Revolution was the last gasp of a classical politics, Pocock believes that although republican ideology was transformed as it became Americanized, its core organizing antithesis of virtue and corruption has persisted into our own political culture. Americans inherited "rhetorical and conceptual structures" in which "venality in public officials, the growth of a military-industrial complex in government, other-directedness and one-dimensionality in individuals" could all be conceived of "in terms continuous with those used in the classical analysis of corruption." Having made the commitment to the "renovation of virtue," Americans have remained "obsessively concerned by the threat of corruption—with, it must be added, good and increasing reason." Their political drama continues

> in ways both crude and subtle, to endorse the judgment of Polybius, Guicciardini, Machiavelli, and Montesquieu in identifying corruption as the disease peculiar to republics: one not to be cured by virtue alone. In the melodrama of 1973, the venality of an Agnew makes this point in one way; an Ehrlichman's more complex and disinterested misunderstanding of the relation between the reality and the morality of power makes it in another. (Pocock 1975a, 548.)

Americans retained a focus on corruption as the central threat to the stability of republican regimes, but the roles of institutional structure and popular participation in forestalling corruption differed substantially from their antecedents across the Atlantic. The doctrine of the king in parliament had occupied a middle ground between classical republican theory and English feudalism, but Americans had no use for the classical conception of government based on a mixture of social orders. Even before the Revolution the volatility of colonial American politics had been explained by some observers as resulting from the absence of an equivalent to the House of Lords, which, in the British constitution, had been argued to play the role of the classical few. As long as America was thought of as a colony this lack presented no problem for republican theory, which had always held that colonies and provinces were not fully incorporated and should be ruled by a dependent oligarchy. Once the colony began to be conceived of as an autonomous republic however, such an oligarchy must inevitably be corrupting. Yet an independent hereditary aristocracy could not be created under colonial conditions, and an appointed second chamber would inevitably be an oligarchy dependent on whoever appointed it. The conceptual impasse thus created could only be escaped by the repudiation of the idea of hereditary aristocracy as inherently corrupting. This radical move involved a return to the Harringtonian notion of a natural aristocracy, and in most American colonies a patrician elite stood ready to step into this role. Indeed it could be argued on meritocratic grounds that a true elite would always be recognized by the many. "It was assumed that a supply of such persons was guaranteed by nature, and . . . [that] democracy could discover the

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aristocracy by using its own modes of discernment, and there was no need to legislate its choice in advance" (*ibid.*, 513-4, 515).

The American people were clearly an undifferentiated mass rather than the combination of estates of conventional republican theory, but Pocock disputes Wood's contention that this meant an end to classical politics. He points out that the people's function of evaluating and electing their governors from a reservoir of talent, as the natural aristocracy theory implied, was by no means trivial. Pocock's burden of argument becomes heavier here, however, because it soon became widely agreed that a natural aristocracy had not yet emerged and could not realistically be expected to do so. As he concedes, in revolutionary America "the tide had been running strongly in favor of the view that elected representatives were highly corruptible delegates, who must be subject to instruction and recall" (*ibid.*, 519); the difficulty with the Madisonian claim that they should be chosen from the patrician elites was that those elites were obviously a far cry from a natural aristocracy. Yet Pocock notes that the dilemma thus created could be and was dealt with within the confines of republican theory. For the Federalists, the failure of a natural aristocracy to emerge indicated that the people could not be virtuous, that they were already corrupt, so that government became "a Guicciardinian affair of guiding a people who were not virtuous, or helping them guide themselves, along paths as satisfactory as could be hoped for in these circumstances." Thus, the prudent management of self-interest took its central place in republican theory. If men "no longer enjoyed the conditions thought necessary to make them capable of perceiving the common good, all that each man was capable of perceiving was his own particular interest," so that "[i]nterest and faction are the modes in which the decreasingly virtuous people discern and pursue their activities in politics." For Madison, the checks and balances of the separation of powers to be built into the federal structure ensure that interest does not corrupt, "so that the full rhetoric of balance and stability can still be invoked in praise of an edifice no longer founded in virtue, and the very fact that it is no longer so founded can easily be masked and forgotten." The federal constitution could absorb a potentially limitless number of conflicting interests and thus stave off—perhaps indefinitely—the instability that attends all republican institutions, through perpetual growth and change. Thus despite important differences between Federalist theory and the Court ideology of late eighteenth-century England,[13] the Revolution did not see the "end of classical politics"; rather it was transposed into a new key (*ibid.*, 520, 522-3).

Pocock also parts company with Wood's analysis as it deals with the social dimensions of popular participation. The tension between landed and commercial interests that infused the English debate was reconciled in the American debate via the argument that in a continuously expanding economy self-interest could actually displace virtue without becoming corruptive.[14] If the federal structure no longer had to preserve an harmonious balance among estates, but could absorb innumerable factional interests and remain stable, the traditional ambivalence toward imperialism in republican theory was dissipated and the expanding

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western frontier could be a source of republican stability. The new federation could be "both republic and empire, continental in its initial dimensions and capable of further expansion by means of simple extensions of the federative principle, greatly surpassing the semimilitary complex of colonies and provinces which had extended the Roman hegemony." Thus could William Vans Murray argue that the virtue of the individual was no longer a prerequisite for free government. Subjecting private to public good had been required in a "rude and precommercial society," but now that the true secret of republican liberty—continuous expansion—was known, this was no longer so (*ibid.*, 524, 525).

The specialization that had been thought the very enemy of virtue in the English confrontation between landed and commercial property could now be embraced unambiguously. Thus Hamilton—who maintained, against Madison, that if virtue is the principle of classical republics, interest is that of empires—defended a view of America as an expanding mercantile and manufacturing economy, competing with the other powerful trading nations of the world. In Hamilton's mind, then, the passage from virtue to commerce was no

> serene withdrawal into liberal complacency, into a world where separate interests balanced one another. He was opting for dominion and expansion, not for free trade, and emphatically rejected any argument that the interests of trading nations were peacefully complementary. There would be war, and there must be strong government. (*Ibid.*, 531; *see also* 530.)

Hamilton's extremist language and his almost open identification of the republic with strong internal government and imperialism abroad caused many to reject his views as corrupting, but the essential thesis was embraced by those followers of Jefferson who wanted to reconcile Jefferson's commitment to agrarian life as the essential basis for virtue with his acceptance that men are transformed by scientific progress so that the republic could not be based on individual virtue *simpliciter*. Jefferson argued that "[c]ommerce—the progress of the arts—corrupts the virtue of agrarian man," but he also agreed with Webster's argument that an agrarian society can absorb commerce and that an expanding agrarian society can absorb expanding commerce.

> America is the world's garden; there is an all but infinite reservoir of free land, and expansion to fill it is the all but infinite expansion of virtue. The rhetoric of Smith's Virgin Land, filling the century after Jefferson and Webster, is the rhetoric of this expansion of arms-bearing and liberty-loving husbandmen. . . . The justification of frontier expansion is thus Machiavellian, and in the myth of [Andrew] Jackson it is seen to entail a Machiavellian *virtù* which will extend virtue without corrupting it—a process possible in the fee simple empire. . . . The synthesis of virtue and *virtù*, achieved by Polybius and Machiavelli in their more sanguine moments, is recreated in the Jeffersonian-Jacksonian tradition at a far higher level of sociological complexity and hence of optimism. (*Ibid.*, 538–9.)

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Now "frontier and industry, land and commerce, are both expansive forces, [and] they can both be described in terms of passion and dynamism: the patriotic *virtù* of the warrior yeoman for the former, the passionate and restless pursuit of interest for the latter." Yet Pocock concludes that a degree of ambivalence was built into utopian variants of American republicanism. Because the land is finite, the end of utopia must eventually be reached; the land will run out, the expansion of virtue will no longer keep pace with commerce, and the process of corruption will resume so that "[e]ven in America, the republic faces the problem of its own ultimate finitude, and that of its virtue, in space and time" (*ibid.*, 540–1).

There is no denying the richness of Pocock's portrayal of the unfolding of civic humanism. The burden of the remainder of this essay is to discuss the implications of three difficulties attending Pocock's account that must inform any analysis of its normative political significance. First, although Pocock's analysis reveals important dimensions of our cultural landscape of which insufficient account is typically taken by both liberal political theorists and their critics, Pocock is hoodwinked by a straw conception of liberalism in setting up his alternative paradigms thesis. This creates a misleading opposition of gross concepts, directing attention away from the first-order questions we should be arguing about and toward second-order debates that by their nature cannot be resolved. Second, the claim that attention to civic republicanism opens up a way of thinking about property and power relations that is not dominated by the issues surrounding the rise of bourgeois modes of thought is found wanting; to a great extent these issues are inescapably ours. Third, I argue that insofar as a distinctive politics can be identified as flowing from civic humanism, in its contemporary manifestations it is neither justifiable nor attractive mainly because of its implausibly benign assumptions about the relationship between private property and independence and its almost exclusive preoccupation with instrumental questions concerning the stability of political institutions. In fairness to Pocock I should note at the outset that he is an expositor rather than an advocate of the tradition he describes. Although I maintain that he describes the civic humanist paradigm in unduly favorable terms, it is primarily to those others who appeal to the tradition of civic republicanism for contemporary normative purposes that this last part of my argument is directed.

Distractions of Republican Terminology

Pocock wants first and foremost to establish that republican writers used distinctive terms of political argument.[15] To bring these to the surface, he employs two strategies, one linguistic, one analytical. The linguistic strategy consists in describing his paradigms by example: he points to key terms, clusters of terms or preoccupations that are held to be distinctively *liberal* or *republican*. Yet on close inspection every such appeal encounters difficulties.

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To begin with, the term *republican* exhibits a great many competing meanings. Even if we restrict ourselves to the uses Pocock explicitly embraces, we find a remarkable diversity of referents ranging from the Greek city-states of the ancient world to the modern territorial one, and over polities as different in their socio-economic systems as slave-based ancient societies and feudal, agrarian, commercial and modern capitalist ones. At times when Pocock speaks of the republican tradition he lumps together as its "major phases" ideologies as disparate as Aristotelianism, Thomism (which in other contexts is held to be paradigmatically antirepublican),[16] "neo-Machiavellism," and Marxism, and claims that they display "an astonishing unity and solidarity" in their mistrust of money as a medium of exchange (Pocock 1985, 103–4). Questions inevitably arise, therefore, concerning how anachronistic it might be to try to describe these different uses with the same Arendtian political vocabulary,[17] and concerning what consistent meaning over time the term *republican* can have if it is to apply to them all.[18]

Liberalism is, notoriously, no less problematical. It, too, denotes a host of quite different political ideologies. Pocock seems to think of it in Hartzian terms as representing a view of the world in which asocial individuals are prevented from destroying one another by legal constraints but otherwise pursue their self-interested goals. Yet liberalism has seldom been like this historically. Today the term generally denotes a quasi-statist ideology, geared (however effectively) to the promotion of public welfare and the protection, even privileging, of historically disadvantaged groups within the constraints of advanced capitalism. Perhaps the libertarianism of Nozick, with its eschewal of "patterned" theories of the good and insistence on "rights-as-side-constraints," and the Rawlsian insistence that all teleological commitments ride roughshod over the rights of individuals fit the Pocockian stereotype.[19] But these have no more in common with the major historical variants of liberalism than do they with contemporary political liberalism.[20]

Within the alleged paradigms, Pocock's characterizations of key terms and preoccupations run into analogous difficulties. He counterposes the emphasis on rights in liberalism's law-centered paradigm with the claim that the civic humanist paradigm revolves around the idea of virtue—that "*homo* is naturally a citizen and most fully himself when living in a *vivere civile*." Because the civic humanist and liberal vocabularies are "discontinuous with one another," and because they "premise different values, encounter different problems, and employ different strategies of speech and argument," republicanism's virtue "cannot be satisfactorily reduced to the status of right or assimilated to the vocabulary of jurisprudence." The discontinuity remains even when both vocabularies are used "in the same context and to congruent purposes," as when both republican and juristic modes of argument were simultaneously invoked to vindicate republican independence in the late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (Pocock 1981b, 365, 355–6, 357, 356).

Yet the entire historiographical debate spawned by Pocock's casting of republicanism as an alternative virtue-based paradigm (even if he equivocates about the

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periods in which it is held to have been distinct) has shed more noise than light on our understanding of early modern thought.[21] Many commentators have pointed out, on the one hand, that liberalism has always employed conceptions of virtue and, on the other, that such writers as Harrington, whom Pocock deemed paradigmatically republican, employed much of the liberal vocabulary of law, right, and value.[22] As with all historiographical fads, the endless contortions engaged in by Pocock's followers to save the thesis dilute its explanatory power. An increasingly diverse collection of theorists is deemed somehow to have been republican, including writers like Adam Smith who explicitly rejected core republican arguments, openly embracing standing armies and the division of labor.[23] Even Locke, who Pocock originally argued had been given too much prominence at the expense of civic humanist writers, now teeters on the verge of incorporation into the new civic humanist rewriting of early modern thought.[24] How ironic, in light of Pocock's original motivation: his dissatisfaction with what he saw as the tendency of Marxists and Straussians alike to give too much attention to Lockean liberalism, and to discover everywhere they looked after about the time of Machiavelli either the rise of bourgeois modes of thought or the decline of Western civilization.[25] My point is not that a more scrupulous depiction of the paradigm would resolve these difficulties, but rather that just as liberalism has always entailed notions of the good and of virtue, so republican writers have been concerned with law and legitimacy, even if sometimes implicitly, because any theory of politics has to be concerned with both.[26]

No more successful is Pocock's attempt to distinguish his paradigms by reference to liberalism's typical preoccupation with instrumental questions of distribution in the face of republicanism's teleological commitments. As he is forced to concede, there have always been ideas of legitimate distribution in the republican tradition. "[I]f the citizens were to practice a common good, they must distribute its components among themselves, and must even distribute the various modes of participating in its distribution." Indeed, Aristotelian, Polybian, and Ciceronian analysis had shown "that these modes were highly various and capable of being combined in a diversity of complex patterns; political science in the sense of *politeia* took this as its subject matter." Pocock nonetheless continues to maintain that because the virtues that it was the business of these different distributions of means to realize could not be reduced to those means, "the republican or political conception of virtue exceeded the limits of jurisprudence and therefore of justice as a jurist conceived it" (*ibid.*, 358). Even this formulation should suggest to Pocock that his dichotomous classification is misleading; it is only because he operates with the assumption that the liberal view reduces politics to an account of law and right that he can entertain the notion of an alternative and discontinuous republican vocabulary that reduces it to an account of the good.

Pocock's analytical strategy is to underpin the dichotomy between republican and liberal paradigms with the dichotomy between negative and positive liberty. Although the value of liberty is central to both traditions, in the liberal tradition liberty is typically a negative constraint on the power of others (principally if not

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exclusively the state) over the individual. The negative liberty view tends to "lower the level of participation and deny the premise that man is by nature political" and to be narrowly preoccupied "with that which can be distributed, with things and rights." By contrast, classical republican positive liberty elevates participation through the Aristotelian affirmation that we are naturally political animals.[27] The laws of the republic, "the *lois* obeyed by Montesquieu's *vertu politique* – were therefore far less *regulae juris* or modes of conflict resolution than they were *ordini* or 'orders'; they were the formal structure within which political nature developed to its inherent end" (*ibid.*, 359).

Pocock's confrontation between liberal and republican paradigms and the negative/positive dichotomy with which he underpins it are instances of what I have elsewhere described as mutual oppositions of gross concepts. When protagonists argue in terms of gross concepts, they engage in a double reduction. First, they reduce what are actually complex relational ideas to one or another of the terms in the relation over which they range, dealing with the other terms implicitly while seeming not to deal with them at all. Second, they reduce what are often substantive disagreements about one or another of the terms in a relational argument to disagreements about the meanings of the terms themselves, making a self-fulfilling prophecy out of the "essential contestability" thesis, which posits exactly the kind of discontinuous vocabularies whereby protagonists allegedly speak past one another, that Pocock is seeking to establish.[28] As MacCallum (1972, 174–93) showed long ago in relation to the negative/positive liberty debate, any assertion about freedom or liberty minimally involves reference to agents, restraining (or enabling) conditions, and actions. It always makes sense to ask of any use of the term, who is free, from what restraint (or because of what enabling condition), to perform which action? Negative libertarians tend explicitly to argue by reference to the first two terms in this triad; positive libertarians, the second and third. Negative libertarians usually discuss the second term in the language of constraints, whereas positive libertarians employ that of enabling conditions. MacCallum's argument was, first, that constraints and enabling conditions can invariably be redescribed as one another (so that there is no politically interesting difference between saying that the prisoner is unfree because of the presence of locked chains rather than the lack of a key), and second, that all three terms in the relation must be integral to any credible account of freedom. He showed that it does not take much digging to bring an author's assumptions about each of the three terms to light and that once this is done we can see that negative and positive libertarians do not have different understandings of the meanings of the terms *freedom* and *liberty*. Rather, they disagree about the content of the substantive terms in his triad, though this is seldom obvious to protagonists just because their disagreement appears to them to be about the meanings of the terms *freedom* and *liberty* themselves. But just as the arguments of negative and positive libertarians can easily be rearticulated in one another's terms, so it can be shown that theories of the right and the good mutually require one another, and are therefore not basic

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or paradigmatic terms of political argument. Pocock's analytical attempt to distinguish liberal from republican paradigms fails as a result of these facts.[29]

Certainly some writers have understood themselves to be embracing a republican ideal as an alternative to some other, but we make a serious error if we take them at their word. The very fact that civic humanist writers employ so many different and conflicting concepts of virtue,[30] that the idea of liberty is central to both alleged paradigms, and that those paradigm-case republicans, the American revolutionaries, were obsessed with questions of law and legitimacy should make us suspicious of this dichotomous classification. There is no exclusive language of the virtues (or of law). There are many (often conflicting) assumptions about virtue and about legitimacy embodied in both Pocock's jurisprudential and civic republican traditions, some conservative, some radical, and some liberal, as we have seen on Pocock's own account.[31] The interesting questions concern which of these assumptions merit our endorsement and which our rejection, but they are obscured by the mindless opposition of gross concepts, liberal *versus* republican. Perhaps Pocock can make a case that his interest is simply to recover the terms of debate as protagonists understood them. Granting this, for now (though I dispute part of it below), my analysis here reveals the limits to such methods from the standpoint of anyone interested in analytical clarity or normative argument. If a set of assumptions about purposes, or about law, is implicit in an argument—perhaps not even evident to its author—those assumptions may be some of the most interesting things about it, and exclusive preoccupation with authorial intention will lead us to miss them.

Whether or not an historian like Pocock can formulate a description of his enterprise that makes these issues exogenous, contemporary communitarians like Sandel, who want to invoke the revival of interest in republicanism as part of the normative basis for an allegedly alternative theory of politics, cannot legitimately avoid it.[32] For the debates on "whether-or-not-republic" and "whether-or-not virtue" do not begin to get at the questions of *what sorts* of republic or virtue; it is small wonder, then, that appeal to the republican conceptual vocabulary has seemed compatible with every political ideology from far left to far right and with every kind of polity from the pastoral village to the nation-state (and many kinds of the latter, at that).

Thus we should not allow the question to be who is right: liberals or republicans?, because both are right about one another. Liberalisms that reduce politics to questions of right will always be vulnerable to republican critiques either that they lack conceptions of the good, or that their implicit conceptions of the good are not adequately defended. Conversely, republican alternatives that direct attention to the language of virtue while ignoring questions about its substance, about how it might be implemented, about the distributive consequences and external effects of treating one conception of the public good as authoritative rather than another will rightly seem vulnerable to liberals. Arguing by reference to alternative paradigms perpetuates the process of gross opposition because it directs

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critical attention to the terminologies in which arguments are expressed, rather than the arguments themselves.

The Unsuccessful Argument against Bourgeois Orthodoxy

A powerful motivation behind *The Machiavellian Moment* is Pocock's conviction that understanding the republican tradition will free us of the illusion that the history of the last four hundred years has been the story of the inevitable if gradual triumph of bourgeois modes of thought. Whether a self-congratulatory affirmation of Lockean liberalism, or a searing indictment (from the left, of more or less self-conscious rationalizations for capitalism; from the right, of the passing of "traditional society"), defenders and critics alike allow the paradigm of bourgeois liberalism to set the terms of their understanding of our past, and this weakness limits their understanding of our present and its possibilities. Yet how convincing is Pocock's case against Macpherson? How powerful is Pocock's claim that the political argument that emerged from the civic republicanism tradition offers an alternative set of self-understandings to the bourgeois thought of liberal modernity?

No one doubts that Harrington used the vocabulary of classical republicanism in his attack on English feudalism; the debated question is to what extent this signified commitment to classical conceptions of property, rather than being part of an innovative argument. Pocock's claim is questionable on its face because Harrington's target was the feudal structure of land ownership and the dependencies he believed it fostered. It must therefore be conceded that he was concerned with problems fundamentally different from Aristotle's or the scholastic Aristotelians'. What, then, are we to make of his reliance on republican rhetoric? One thing to note, as Jeffrey Isaac has pointed out in a balanced and judicious assessment, is that Harrington's rhetoric was many-sided and that his republican commitments coexisted with the open embracing of values we characteristically think of as liberal. Thus although Harrington argued in the idiom of harmony and stability, emphasized the centrality of public virtue to politics, and conceived of the state as "the repository of political virtue and patriotism, of a collective elan," this is only a part of the rhetorical story (Isaac 1988, 22-36, 36). There is also a heavy emphasis on the centrality of the rule of law. Thus the "soul" of a nation or city must be virtue, "for as much as the soul of a city or nation is the sovereign power . . . her virtue must be law." The ultimate goal is to prevent the privatization of political power characteristic of monarchy, so that popular government uniquely "reacheth the perfection of government." Only under it can the rule of law remain supreme (Harrington 1977, 179; Isaac 1988, 23-6).

As well as this populist affirmation of the rule of law, there is a view of private property and appropriation underlying it that is fundamentally bourgeois. As Isaac notes, although Harrington did not develop an analysis of property of the sort that can be found in the fifth chapter of Locke's *Second Treatise*, he did express

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"an individualist view of appropriation quite parallel to that of liberal rights theory" (Isaac 1988, 32). Thus he wrote in the opening chapter of *The Art of Lawgiving* that

> [t]he donation of the earth by God unto man cometh unto a kind of selling it for industry, a treasure which seemeth to purchase of God; from the different kinds of successes of this industry, whether in arms or in other exercises of mind or body, deriveth the natural equity of dominion of property; and from the legal establishment or distribution of this property (be it more or less approaching towards the natural equity of the same) deriveth all government. (Harrington 1977, 604.)

For Isaac this passage embodies a petty-bourgeois morality, as do Harrington's accompanying appeals to a distribution of property that promotes industry. Harrington opposes those inequalities he considers to be unproductive, but he is quite prepared to tolerate those that conduce to greater productivity. Indeed, as Macpherson (1962, 186) long ago pointed out, as it relates to unequal distributions of wealth, Harrington's view is one of equality of opportunity, not equality of result, and he favored inheritance as well as transmissibility of property. Harrington states explicitly (if not entirely coherently) that substantial inequalities of wealth may be perfectly consistent with an "equal agrarian" and popular state; he argues against only those inequalities that would be so great as to destroy the agrarian state (Harrington 1977, 424-5).[33]

Attention to the intellectual context in which these arguments were developed enables us to endorse Macpherson's and Isaac's claims. Harrington's assumptions about industry and productiveness fall into the mainstream of much seventeenth-century economic thinking on the nature and origins of wealth—both in his critique of the feudal distribution of wealth as unproductive, and in his elaboration of his own account of industriousness. Taking the second of these first, Joyce Appleby's seminal study of seventeenth-century economic ideology has made it clear that one innovative change of this period was the redefinition of wealth as the capacity to produce for exchange. The idea of wealth as inhering in a productive capacity is at the core of the labor theories of value embraced by Petty, Hobbes, Locke, Cary, and many others, that reflected the growing belief that human work could produce more than nature (Appleby 1978, 156, 135-41).[34] Harrington did not even try to develop a political economy in the way that Petty or Locke did, but he clearly fell into the mainstream of the new seventeenth-century identification of labor and industry with wealth. This is reflected not merely in the continual references to industry as the basis of liberty throughout his writings but also in the very terms of his attack on feudal wealth[35]

Harrington's criticism is not simply that the nobility is corrupted by its wealth; more importantly it is unproductive. "[T]he aristocracy is ravenous," he tells us in many different ways, "not the people" (*ibid.*, 292-4). Here again attention to the broader intellectual context reinforces the claim Isaac wishes to advance, for many seventeenth-century economic writers singled out these "unproductive" classes for criticism. As early as 1662 William Petty was forcefully arguing the view that

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landlords were parasites on their productive tenants and was defending redistributive taxation from the landed to the productive classes. At about the same time William Shepherd defended an excise tax because it taxed extravagance. These writers were embracing the view, later to be articulated by Defoe, that taxation could redistribute from the unproductive to those whose spending would "terminate in the hands of industry and trade." By the later part of the century Sir Dalby Thomas was arguing that the unproductive included "Gentry, Clergy, Lawyers, Servingmen and Beggars," even though he had no objection to, even embraced, accumulations of wealth and luxury consumption because they promote productiveness. By this time, Appleby tells us, "[t]he idea that only laboring people could increase wealth had become a truism," embraced by Slingsby Bethel and many others in arguments over taxation policy, immigration, and demography.

Although Appleby does not discuss Harrington, his antipathy for the nobility and its parasitism fits squarely into the tradition she describes. "Your highwaymen are not such as have trades or have been brought up into industry, but such as whose education hath pretended unto that of gentleman," he tells us in *Oceana*. Lysander, in "bringing in the golden spoils of Athens, irrecoverably ruined that commonwealth," which is a warning that "in giving encouragement unto industry, we also remember that covetousness is the root of all evil." Always there is the example of the Romans, "who through a negligence committed in their agrarian laws, let in the sink of luxury, and forfeited the inestimable treasure of liberty for themselves and posterity" (Harrington 1977, 292, 239, 188).

Harrington embraced inequalities he believed were productive and succored industry, while rejecting concentrations of wealth among the feudal nobility as corrupt, all in the name of the public good. For, like the political economists from Petty to Thomas, he did not object to inequality or even to wealth as such but rather to their unproductive and corrupting feudal forms. One cannot help but be reminded of Locke's defense of enclosure, despite his theory of property as use rights to the common, through simultaneous appeal to the labor theory of value and a theory of productivity that was essentially a trickle-down theory of wealth.[37] Of course none of this is to say that Harrington was a defender of capitalism (any more than it is to say that Locke was), that he could have had the slightest idea of what capitalism would be like, or even that if he had had any idea of what capitalism would be like, that he would have defended it. It is to say, however, that he took for granted the core tenets of the new political economy in his defenses of industriousness and social mobility and in his attacks on the feudal social structure and the absolutist political institutions he thought it had spawned.

Pocock's reading of the neo-Harringtonians confronts analogous difficulties, as Jesse Goodale (1980, 240-57) has shown. By exaggerating the neo-Harringtonians' idealization of the past, Pocock misidentifies a circumscribed and qualified critique of the monied interest as a fundamental rejection of it. Trenchard (the author of *Cato's Letters*), for example, was primarily concerned with political corruption, and his preoccupation with the debt and the monied interest derived

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from the growing threat he believed it created of controlling the court interest. But he had no particular objection to the emerging property relations; like Harrington he equated the growth of freehold property with the expansion of liberty, but he did not favor equality in its distribution, only a sufficiently wide distribution to prevent the tyranny of a small, wealthy elite. Although he favored the redistribution of feudal wealth that resulted from the shift in landed property to the gentry and endorsed the rise of commerce as having expanded liberty, he did not think England's political institutions had adapted to the changes, and it was to this imbalance that reform had to be addressed.[38]

A brief examination of the terms of Trenchard's diagnosis will reveal his open embrace of commercial institutions. As with Bolingbroke, the primary objection was to stock-market speculators and accumulators of the national debt for undermining "honesty and industry" with their "mean and contemptible hands" (Trenchard 1969, vol. 1, 6).[39] They have mortgaged the nation's assets, for

> national credit can never be supported by lending money without security, or drawing in other people to do so; by raising stocks and commodities by artifice and fraud, to unnatural and imaginary values; and consequently delivering up helpless women and orphans, with the ignorant and unwary, but industrious subject, to be devoured by pick-pockets and stock-jobbers; a sort of vermin that are bred and nourished in the corruption of the state. (*Ibid.*, vol. 1, 17.)

Expanding the national debt "instead of preserving public credit, destroys all Property; turns the stock and wealth of a nation out of its proper Channels." Far from nourishing the body politic, it "produces only ulcers, eruptions, and often epidemical plague-sores: It starves the poor, destroys manufacturers, ruins our navigation, and raises insurrections Etc" (*ibid.*). Monopolies or "conspiracies and combinations" of "artful and wealthy merchants" are objected to on the grounds that they are "against general trade" and must eventually "destroy the trade itself." For

> [t]he success and improvements of trade depend wholly upon supplying the commodities cheap at market; and whoever can afford those of equal goodness at but half per Cent. cheaper than his neighbors, will command the sale. (*Ibid.*, vol. 3, 202.)

Not the productive system, nor even credit, but rather their unproductive abuse for personal gain is at the root of the problem.[40]

> What can be more invidious, than for a nation, staggering under the weight and oppression of its debts, eaten up with usury, and exhausted with payments, to have the additional mortification, to see private and worthless men . . . grow rich while they grow poor; to see the town every day glittering with new and pompous equipages, whilst they are mortgaging and selling their estates, without having spent them. . . . (*Ibid.*, vol. 3, 274.)

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None of this invective reveals hostility to the emerging commercial system. Compare it with the stock Democratic criticism of the Reagan administration for corruption and selfish pursuit of the interests of its wealthy constituencies to the detriment of the public good. "Instead of investing to rebuild America's power as a competitor in a swelling global marketplace," complained the *Democratic Fact Book for 1984*, "the Reagan Republicans are driving the nation—and our international customers—into paralyzing debt. They are wasting financial resources to buy superfluous or gold-plated weapons when what we really need are tools that build. And they are wasting human resources—whose minds and skills must be trained to master the needs of tomorrow."[41] Like much other campaign literature, the Democratic tract was filled with allegations of cronyism and corruption regarding the use of insider information for personal benefit in corporate takeovers, the giving of defense and other contracts to personal friends and business associates without competitive bidding, the cynical refusal to enforce such public-interest legislation as antitrust and environmental protection laws, the reduced enforcement of tax compliance, and the staffing of public-interest agencies with manifestly incompetent personnel.[42] Yet just as nothing in this attack on the Reagan administration's corrupt use of political power should incline us to the view that its authors are rejecting bourgeois values, let alone that they are employing a premodern political language, so it is with the neo-Harringtonians. This is evident not only from the fact that in both cases the problem is diagnosed as an abuse of political power, but also because in both cases it is the undermining of market mechanisms rather than their existence that is held to be at fault.

A similar argument can be made against the idea that republicanism presents an alternative to bourgeois modes of thought in early American political argument. Although the ideological theorists of the Revolution never argued that it did, this literature is notable for the paucity of its treatments of matters economic and, most surprising, even of the economic presuppositions of republican ideology; books like Gordon Wood's *The Creation of the American Republic* and Bernard Bailyn's *The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution*, tremendously rich in other respects, are virtually silent on the subject of republican political economy—because there *was* no distinctive republican political economy.[43] Beyond the assertion that great extremes of inequality can be politically dangerous, nothing in republican assumptions about economic relations need be anticapitalist. On the contrary, there was often what with hindsight we might call a naive embrace of market institutions, particularly private property, as guarantors of autonomy. This was an understandable result of the historical preoccupation of many republicans with the rejection of feudal institutions and aristocratic ways.[44] Central to their naïveté was an overestimation of the importance of land and its differences from movable property—a failure to see that it was the form rather than the object of ownership that would shape the social and political relations of the future. That the land held to guarantee the independence necessary for republican virtue would be freehold ended up being far more significant than its being land, just as the differences between agrarian and commercial capitalism

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would turn out to be far less significant than eighteenth-century protagonists believed.

The ideal of independence as requiring freehold property (which Pocock locates in the republican tradition long before it reached America),[45] the work ethic, and the emphasis on productive expansion as essential for stability (and thus for preventing corruption) all became central to the capitalist world view. The pastoral ideal of the yeoman farmer may not be that of a nascent capitalist, but from the standpoint of the logic of property law, they have more in common than does either with a feudal serf or lord.[46] This is not to deny that some republicans wanted seriously to limit economic inequality or that some saw urban capitalism and its ethic of self-interest as potentially corruptive of the pastoral ideal required by republican theory in its eighteenth-century American variant.[47] Nor is it to say that there are not deep and enduring tensions between the ethic of self-interest fostered by a private property regime and a market society and the dictates of public-spiritedness in politics required by the republican ethos. This tension is a good deal older than the American nation; it has been shown decisively by Kramnick (1982, 629-64), Burtt (1986), and others to have necessitated major modifications in the republican conception of virtue, in order to accommodate self-interest, and even in some cases to be defined by reference to self-interest (in early eighteenth-century England and Scotland).

However the interpretive debates on the changing meanings of virtue are finally resolved, if they are, it is by now clear that republican conceptual vocabulary was not inherently unfriendly to capitalism by the time it reached America, even if a primitive and romantic agrarian capitalism was often the implicit model. Pocock (1975b, 75-6) all but concedes this in a discussion of the Augustan debate, when he notes that both sides in the eighteenth-century dispute on commerce shared "the same underlying value-system, in which the only material foundation for civic virtue and moral personality is taken to be independence and real property," [48] as well as in his discussion of the evolution of American republican thinking, as we have seen.[49] Yet this surely undermines the claim that for too long our view of early modern thought has been driven by the preoccupation with the rise of bourgeois social relations. Indeed, the effectiveness with which republican rhetoric was co-opted—on Pocock's own account—by forces friendly to capitalism is *prima facie* evidence of their causal significance.

Civic Republicanism as a Political Ideal

As Pocock explains it, once the republican ideal was extracted from ancient (cyclical) conceptions of time (where decay would inevitably be followed by rebirth) and located in secular time, the problem of preventing entropy and decline became the central organizing question of civic republican theory. This resulted in an instrumentalist preoccupation that had been absent from the classical Greek conception.[50]

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For a political theorist there are two central difficulties deriving from this instrumentalism. The first has to do with a host of issues concerning membership, the treatment of outsiders, and external relations generally in republican theory. If the republic is thought of as comparatively weak, coping with the idiosyncrasies of fortune in a hostile and uncontrollable world, the republican prudence of Guicciardini might seem the only sensible option. But this view, if generalized, fails to account for major differences among the powers and kinds of republics or the fact that many people will effectively be excluded from all republics. Any moral claims or dilemmas generated by these facts remain conveniently off the agenda from the standpoint of this inward-looking political theory. It is inherent in taking the political community as given, and treating its stability as the core problem of politics, to be indifferent toward outsiders (or at most instrumentally interested in them), whether these be individuals or other communities. As MacIntyre notes in *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*, the Aristotelian tradition has been criticized for just this reason for centuries.[51] In Pocock's civic republican tradition, even when outsiders cease to be declared explicitly to be barbarians, they continue to be treated purely instrumentally, relevant only to the extent that they affect the stability of the republic. In this light it can hardly be surprising that there are powerful links between republicanism and nationalism in the contemporary world, for although republican and communitarian arguments are typically defended by appeal to the benefits of membership for the included, they are equally mechanisms of exclusion. Indeed their mere existence as valued communities requires the existence of outsiders who are devalued. Despite the heroic attempts of Anderson (1983, 129-40) and others to distinguish patriotic from racist nationalisms on the grounds that the former need not dehumanize outsiders, a persuasive case has yet to be made for this view. Certainly the civic republicans never held it. Like Allan Bloom and Richard Rorty, they saw civic commitment as necessarily involving parochial prejudice, but they were much less squeamish about acknowledging its implications – often openly maintaining that war was a normal condition among republics.

Republican prudence might be defensible as a way to deal with the vicissitudes of fortune if we believe ourselves to be playing a game with the gods that we cannot control and are bound eventually to lose. But we have no reason to believe this in our dealings with other political communities. It is, further, scarcely defensible to legitimate the external actions of the world's most powerful nation-state in Guicciardinian terms, because the pragmatic justification (that there is no other way to survive in a world of hostile and more powerful states) is unavailable.

This leaves the Machiavellian argument that all potentially hostile threats should simply be dominated. This issued, we saw, in Machiavelli's defense of imperial expansion. If we accept Pocock's account of how this argument was eventually adapted in America into the notion of a fee simple empire, it becomes instrumentality more effective than even Machiavelli believed it to be. Although stability may still be being bought at the price of longevity of the republic, the day of eventual reckoning is pushed into the distant future perhaps never to arrive.

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Moreover, continuous expansion is no longer threatening to the internal social structure of the republic, because this latter is no longer believed to be dependent on balancing various estates for its survival.[52] Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the neo-Machiavellian argument is causally true, it is morally unattractive for the same reasons that the Guicciardinian argument is—only more so. Domination of outsiders, rather than mere indifference to them, is assumed to be justified on purely instrumentalist grounds, leaving all questions about political membership and the moral claims of outsiders unasked if not unaskable.

Republican theory may not always have been so morally vulnerable. For the Greek city-states or the republics of Renaissance Europe, the world was an enormous place, its limits unexplored by Europeans and even unknown to them. In these different circumstances antipathy toward outsiders must have appeared quite different than in the postcolonial world we live in, with its unprecedented economic and geopolitical interdependence and destructive technological capacities. In our circumstances, where the public policies and economic practices in any major nation have massive effects on outsiders, a political theory that by its terms denies these latter any moral claim—or even a moral identity—seems intuitively less than fully satisfactory.[53]

The second morally unattractive aspect of republican instrumentalism concerns its inevitable abandoning of its classical roots once people tried to put it into practice in the modern world. Eighteenth-century republicans had to cope with the centralizing and nationalizing tendencies of the modern state. They had to ask themselves how a model of participatory politics derived from the small self-governing Greek polis (itself something of a romantic idealization) could apply in their quite different social and political context.[54] The federalist/antifederalist debate on how to order institutions to prevent corruption and decay in the new mass republic revolved partly around this question. Yet it was never resolved; it was left hanging as classical republican politics went into decline in the late eighteenth century.[55] By then many of the staunchest republicans had conceded that it was not possible to foster and preserve republican virtue in political life, that the management and control of self-centered factions and interest groups was the most that institutional designers could reasonably try to achieve. These problems came to seem increasingly intractable as the factional model of interest-group politics became dominant in the mid-1780s, but they predated this development; they were built into the logic of the new national republic.[56] Even if we grant Pocock's contention that these conclusions were sometimes arrived at in a republican idiom, this was clearly achieved at the price of abandoning the central commitments of Aristotelian republicanism.

That nothing approaching the classical republican ideal was implemented in eighteenth-century America implies that when contemporary American political theorists, activists, and politicians appeal to the republican tradition, they are being doubly romantic. They are not appealing to a pure classical past that existed at some point in American history and that has been corrupted or lost and needs to be recreated. To the extent that they are appealing to anything in American

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culture and history, *they are appealing to an appeal* to a classical politics, to an unfulfilled eighteenth-century agenda in which the tensions between Greek and Roman variants of republican theory had never been resolved.[57] Given that part of what makes civic republicanism attractive to those disillusioned with the artificiality of neo-Kantian ideal theory is civic republicanism's alleged rootedness in American history, this is a serious defect. Pocock may be persuasive in arguing that the myths surrounding the American republican vision are "not inherently more absurd than those entertained in other cultures" (Pocock 1975a, 543), but this is less than a reason for their acceptance or even plausibility. Like all romantic doctrines, their emotional appeal is likely to be exploited for ulterior purposes behind the smokescreens of their unattainable goals.

The Failure of Civic Republicanism

A principal weakness that modern communitarians have identified in the liberal tradition is its instrumentalism. Yet we are now in a position to see why the civic republican tradition Pocock describes is scarcely more attractive on this score: a large part of the story he tells is an account of how an Aristotelian view of politics became permeated with instrumental concerns once it was extracted from a cyclical conception of time and came to treat institutional instability as the core problem of politics. On Pocock's account, an instrumental preoccupation is built into the republican conception of politics as staving off decay and decline, but it has two more parochial sources as well. First, many of the humanist writings were advice books for princes, which obviously gave the maintenance of political stability central importance. Second, there is Harrington's materialism, the argument—picked up and adapted by his successors—that in order to endure, political institutions must reflect and embody the distribution of wealth, particularly that of property. Whether in neo-Machiavellian or neo-Harringtonian form, the preoccupation with stability generates a conservative relativism whereby the political system preserves itself by adapting to socioeconomic conditions, and even virtue—the crucial term in the classical republican scheme—is eventually redefined to that end.

That such a politics could seem benign to republican theorists since Harrington, I argued, turned on their lack of a plausible political economy. In marked contrast to their advanced understanding of the dynamics of organized institutions, they greatly underestimated the consequences of linking liberty to freehold property, and this wedded many of them—some consciously, others not—to a recognizably bourgeois ethos. To be sure, Jefferson and others were uncomfortable with many of the political implications of this ethos but they lacked an alternative political economy to the emerging market system, and a republican ideology did not begin to dictate that they find one. Like their English predecessors, American republicans generally assumed that, in the main, market relations

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were compatible with republican political institutions, indeed often that they required them.

Although Pocock and the republican revisionists have enriched our understanding of the dynamics of bourgeois culture and its internal tensions, they have not delivered on the promise to provide an alternative. Indeed, we saw that the opposition of liberalism and republicanism is conceptually and historically misleading: it can appear plausible only when the contrast is to a reductionist version of liberalism, incoherent in its own terms, that equates it with a libertarian ideology of right. Preoccupation with these second-order issues has served to divert attention from the moral dimensions of civic republican political commitment; when these are laid bare they are revealed to be unattractive. The methodological commitment to understanding human values within the changing limits of the possible is a great contribution of the civic humanist tradition, but this tradition has failed to supply us with defensible substantive values—or indeed even with critical standards for making substantive choices—within the limits of what is possible.

NOTES

1. For my own account see Shapiro and Kane 1983, 5–39.
2. See also Pocock 1981a, 57; 1981b, 354; 1985, 60ff.
3. On pragmatism, see Kloppenberg 1986 and Kaufman-Osborn 1984, 1142–65; 1985, 827–49. On America's socialist past, see Weinstein 1984.
4. See Sandel, whose "communitarian" and "republican" become interchangeable terms (1984a, 81–96; 1984b, 1–11); Bellah (1985, 75–80ff), Michelman (1986, 4–77), and Lasch (1990). See also the special issue of the *Yale Law Journal* on the Republican Civic Tradition, vol. 97, no. 8 (July 1988), especially the contributions by Michelman, Sunstein, Abrams, Brest, Powell, and Sullivan.
5. I argue (Shapiro 1986, 151–305) that none of the claims concerning agnosticism or neutrality about conflicting conceptions of the good advanced by the neo-Kantians can be sustained. Protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, every such argument privileges some conceptions of the good, and disprivileges others.
6. By comparison, Guicciardini argued that if the Romans had employed mercenaries and "had to live 'as unarmed cities do,' by means of wit rather than arms, their form of government would have ruined them" quickly (Pocock 1975a; 240).
7. Translated in *ibid.*, 252.
8. See *ibid.*, 202.
9. See *ibid.*, 335–6.
10. For a full account, see Pocock 1957, chs. 2–3.
11. See Pocock 1975a, 366, 375–6, 381–3.

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12. For Macpherson's account of his possessive market model, see Macpherson 1962, 53–61; for his analysis of Harrington by reference to it, see ibid., 160–93.
13. The Court thesis located sovereignty in parliament, not the people; it rested on a version of history in which there were pragmatic adjustments rather than fundamental principles; and it was traumatically influenced by the new "monied interest" in ways that did not concern Americans in the 1780s (Pocock 1975a, 525).
14. See *ibid.*, 533–4.
15. Pocock's view of the relation between liberal and republican ideas is complex, and he has modified it over time. But he continues to discuss them as constituting analytically distinct paradigms, not translatable or reducible to one another. Pocock now acknowledges that liberalism's "law-centered paradigm" is "the principal theme of the history of early modern political thought," and concedes that there was a period in the eighteenth century when republican and liberal outlooks were fused by the legal humanists (Pocock 1981b, 361, 366–7). Yet even when he identifies his enterprise as "trying to get . . . [the liberal] paradigm into perspective," he continues to maintain that "readers of Kuhn will know that a covert attack on the paradigm may be entailed" (Pocock 1985, 61).
16. See Pocock 1985, 104ff.
17. Arendt's influence on the architecture of Pocock's civic republican model becomes explicit at Pocock 1975a, 550.
18. If we think about the term *republican* more generally than Pocock, the problem of characterization (let alone definition) becomes even more serious. In the history of ideas we can distinguish Plato's conception in *The Republic* from Machiavelli's neo-Aristotelian formulations, and from the republicanism of the French revolutionaries of 1789 and the English Chartists of the 1840s, and fail to discern obvious common characteristics. At times it is a generic term, almost co-synonymous with "regime," so that even a monarchy can be a kind of republic (as indeed it was in the thought of some of Pocock's [1975a, 401–22] English neo-Harringtonian Machiavellians), yet at others it exhibits an explicitly antimonarchical connotation—as it did in France in 1789, 1830 and 1848, and as has always been implied in its American usages (though here an anticolonial element enters as well). The many social formations that have historically been labeled *republican* are comparably diverse: The Greek city-states were republics (though they differed greatly in internal structure and organization); there was republican Rome, the English republic during the seventeenth century, and the various short-lived European republics of the nineteenth. The geography of the contemporary world tells a story of perhaps unparalleled diversity subsumed under the term. The United States is a republic, but we also have the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the People's Republic of China, the Fifth Republic in France, the Republic of the Philippines, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Republic of South Africa, to name but a few. Of the 170 countries

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listed in *The Countries of the World and Their Leaders,* 1987 (Washington, D.C.: Gale Research, 1987), 150–62, 113 contain the term *republic* or one of its cognates in their formal names.

19. Even Nozick's libertarian view rests on conceptions of both human and public goods, as I have noted elsewhere (Shapiro 1986, 165–78, 289–92).
20. For useful discussions of liberalism that establish this case, see Galston 1983, 621–9, Smith 1985, and Kloppenberg 1987.
21. For a recent statement of his view, see Pocock 1985, 37–50. In this and the next several paragraphs I draw on arguments in Shapiro 1989, 62–5.
22. On liberal treatments of virtue and the good, see Galston 1983, 621–9, Smith 1985, 13–59, and Kloppenberg 1987. On "liberal" assumptions in the English and Scottish republican traditions see Isaac 1988 and Burtt 1986, and for a critical assessment of republicanism as an alternative paradigm in America, see Greenstone 1986, 1–49.
23. See Winch 1980. For a good critical analysis, see Harpham 1984, 764–74.
24. Thus although Grant (1985, 15) does not argue that Locke was a civic humanist and is not herself a Pocockian, she does argue that Locke's political doctrine "is perfectly compatible with community in many forms and with strong communal institutions."
25. For an illustration of his ringing denunciations of "the paradigm of liberalism," see Pocock 1985, 59–62ff.
26. For a more general elaboration of why this is so, see Shapiro 1989. In this connection note that Riesenberg (1969, 237–54) criticized an earlier version of the civic humanist alternative paradigm view, as formulated by Baron (1966), by arguing that citizenship in the Italian republics was mainly defined in jurisprudential terms, not those arising from the humanist vocabulary of *vita activa* and *vivere civile*, so that law, right, and obligation were central to the classical republican view of citizenship. Although Pocock (1975a, 83; 1981, 355) has acknowledged the existence of this critique, he has never responded to it.
27. "The republic or *politeia* solved the problem of authority and liberty by making *quisque* [everyone] participant in the authority by which he was ruled; this entailed relations of equality which made in fact extremely stern demands upon him, but by premising that he was *kata phusin* formed to participate in such a citizenship it could be said that it was his 'nature,' 'essence,' or 'virtue' to do so. But [sic] nature may be developed, but cannot be distributed; you cannot distribute a *telos*, only the means to it; virtue cannot therefore be reduced to matter of right" (Pocock 1981b, 358, 359).
28. *Essential contestability* is the term first popularized by Bernard Gallie 1955, 167–98.
29. I defend a more general version of this claim in Shapiro 1989, 51–76.
30. Three of which have been distinguished in a most useful paper by Burtt (1986).

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31. Even the neo-Kantian political theories of John Rawls and his followers, which express explicit agnosticism about intersubjective purposes, implicitly make these assumptions, as I have argued elsewhere (Shapiro 1986, 169, 214–8, 260–2, 285–7).
32. This linking of communitarianism to republicanism is implicit in the argument of Sandel (1982), and later becomes explicit (Sandel 1984a, 91–3 and 1984b, 7ff). For additional references, see note 4 above.
33. For additional textual evidence see Harrington 1977, 1972, 232, 292–3.
34. For further discussion of the labor theories of Petty, Hobbes and Locke, see Shapiro 1986, 35–8, 92–6, 303. For more general discussion see Coleman 1956, 280–95, Wiles 1968, 113–26 and Appleby 1978, 129–57.
35. See Harrington 1977, 202. See also 292, 188–9, 239, and 292–4.
36. For further discussion of the sources on which I draw here, and of additional sources, see Appleby 1978, 132–4, 171, 181, and 211.
37. On Locke's labor theory of value, see Locke 1963, 330, 331, 337, 338, 341. On his theory of productivity, see *ibid.*, 336. For extended discussion of these issues, see Shapiro 1986, 89–100, 122–48.
38. For further discussion, see Goodale 1980, 257ff, on whom I draw here.
39. In this and subsequent quotations from *Cato's Letters*, the English has been modernized.
40. Thus:

> [a] merchant, or tradesman, is said to be in good credit, when his visible gains appear to be greater than his expenses; when he is industrious, and takes care of his affairs; when he makes punctual payments, and the wares which he sells may be depended upon as to their goodness and value; and when those who deal with him can have a reasonable assurance that he will make a profit by his care from the commodities that they entrust him with. . . . But if a merchant be observed to live in riot and profusion, to leave his estate to the direction of servants, who cheat him, or neglect his business . . . no fair dealer will have anything to do with them. (Trenchard 1969, vol. II, 13–14.)

41. *The Democratic Fact Book 1984* (Washington, D.C., 1984), 446.
42. See, for examples, *The Democratic Fact Book 1984*, 423–41, and *The Democratic Fact Book 1986: Democrats for the 1980s* (Washington, D.C., 1986), 98–115.
43. Bailyn (1967) and Wood (1969) de-emphasized capitalism by omission more than by argument, largely as a by-product of their preoccupation with the internal structure of revolutionary republican ideology. Pocock (1975a, 462–552), Banning (1974, 168–77; 1978; and 1986, 3–18), McCoy (1974, 633–46; 1980) and others went further, pointing to tensions between republicanism and commercial capitalism and emphasizing, in varying degrees, the pastoral and explicitly antimodern model of agrarian self-sufficiency that infused much eighteenth-century republican argument. This interpretation has in turn been subject to trenchant criticism from Appleby (1982a, 833–49; 1982b,

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287–309; 1984a; and 1986, 20–34), who has emphasized the commercial aspirations and success of American agrarian capitalism and the emergence of a new vision from it that was "both democratic and capitalistic, agrarian and commercial" (Appleby 1982a, 844). This debate is further complicated by geographical considerations, with Shalhope (1976, 532–3) and Foshee (1985, 523–50), among others, arguing that the South retained an antimodern agrarian and pastoral republicanism even into the twentieth century, but that in the North republican ideals were being reconceptualized in ways compatible with commercial capitalism by Jefferson's time. Others, like Marmor (1967, 377–406), have argued that the story of Southern anti-industrialism and anti-commercialism is more ambiguous, and Appleby (1982a, 833–49; 1984a; 1984b, 275–83; 1986, 20–33) continues, in the main persuasively, to resist it entirely. For criticism of her view see Ashworth (1984, 425–35) and Winch (1985, 287–97).

44. It would be illuminating in this regard to reconstruct the argument of a text like *Democracy in America,* to see where it would lead in the absence of Tocqueville's benign assumptions about private property.
45. See Pocock 1975a, 375, 386–8, 390, 408, 440–1.
46. Even in such strongholds of old world sentiment as the antebellum South Carolina depicted by Wier (1969, 473–501) and Greenberg (1977, 723–43) and among the genteel aristocratic "Brahmins" of early Gilded Age Massachusetts described by Thomson (1982, 163–86), republican commitments were identified with politically antimodern and anti-democratic instincts that were often aristocratic in tone, but these instincts were not translated into hostility toward capitalism as a socioeconomic system.
47. We are beginning to see a body of scholarship on this subject by historians of political economy, although most of it is focused on the nineteenth century. See, for example, Sabel and Zeitlin 1985, 133–76.
48. Earlier he says more fully: "all Augustan analysts of political economy accept the interdependence of land, trade and credit; and furthermore . . . all agree that land is an important foundation of virtue, stockjobbing a pernicious means to corruption, and money and trade vital components of national wealth and power. The apologists for land make much of the importance of trade, and claim that stockjobbing is ruinous to the value of both; the apologists for war and credit stress that trade is necessary to the value of land, and deny that stockjobbing alters this relationship; and there are, on the face of it, no apologists for stockjobbing at all" (Pocock 1975b, 75).
49. See "The Americanization of Virtue," above.
50. See Pocock 1975a, 53–4, 75, 76–8, 84, 112–3, 136, 208–9, 333, 395–6.
51. MacIntyre's view is that republican theory could only be brought to deal with the moral dimensions of external relations through the addition of an independent theological component. See MacIntyre 1988, 121, 146–7ff.
52. On Machiavelli's account see the section on his thought above.

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53. Why this is so is taken up at length in chapters eight and nine of Shapiro 1990.
54. See Ketcham 1984, 69–85, 167–87.
55. This is usefully described by Wood 1969, 471–615.
56. See Wood 1969, 606–7, 393–564, and Ketcham 1984, 167–87 on the debate.
57. As Wood usefully puts it:

> The sacrifice of individual interests to the greater good of the whole formed the essence of republicanism and comprehended for Americans the idealistic goal of their revolution. From this goal flowed all of the Americans' exhortatory literature and all that made their ideology truly revolutionary. This ideology both presumed and helped shape the Americans' conception of the way their society and politics should be structured and operated—a vision so divorced from the realities of American society, so contrary to the previous century of American experience, that it alone was enough to make the Revolution one of the great utopian movements of American history. By 1776 the Revolution came to represent a final attempt, perhaps—given the nature of American society—even a desperate attempt, by many Americans to realize the traditional Commonwealth ideal of a corporate society, in which the common good would be the only objective of government. (Wood 1969, 53–4. See also 57–8, 59–65, and 606–15.)

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CORRESPONDENCE

"From Aristotle to Marx"

TO THE EDITOR:

In his essay "From Aristotle to Marx" (CRITICAL REVIEW 4, nos. 1-2 [Winter-Spring 1990]), Chris Sciabarra claims that those libertarian natural-rights theorists who trace their pedigree to Aristotle have Marx as a distant cousin. Although there are many aspects of Sciabarra's paper that deserve discussion, I wish to focus on only two.

First, Sciabarra states that "claiming Aristotle as their intellectual forebear, natural rights theorists [Rand and I are mentioned in a footnote] argue that man's nature is fulfilled by recognizing those 'rights' which enable him to freely realize his essence' " (68). As I understand it, however, the proposed Aristotelian pedigree of some natural rights theorists does not pertain so much to natural rights as to the foundations of those rights within a sensible ethical framework. Certainly neither Rand nor others who consider her position sound believe that "man's nature is fulfilled by recognizing . . . 'rights.' " Indeed, it is mostly Marxists who claim that this is the bourgeois philosophy. The bourgeois promise is more limited: politics never by itself fulfills human nature. But the fulfillment of human nature does necessitate that certain political conditions be secured: those protecting individual rights to life, liberty and property.

Second, although Marx does have a certain affinity with Aristotle, insofar as they are both naturalists (or essentialists), there is a crucial difference. For Aristotle human nature involves an essential individual component,[1] while for Marx "the human essence is the true collectivity of man."[2] In other words, for Aristotle the concrete actuality is the individual human being, whereas for Marx the universal "man" is concrete. (Marx is more of a Platonist in this respect.) Sciabarra focuses on similarities that have scholarly value but neglects this crucial substantial and thus moral and political difference.[3]

Sciabarra is right, of course, to argue that essentialism and naturalism are given up, quite mistakenly, by Hayek, Popper and others who are too eager to avoid the Platonist/Hegelian aspect and implications of a collectivist naturalism.

Tibor R. Machan
Department of Philosophy
Auburn University
Auburn, AL 36849

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NOTES

1. Emerson Buchanan, *Aristotle's Theory of Being* (Cambridge, Mass.: Greek, Roman and Byzantine Monographs, 1962), 2ff.
2. David McLellan, ed., *Karl Marx: Selected Writings* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 126.
3. I discuss some of this in more detail in my "The Pitfalls of Humanism," in T. R. Machan, *Liberty and Culture: Essays on the Idea of a Free Society* (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1989). See also my contribution to a recent symposium on libertarianism and humanism in *Free Inquiry* magazine. For the way in which libertarian natural rights theory does gain support from elements of Aristotelianism, see my *Individuals and their Rights* (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989). In the end what is relevant, of course, is whether libertarianism is sound; I happen to think that it is because it rests on a basically sound Aristotelian foundation.

CHRIS SCIABARRA *replies:*

Tibor Machan criticizes my paper on two counts, one of which necessitates a brief discussion of the Aristotelian-Randian natural rights position, while another requires that I explore Marx's concept of human essence.

In previous articles,[1] I have expressed the conviction that there are two fundamentally opposed versions of libertarianism that are based upon different modes of inquiry. The first version is dualistic and one-dimensional. It abstracts the political sphere from the philosophical totality and sees natural rights as the sole basis for individual fulfillment. One representative of this school of thought is Murray Rothbard. The second version is dialectical; it views political freedom as part of a larger totality. Both F. A. Hayek and Ayn Rand are proponents of this position, even though there are substantial differences between them.

My paper alluded to the dualist-dialectical distinction in a footnote which placed Tibor Machan squarely within the Randian tradition. As Machan suggests, this tradition anchors natural rights in an appropriate ethical framework. In Rand's philosophy, there is no such thing as ethical "neutrality" since the fulfillment of "man's" rational nature necessitates a condition in which politics is both a product of and a context for the achievement of essential moral, psychological, cultural and social values. Machan is correct: in the Randian vision, politics can never be separated from the larger totality which gives it meaning. This dialectical approach to libertarianism is far more radical in its implications than its dualistic counterpart, which offers freedom without foundations. In the dualistic perspective, rights are both necessary and sufficient for the individual's realization of his or her own essence.

Machan claims that there is a crucial difference between how that "essence" is defined within the works of Aristotle and Marx. It is true that the full context of Aristotle's metaphysics leads to a recognition of the concrete actuality of the individual human being. Marx's approach, however, is not as opposed to this

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Aristotelian ontology as Machan suggests. Marx's chief problem lies not in ontology, ethics, or politics, but in epistemology. Marx has an insufficient grasp of the actual nature and objective requirements of human cognition. Ultimately, Marx views human consciousness in historical terms and projects a form of communism which demands the achievement of human omniscience. This postulated epistemic transformation is at war with Marx's own dialectical method. In his historical teleology, Marx replaces the contextual emphasis of dialectics with an attempted synoptic grasp of the movement of history. Marx acts as if he has knowledge of the ultimate goals of human history. But such knowledge is impossible for any social theorist to achieve.

My interpretation of the Marxian project requires, at the very least, a brief discussion of the nature of Marx's metaphysics and social ontology, something which I only touched upon in my paper's review of Scott Meikle's *Essentialism in the Thought of Karl Marx*.

Marx's first metaphysical and epistemological premise is what he describes as the primacy of *conscious existence*. He rejects the notion that existence has a cause. For Marx, as for Rand, existence exists; it is what it is, and does not come into or go out of existence. To deny the axiomatic character of this proposition is to forfeit the epistemological validity of one's own denial, since one must exist in order to deny existence as such. For Marx, the belief in a "first cause" is, then, "a product of abstraction."[2]

Second, Marx views consciousness as an ontological category. Consciousness exists. It is awareness of material existence. It is "directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men."[3] Consciousness is not an abstraction; it is a capacity of specific, real, living individuals who act "within their given historical conditions and relationships."[4] These conditions constitute and are constituted by human activity.

Thus, Marx rejects the vulgar materialist notion of consciousness as a physiological derivative. But he equally rejects the idealist notion which abstracts consciousness from its material, historical, and social context. Ideas are not disembodied abstractions. They are generated and absorbed by individuals living in specific socio-historical conditions. Like Hayek, Marx conceives of the human mind as residing within a specific context that gives it meaning. In advocating the primacy of *conscious existence,* Marx attempts to preserve the internal relationship between objective reality and human consciousness.

Third, Marx views consciousness not merely as conscious existence but as conscious, material, *social* existence. The old "perceptual materialism," as Marx calls it, concentrated specifically on the objectivity of the material world, while denying the objectivity of the conscious mind. Marx attempts to transcend this one-dimensionality. He identifies man's "species-character" with the unique ability to engage in life-sustaining, "free, conscious activity."[5] Man's essential, distinctive characteristics are expressed in his productive labor; they come to fruition in a social and historical context.

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Labor is not purely instrumental or mechanical. It is "a process in which both man and nature participate, and in which man of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material reactions between himself and nature."[6] For Marx, there is no ultimate duality between nature and society. Man "is affirmed in the objective world" as he appropriates nature's substances to human requirements.[7] By acting on the external world, he transforms it and actualizes his own nature qua conscious and social animal.

Given these metaphysical and epistemological assumptions, Marx's approach to social science concentrates on "individuals producing in society—hence socially determined individual production."[8] Though this statement sounds "deterministic," Marx's social "determinism" is really social contextualism. Like Hayek, Marx does not abstract individuals from the context within which they live and produce. For Marx, the individual *is* a concrete actuality, a natural, sensuous, conscious being who lives under definite social and historical conditions. Thus, Marx places ontological priority on the "real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live."[9]

Since Marx's approach is highly contextual, it rarely grants trans-historical validity to any broad abstractions. For instance, Marx denies that "man" has natural rights. He is correct in assuming that individual rights cannot be taken out of context; the whole concept of rights is historically emergent. But he does not recognize that rights may be a requirement of man's survival—not abstract man, but man in a specific social context. Denying the validity of natural rights, Marx is more apt to reach non-liberal conclusions.

More problematic, however, is Marx's denial of any trans-historical invariants in human cognition. Though Marx sees the essence of human nature in free, conscious activity, he argues that man's nature is effectively distorted by the capitalist mode of production. Capitalism thrives on unintended consequences which rob man of his efficacy. According to Marx, only communism would provide men with the ability to actualize their true potential. In Marx's vision of communism, as Shlomo Avineri observes, epistemology "becomes the vehicle for shaping and moulding reality."[10]

But Marx's resolution depends upon the achievement of an epistemic miracle. It would require, as Hayek suggests, that "every action would have to be judged as a means of bringing about known effects."[11] In Marx's historical teleology, individuals in their collective association must achieve the impossible: the ability to produce the desired effects, while transcending the unintended consequences, of their actions. This presumes that people *are* capable of omniscience. Marx is gravely mistaken in his belief that the full conscious control of social existence is possible. Marx wants history to actualize a standard of efficacy that is wholly inapplicable to the human species.

Thus, Marx's vision of actualizing human essence is based on an epistemic absurdity. The "crucial substantial" difference between Marx and Aristotelian neo-liberalism is epistemological and it pertains to their differing assumptions of what constitutes human efficacy. The whole purpose of my paper was to abstract

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the radicalism of Marx's dialectical method from the epistemic utopianism that undercuts it. Meikle's book shows that dialectical method is an Aristotelian legacy. Following the lead of Hayek and Rand, neo-liberals must reclaim this legacy if they are to pave the way for a more radical mode of analysis.

NOTES

1. See for instance, "The Crisis of Libertarian Dualism," *Critical Review* 1, no. 4 (Fall 1987): 86-99, and my exchange with Tibor Machan in *Critical Review* 2, nos. 2-3 (Spring-Summer 1988): 227-9.
2. Karl Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (New York: International Publishers, 1964 [1844]), 145.
3. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The German Ideology* (New York: International Publishers, 1970 [1845-46]), 47.
4. *Ibid.*, 83.
5. Marx, 113.
6. Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy,* vol. 1: *The Process of Capitalist Production* (New York: International Publishers, 1967 [1867]), 177.
7. *Ibid.*, 140.
8. Karl Marx, *Grundrisse: Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy* (New York: Random House, 1973 [1857-58]), 83.
9. Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, 42.
10. Shlomo Avineri, *The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx* (Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1968), 68.
11. F. A. Hayek, *Law, Legislation, and Liberty,* vol. 2: *The Mirage of Social Justice* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976), 39.

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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